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

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THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS

ON THE

PRESENT POSITION OF EUROPE,

AND ITS PROBABLE

Consequences to the United States.

BY FRANCIS J. GRUND.

PHILADELPHIA:
CHILDS & PETERSON, PUBLISHERS,
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PREFACE.

THE following pages are not intended for the American student of history, but for the general reader. History is a branch of knowledge so extensive, that but few can find time to explore it; though an acquaintance with leading facts is indispensable even to a proper understanding of the present situation. Events have, of late, followed each other in such rapid succession, that it may truly be said, history was made faster than it could be written. The Press—seldom impartial and independent in its views—in chronicling these events, colors them for its own purpose; so that the thousands who, for political information, are almost entirely dependent on newspapers, are as often perplexed as instructed by their contents. In addition to this, our people, divided into sections and parties, are disposed to receive garbled statements, and to treasure up opinions and conclusions corresponding with their own predilections. Where such a disposition exists writers are always ready to cater for the public taste; preferring success which, to a certain extent at least, insures reputation, to the more arduous task of establishing historical truth. No such attempt is made in this brief sketch of events which preceded and, as we believe, are likely to follow the present European crisis. The desire to place before the reader the facts from which he himself may judge, together with the reasons which led to the author's own conclusions, is all that induced its publication.

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One remark only must be made in advance, to prevent misapprehensions. If it shall appear in the following pages that the present Monarch of France has really surpassed the expectations of his contemporaries—if it shall be found that he has given France a controlling influence on the destinies of Europe—that he has undertaken the regeneration, perhaps the political re-division of that continent, and that, to accomplish this, he has already conducted two great wars to a successful issue, the conclusion is inevitable that he has wielded power to some purpose; and we may, without justifying the means by which he obtained it, but starting from it as an accomplished fact, do justice to his commanding talents, the wonderful productiveness of his genius, and the perseverance and energy which mark his present career. We must judge of the emperor's motives from the French stand-point, not from our own; and of his plans, as they affect France. Any other process of reasoning would necessarily lead to wrong conclusions as to the future, and rather serve to mystify, than to explain, the present political situation.

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THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS, ETC.

CHAPTER I.

THE PRESENT CRISIS, AND THE THINGS WHICH LED TO IT.

The present European crisis is miscalled an Italian or a French crisis. A question which affects twenty-five millions of Italians, thirty-six millions of Frenchmen, to say nothing of the Austrian conglomeration with its thirty-eight or, as some claim, forty millions of souls, is necessarily an European one; and as the condition of Europe influences our own relations, it must be considered as a world-crisis which, in all probability, will introduce a new historical period. Neither is it artfully prepared and evoked by the Emperor Napoleon alone. Great historical events are seldom, if ever, the result of the efforts of a single man, however gifted. Single men can only give birth to that which is struggling for existence; they act as executors of the laws which govern the rise and progress of nations. Centuries were required for the advent of Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon I. These men were political necessities of the periods in which they flourished, and succeeded in proportion as they comprehended and acted in the spirit of their times. The propagation of Christianity itself was prepared by the degeneration into externals of the Mosaic faith, by the sectarian spirit of its followers, and by the moral and political decline of Rome, the then mistress of the world, toward which Christianity itself afterwards powerfully contributed.

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Had Christianity (principally through St. Paul) not reached Rome, and had Rome not then been mistress of the world, ourselves might at this time, not be Christians.

The present Emperor Napoleon—in common with all men and especially with all rulers—may have selfish instincts, and be guided by projects of aggrandizement; but it cannot be denied that he has succeeded in rendering the leading ideas of the age tributary to his views, and that he was right when, with true historic instinct, he charged the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria with "not comprehending his epoch." That the Emperor of the French understands his own people, is proved by the fact that he s their ruler: that the second French Republic had no mission to fulfil, is demonstrated by the fact that it perished. The Revolution of 1848, in France, was the *mise en scene* of an old play without a single great actor—the abortive attempt to harmonize the abstract ideas of political ethics with the actual condition of men resulting from the progress of ages. There was no organizing spirit in the French National Assembly, no practical man who distinguished between ideal justice and that absolute political *right* which derives its final sanction from the possession of the adequate power to enforce its decrees. The Second Republic was still-born; it died, like the Constitutional Monarchy of July, from too great anxiety to keep at peace with all its enemies. Its panegyrists called it "the honest Republic" (*la Republique honette*); but this nursery epithet in French politics did not prolong its existence. It lacked character, energy, decision. There were but two men of action in it:—Cavaignac and his rival for supreme power, clothed with the prestige of the name of *Napoleon*.

We are not disposed to approve of the steps by which the Emperor Louis Napoleon arrived at supreme power, or to justify the means by which he executed his designs. This much, however, we venture to assert in his favor—that he aimed at supreme power not merely for the possession of it, and that he employed that power with great skill and judgment for the advancement of France. His movements against the party he destroyed were not dictated by a spirit of resentment; and, though his proceedings were summary

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and terrific, he employed, perhaps, no more coercive means than were actually required to attain his object. As to the republic, all European statesmen are now agreed that it was doomed without him; and if a restoration must follow, was a return to the Empire more criminal than the return to the younger or elder branch of the Bourbons? With much apparent truth say the old legitimists of Louis Philippe that he knocked the crown from the lawful head that wore it, to put it on his own; while Louis Napoleon found it in the streets, abandoned by the royal race, the chance reward of any bold adventurer that had the courage and good fortune to seize it.

We, in this country, find it difficult to reconcile the conduct of Louis Napoleon with our ideas of political justice. We have a right to the severity of our judgment; but have other potentates acted with greater deference for the opinion of those subject to their rule? Let those among them that are pure cast the first stone at him! And was there no attempt made by the Kings of England, from the Plantagenets and Stuarts down to George III. of the House of Brunswick, to subvert the liberties wrung from them by the people? And were these attempts made from any other motive than that of personal ambition? He that stretches out his hand for the crown of France, covets a very uncertain possession; for Monarchies there are scarcely more stable than Republics. The crown, in France, is the reward of each day's exertion; he who wears it must rise earlier and go to bed later than the people; wo to him if he once oversleeps himself! As to dynasties in a country which has abolished all substantial hereditary distinctions and privileges, they have become mere myths.*

* The dukes and princes created by the First and Third Napoleons only serve as illustrations of the military history of France. In common with the streets and public places in Paris named after battles, they remind you of great events; but neither their offsprings, nor the people living in those streets, are objects of particular veneration. The essence of nobility consists in hereditary fortunes, secured by entailed estates. The even distribution of the nobleman's fortune among his children soon reduces them to the common standard of citizenship, and makes nobility, as is the case in most countries on the Continent of Europe, an incumbrance rather than an advantage to him who enjoys the *distinction*

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Where no other standard of excellence prevails but that of personal merit, it would be absurd to talk of loyalty in the sense of a British subject. Loyalty is the result of tradition and education, not of thought; as obedience, with the people of Europe, is from habit rather than reflection or an abstract regard for the law. The French, since their great social revolution of 1789, yield to nothing but power, wielded by the man who, to use one of their own idioms, "has come up," (*l'homme qui est arrivé*,) and who, by his very presence, furnishes the best proof of his superiority. Submission to him, means hopelessness of resistance. With all this, the French, especially the middle classes (the *Bourgeoisie*), *like* to be governed. They think they have a right to demand a government in return for being taxed; but the government they desire must be visible—it must display power. The whole French nation is carried away by power; and their facility for military organization sufficiently determines the nature of the one to which they most readily submit. France has no more national institution than the army, which is constantly recruited from the whole people; he, therefore, who has the suffrages of the army, may be certain to have ultimately the suffrages of France. An exception to this rule may exist in Paris, the seat of nine-tenths of the intelligence of France; but even there the superior attainments of the officers in certain branches of the service connect them with the Academy and the men of letters.

The French army, besides being national, is democratic in its essence, and so is the French nation. The men of 1793 did their work so completely as not only practically to exterminate the aristocracy, but the very idea of it in the minds of the people.

without a difference. The titles of nobility conferred on the victorious generals of the French army merely serve to commemorate their deeds, and to stimulate emulation. They partake of the nature of orders and decorations with which it is usual to connect some pension for life. The times when principalities and kingdoms were distributed among the victorious generals of France are not likely to return; but it is certainly better to make princes and dukes out of great generals, than generals out of great princes and dukes, as the French marshals have repeatedly demonstrated to the incredulous Austrians.

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The word "*Seigneur*" (Lord), except as applied to the Deity, or synonymous with proprietor, disappeared even from the Dictionary.* The terms "*grand-monde*" and "*demi-monde*" rather refer to position and wealth, than to any inherent or hereditary quality of men or women. An army recruited from such a people, not by enlistment but by conscription, from which none but the aged and infirm are exempt, with no other rule of advancement but knowledge, length of service, or individual merit, is an armed propaganda; and such all French armies have proved themselves since the First Revolution. In whatever cause French troops were engaged, their organization and discipline always furnished a democratic example to their adversaries, more powerful and lasting in its consequences than all the reasoning of philosophers and statesmen. It is the French armies which have carried the germ of modern political institutions into Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, and latterly also into Russia. Their commanders, risen from the ranks, defeated the men of historical renown and illustrious descent; while the men, prompted by their social instincts, readily fraternized with the people. The sociable nature of the French made friends for them wherever they went; their organization—the type of modern French society—did the rest.

That the French democratic army should cherish the remembrance of the first emperor, is natural; that they should transfer their affection to his nephew, proves that they thought him capable and disposed to do great things. The sentiment of loyalty had nothing to do with it; though a certain spite against the National Guards, the embodiment of the *bourgeoisie* under Louis Philippe, was manifested by the troops of the line on more than one occasion previous to the formation of the Second Republic. The army under the Citizen King—the officers called him the King of the Shopkeepers (*roi des Boutiquiers*)—was occupied in Africa; but it had no chance of signal distinction, and its rewards were scanty

* The *Petit Dictionnaire de l'Academie Française*, adopted by the Council of Public Instruction in France, page 612, defines *Seigneur* as follows:—"Master, proprietor of a country, of a state, or of land." And then in brackets, as obsolete, ["a title formerly bestowed on certain persons of distinction."]

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by the side of the splendid retribution of industry. The Republic which followed did not improve its condition; while it proposed to protect and, in a measure at least, to support the laboring classes at the expense of the State. This last step, which was construed into a war upon property, left to the Republic no other supporters but the operatives of the large towns. The peasantry, the large and small proprietors, the clergy with whom the Republic was never on very good terms, and the army were ready for a change of government. There might have been a diversity of opinion in Paris; but the great mass of population throughout France was undoubtedly in favor of the Empire, and proved it subsequently by its votes.

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CHAPTER II.

THE REVOLUTIONS IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, AND THE CAUSES WHICH PRODUCED THEM.

The revolution of 1848 took a different direction in Germany. There, the leading idea which pervaded all minds and all classes of society was union—the reëstablishment of a German Empire. It was only after the total failure to realize this national conception that a small party in Germany declared for a Republic. Germany had never been revolutionized after the French fashion of 1793; the different classes of society had not yet assumed towards each other that deadly hostility which existed in France previous to the year 1789, and the fourth estate—that of the laboring classes—was not yet ready to combine against the *Bourgeoisie*. The relation between master-workmen and journeymen partook, as it still does, of a patriarchical character. The journeymen boarded for the most part with the master's family, and marriages between journeymen and master's daughters and widows, were among the most ordinary occurrences. Neither had the progress of manufactures, except in a few provinces, such as Silesia, Saxony and Westphalia, created that houseless and homeless class of society called "operatives." The nobility, with few individual exceptions, had become impoverished by successive wars, the property of the clergy had been confiscated or swept away during the wars of the Reformation; while the smaller princes themselves, shorn of all substantial power and influence, had scarcely an inducement to govern otherwise than economically to save their own and their children's patrimony. Some of them, as far as their scanty means permitted, became patrons of the arts and sciences; most of them guarded, at least externally, the rules of propriety in private life. No striking antagonism existed anywhere, and consequently no conspiracy to threaten the immediate subversion

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of the government. With great justice could Henry Heine, the German Aristophanes, say of his country:

> "Where Oaks and Linden trees abound,
> No Roman Brutus will be found.
> And if a Brutus rose to-day,
> No Cæsar he would find to slay."*

The leading idea of Germany, in 1848, was Union, and union is still the leading idea of the Germans. Under what form of government that union is to be accomplished was then, and is still, an open question. Should the thought ever be realized, it will probably be in the form of a confederacy, under one central head, be he President, King or Emperor. Considering the conservative instincts of all the Teutonic races, the strength and endurance of their personal attachments, the magnitude and variety of interests seeking protection, and the habit of obedience contracted by the people through the progress of ages, the form first adopted will, in all probability, be that of Constitutional Monarchy. For this form of government the Germans are undoubtedly prepared, and it is that which, if we believe their historians and eminent public writers,† could hardly fail to insure to them the greatest amount of individual freedom consistent with safety from foreign intrusion. The establishment, in Germany, of a confederate Republic, would probably lead to an immediate conflict with her powerful neighbors, and it would perpetuate the preponderance of the larger states over the smaller ones which, thus far, has been the principal source of all the political misfortunes which have befallen that unhappy country. The Constitutional party in Germany is, at this moment, far more numerous than the Republican; because the transition from the present state to a federal monarchy seems to be connected with fewer dangers and difficulties, than that to a confede-

* "*Im Land der Eichen und der Linden,*
Wird niemals sich ein Brutus finden.
Und wenn auch ein Brutus unter uns wär,
Den Cæsar fänd er nimmermehr."

† Schlosser and Gervinus.

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rate republic. Germany, it must be remembered, is a country burdened with two thousand years' history, already densely populated, with no other outlet but emigration, and requiring for its defence, at all times, a large standing army. The practical question is not what form of government is the most rational, the most just to all; but simply what sort of government has Germany the power, at this time, to establish and to maintain?

The revolutions which, in 1848, took place in Vienna, Berlin, Dresden, Cassel, Darmstadt, &c., after a sharp conflict with the military, ended all in the establishment or enlargement of representative forms of government. In none of the States was the person of the sovereign exposed to indignities or driven from the throne; and this in spite of the example of the flight of Louis Philippe and the establishment of the French Republic. But without any previous concert, the people of all the States, in addition to their local representative forms of governments, called for a National Parliament in which the people, not the princes, were to be represented, and elections were accordingly held for that purpose. The Parliament met at Frankfort-on-the-Main, the place where the former Emperors of Germany were crowned, and where the Diet, composed exclusively of representatives of the ruling princes, was wont to hold its sessions. The members of this latter Diet voluntarily surrendered their power into the hands of the Representatives of the People, and a new order of things seemed to be at once peaceably inaugurated.

To understand what followed, it is necessary to cast a glance at the history of Germany, since the peace of Westphalia (1648), and to allude briefly to the condition in which the country was left by the Congress of Vienna (1815.) Previous to that period, Germany was an elective Empire, with HEREDITARY PRINCELY ELECTORS; a circumstance which sufficiently accounts for the little power ever exercised by the Emperors thus elected by their merely nominal vassals. The peace of Westphalia, which followed the long religious war of the Reformation, destroyed even this shadow of sovereignty, by conceding to some three hundred princes and nobles of the empire the right of making treaties among themselves and with foreign

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Powers. France and Sweden guarantied the conditions of this treaty; the former receiving Alsace, the latter a part of Pomerania, Bremen, Verden and Wismar, for this pernicious service. Nothing was secured to the people except the right of worship of the different confessions, in return for which the central power of Germany was hopelessly weakened, its influence on the councils of Europe proportionally diminished, and its western frontier exposed to military incursions from France. From that day, Germany became the battle-field of Europe—the peace of Westphalia, the basis of all European treaties until the time of the French Revolution.

The immediate consequences of this new arrangement was the attempt, on the part of the greater and more influential German States, to establish themselves as independent European Powers, by the creation of courts, the appointment of ministers and other diplomatic agents to foreign countries, and the assertion, as far as circumstances permitted, of sovereign rights. The two German States which took the lead in this felonious process against their common country, were Prussia and Bavaria; the former leaning toward an alliance with Russia, the latter generally fighting on the side of France. The death of Charles VI., which terminated the male line of the House of Habsburg, finally opened to the genius of Frederic the Great, the road to the hereditary possessions of the German Emperors, while it favored the pretensions of the Elector of Bavaria to the German crown. The wars which followed were civil wars, which wasted the substance of Germany while they brought French and Russian armies into the country, and destroyed the last remnant of central power. By the cession of the Austrian Principalities of Silesia and Glatz to Prussia, the latter became an European Military Kingdom; the husband of Maria Therese, Francis Stephen, of the House of Lorraine, received nothing but the shadow of the German throne. Prussia, since the peace of Westphalia the head and front of the Protestant States of Germany, became now the declared rival of Austria; the other German States embracing the cause of one or the other as their limited views and scopeless statesmanship seemed to suggest.

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The war between England and France (1755) for the possession of their North American Colonies, led to a fresh rupture between Austria and Prussia; the former having, through Madame Pompadour, succeeded in establishing an alliance with France, and Frederic the Great having, on the 16th January, 1756, entered into a treaty with George II., by which the two monarchs guarantied to each other their respective possessions, and bound themselves to prevent France from marching troops into Germany. The Seven Years' war which followed, by engaging France in Europe, facilitated the British conquest of Canada, and insured the success of British arms in India; but it led to so complete a prostration of Austria and Prussia, that in the peace of Hubertusburg (1763) both parties were obliged to recognize each other's possessions as they were before the commencement of the war. The war, though conducted on a scale much inferior to the present rate of destruction, had nevertheless consumed a million of men. Prussia alone lost, in twenty-six battles, some 200 generals and superior officers, 140,000 men in killed and wounded, and 350 cannon. The losses of Austria were even greater, and her finances have ever since been in a shattered condition. These, then, were the consequences of disunion:—a ruined and divided country, with a northern and a southern power struggling for predominance. What a lesson this to France, who has profited by it, and we may add, to the United States!—

The first French Revolution found Germany under the government of three hundred masters, who themselves depended for protection either on Austria or Prussia, or on their alliances with foreign Powers. For a time the common danger effected a union among them; but in the war that ensued, Prussia, conceiving the integrity of her provinces threatened by Austria, signed a separate treaty of peace with France (Basel, 5th April, 1795) which ceded the left bank of the Rhine to the French Republic. Austria, thus left to herself, was afterwards compelled to conclude the peace of Campo-formio (1797), and revenged herself on Prussia by not only confirming, in the secret articles of that treaty, the cession of the left bank of the Rhine with the fortress of Mentz, to France, but

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also obtaining stipulations from that Power against the future expansion of Prussia. Napoleon I., in 1803, seems to have carried out these secret stipulations by seizing on Hanover, which the Prussians had occupied in 1801, in return for which Prussia refused to enter the coalition of 1805, between England, Austria, Sweden and Russia, and demanded, in 1806, that France should give up Hanover and annex it to Prussia. The consequences of this new division were that Austria was separately beaten at Austerlitz, and Prussia at Jena, while Hanover was divided, and a part of it incorporated into the newly formed kingdom of Westphalia. Hanover has since, by the Congress of Vienna, been erected into an independent kingdom; but the mutual hatred between Prussia and Hanover, arising from these transactions, has continued and has had much to do with the conduct of the REGENT OF PRUSSIA during the war which has just terminated for an uncertain period.

The example of Prussia was quickly followed by other German States. Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden and Saxony united with the elder Napoleon in his wars against Austria, and received provinces and titles in reward for their German defection. In this manner, Germany received four new kingdoms out of the spoils of her unfortunate wars; while her territorial limits disappeared, even as a geographical division, from the map of Europe. The greatest German historian, marks this "period of lowest degration" by stating that ministers of the smaller powers of Germany might be seen in Paris courting the mistresses of French Generals, in order, through their influence, to obtain for their masters the privilege of robbing their German subjects and neighbors. Then followed the establishment of the confederation of the Rhine, of which the Emperor Napoleon was the Protector, and, as a necessary consequence of it, the abdication of Francis II. (6th August, 1806) as Emperor of Germany, and his assumption of the imperial crown of Austria, as Francis I.

Once more (in 1809) Austria made an effort to regain her lost position; nearly all the States of Germany assisted the Emperor Napoleon in putting her down again. When the great French army was destroyed in Russia, it was not the German Cabinets,

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but the People, who raised the national standard. To what extent the German princes had forgotten their duty toward their country, was exhibited in the long hesitation of Austria to join the coalition,* in the reluctant movements of the kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, who deserted Napoleon only after the fortunes of war had decided against him, and in the conduct of the King of Saxony, who remained his faithful ally to the last. The invasion of France led to the peace of Paris (1814) and to the Congress of Vienna. At that Congress nothing was done for the substantial union of Germany; while both Austria and Prussia tried to establish themselves as great European Powers; the former by extending her possessions and influence in Italy, the latter by adding to her possessions and influence in Germany. The mutual jealousy of Austria and Prussia was as much manifested during the Congress as it had been during the previous wars. Austria had a faithful coadjutor in England; Prussia leaned toward Russia. It was by this unfortunate dualism which destroyed the influence of Germany, that Talleyrand, the representative of France, succeeded in establishing the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and securing its crown to a Spanish Bourbon. The reëstablishment of the kingdom of Poland, though advocated by Russia, was abandoned, and in its stead the Duchy of Warsaw only erected into a kingdom of that name, with a separate constitution, under Russian supremacy. Cracovia, as an independent Republic, was placed *under the protection of the high contracting Powers.* Prussia, which claimed the whole of Saxony, was defeated in that demand and received, in its stead, about a third of the territory of that kingdom and the Provinces of the Rhine, with a part of Westphalia. The Palatinate was given to Bavaria; Luxemburg, a German province, was given to *Holland*, Slesvigh-Holstein remained with *Denmark*, which claimed even the Hanseatic Towns of Hamburg and Bremen, (a proposition which, for a time, was seriously entertained by Austria,) and such a disposition made

* Metternich, for a long time, leaned toward France, and it was only the demand of Napoleon that Austria should join him with her whole available force, which induced him to espouse the cause of the Allies.

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of the other states and provinces of Germany, that the political geography of that country has ever since been a puzzle to diplomatists. We will not here allude to the charge of bribery that has been preferred against some of the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers, which thus laid the foundation to the new public law of Europe. It suffices, for our present purpose, to state that Austria, which presided over the deliberations of the Congress, did not propose a single measure tending toward the union of Germany, and that the Germanic Confederation, the miserable substitute for it, met with the most violent opposition on the part of the German princes, and was finally only acceded to, when the return of Napoleon from Elba imposed peremptory measures for their common defence.

The Germanic Confederation was from the beginning, and is to this day, nothing but an institution for the military *defence* of Germany. It is utterly incapable of any aggressive movement, and possesses, on that account, but little political power. It is an association of princes for their mutual protection and safety, nothing more. In it the different princes have nearly the same rights; but on all questions of moment, Austria and Prussia, when united, lead the Diet as European Powers, or condemn it, when divided, to hopeless inactivity. As Austria and Prussia, of late years, have been constantly divided, the Confederation has done nothing; its previous acts refer only to the limitation of the liberty of the press, and the interference with other liberal institutions proposed or introduced by some of the smaller States. It enjoyed at no time the confidence or respect of the people, and scarcely that of its own members.

To perpetuate the dualism of Austria and Prussia, the former entered the Germanic Confederation only with twelve millions of her subjects, out of the thirty-seven or eight which she actually possessed previous to the recent war; while Prussia, to balance the account, was only permitted to come in with a like number; although the Austrian provinces excluded were Hungarian, Sclavonic, and Italian provinces, while East and West Prussia, which were not admitted into the Confederation, are essentially German

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and, as such, entitled to representation at the Diet.* Holland, by virtue of the Duchy of Luxemburg, and Denmark, by virtue of Slesvigh-Holstein, became members of the Diet; while, to render its composition as heterogeneous as possible, the smaller States were permitted to establish representative forms of government at home, to bring them either in direct conflict with Austria and Prussia, or, as the case might be, to oblige them to seek the protection of these Powers against their own subjects. The four free cities, Hamburg, Bremen, Lubec, and Frankfort, which entered the Confederacy, were erected into independent Republics, in order, as Metternich sarcastically remarked, by their example "to convince the Germans of their incapacity for self-government."

Metternich's aim in establishing the Germanic Confederation, was to use the German States as a bulwark against France, and, at the same time, to confine Prussia to her present territorial limits. By this means, and by pressing on Germany, at all convenient times, as an independent power, Austria attained the same supremacy on the Rhine and Danube which she sought, and secured, in Italy by separate treaties with the smaller States, and by the right to maintain garrisons in some of the principal fortresses of Central Italy. Prussia, when it suited Austria, could be the executor of her will, and thereby lose popularity and influence with the smaller States; but independently she could do nothing without exciting suspicion and alarm. Metternich took care to convince the smaller princes of Germany that the mission of Austria was the extension of German power into Italy and on the Danube; while Prussia, too small by herself to maintain her position as a Great European Power, must seek enlargement at the expense of

* The provinces of Austria represented in the Diet, are the Arch Duchy of Austria, the Duchy of Styria, the Kingdom of Illyria, the County of Tyrol, the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margravate of Moravia, with Austrian Silesia, and the Duchies of Anschwitz and Zator, in Gallicia. Prussia has entered the Confederation only for the provinces of Brandenburg, Pomerania, Silesia, Saxony, Westphalia and Rhenish Prussia. Austria has twelve out of thirty-seven millions, Prussia, twelve out of seventeen millions of her subjects represented in the Diet.

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her German neighbors. Thus was the disunion of Germany, which had caused her ruin during the progress of two entire centuries, not only perpetuated, but actually reorganized by the Congress of Vienna. The number of masters, to be sure, was reduced to thirty-eight; but these were jealous and distrustful of each other, and not bound together even by material interests. Each State had its separate commercial laws, its own tariff of duties, its custom-houses, and its own financial policy. The stipulations of the Congress in regard to the free navigation of German rivers are to this day wholly disregarded, with no power anywhere to enforce them for the benefit of the entire country.

One good result only was obtained from this division of Germany among many masters; but it is an important and lasting one. It has created a great many small residences, seats of education and learning, of the arts and of civilization generally. Many of the smaller princes, too weak to aim at conquest or aggrandizement, sought lasting fame in the establishment of academies and universities, in the endowments of libraries, and in the protection of artists and men of letters. While Paris, London, Milan, and Naples envied each other the possession of a *prima donna* or a *prima ballerina*, Berlin, Munich, Weimar, and Heidelberg endeavored to capture from each other some celebrated professor of chemistry or geology. Each small capital of Germany has become a seat of superior education and refinement, of study and taste. The capitals of France, England, and Russia may present greater concentration of intellect and genius, but there is certainly no country in Europe where civilization, learning, the fine arts, and true humanity in thought and feeling, are so generally diffused as in Germany. The diffusion of knowledge and the habit of thought act even as checks on the arbitrary power of princes, and this in spite of a shackled press and imperfect political institutions. There seems to be a moral standard by which princes and people, nobility and clergy, fear to be condemned.

The long peace which followed the Congress of Vienna had a most favorable effect on the development of German industry, and, with a people so eminently active and frugal, soon led to the accu-

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mulation of wealth. Most of the States introduced order and regularity into their finances, promoted internal improvements, and facilitated commerce. To do this more effectually, the Customs or Tariff league (*Zollverein*) was formed by Prussia, in conjunction with nearly all the smaller German States, for the purpose of equally taxing the products of foreign industry on the frontier, and leaving the internal commerce of the country free from the vexations and exactions of collectors and inspectors. This was undoubtedly the best thing ever proposed by Prussia to Germany. It was at least an approach to national assimilation and union; and as Prussia justly claimed to represent the League in all commercial treaties with foreign Powers, she acquired by it no small amount of additional prestige in Europe. Austria, at first, opposed the League and refused to join it; but she has, within the last few years, made desperate efforts and submitted to many pecuniary sacrifices, to be admitted as one of its members. But neither states nor individuals have the power to do things at their convenience. They must act at the proper time, or lose the opportunity forever. Bankrupt Austria will now find it difficult to form a commercial league with the solvent States of Germany.

The revolution of 1830, which led to a change of dynasty in France, and to the separation of Belgium from Holland, agitated many of the smaller States of Germany; but as the princes seemed to yield, it led to nothing deserving the name of revolution. The agitation was confined to individual States, the people in their simplicity, actually believing that liberal institutions could be introduced and secured in any one of them without the consent and active coöperation of all the others. The Resolutions of the Diet of 1833, to which some of the smaller princes themselves unwillingly assented, put an end to this delusion, and proved the absurdity of the idea of reform independent of Prussia and Austria. The insurrection in Poland, the most serious consequence of the French revolution of 1830, found a strong echo in the German heart; but when Poland had fallen, and the reactionary movement had commenced in France, the hopelessness of all further struggle produced once more that deceptive state of quiescence which

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monarchs, to their cost, have repeatedly mistaken for submission. Then came the French revolution of 1848, which, as if by an electric spark, convulsed all Germany, including Prussia and Austria themselves.

Up to 1848, Germany looked upon France as the political motor of Europe; but the experience of 1830 had taught the Germans not to rely too much on the stability of their French neighbors. It had convinced them that, as their history and condition differed essentially from that of France, institutions of a different character were required for their progress and welfare. They aimed at liberty; but conceived it to be something more than political equality, and thought it indispensable to their safety first to establish union among themselves. The first French Republic had devoloped a fearful military momentum; might not the second follow in its footsteps? And what if Russia, armed to the teeth, threatened to intervene? The whole past history of Germany was a series of calamities arising from the want of union; union, therefore, was to be the first offspring of revolution. In regard to this one idea, all Germans were agreed; but how to realize it was the question, for the solution of which no organizing genius appeared in the Parliament of Frankfort. The deputies from the smaller States found they could do nothing, those of Prussia and Austria were mutually jealous of each other. The dualism of Prussia and Austria, which prevented the union of the Princes, was equally manifested by the representatives of the People. The German Empire was to be reëstablished on a Constitutional basis, the German Confederation was to be re-constructed of representatives of the People; but who was to be at the head of this Confederacy? A small prince with no power was out of the question; it must therefore be an Austrian or a Prussian Prince. But might not a ruling Prince, with an army at his command, use his power and influence to subvert the liberties of the people? Was the Emperor of Austria willing to submit to Prussia? Would the King of Prussia consent to become a subject of the Emperor of Austria? To avoid these complications and difficulties (the thought of employing *force*, to compel submission, never entered the loyal German mind,)

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Arch Duke John of Austria, uncle to the Emperor Ferdinand, was elected VICAR of the Empire—a step which has since been bitterly regretted, and which only afforded time for the development and success of the reactionary movement. There are those who believe that the Prince, now the REGENT OF PRUSSIA, aspired to that dignity, and there are many who wish that he had been elected; but the historical reminiscences connected with the House of Habsburg prevailed in the Parliament, and the small faction which saw no other remedy for all evils but the establishment of a German Confederate Republic, was voted down.

Arch Duke John was more of an Austrian statesman than his most ardent friends had given him credit for; his achievements consisting chiefly in delay and procrastination. With great skill did he prevent immediate action on the vexed question as to who should finally be ruler in Germany; affording, in the mean time, scope for the discussion of minor topics, such as the disposal of the Duchies of Slesvigh-Holstein, the creation of a German navy, perhaps the reannexation of the former German provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. During all this time the Vicar and his Parliament remained without an army and without a treasury; all real power remained with the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the sovereigns of the smaller states. When the crown was at last offered to the King of Prussia, the reaction had already been successful, and he declined to accept it. The Parliament at Frankfort, shorn of its power and influence, finally broke up: its republican rump assembling at Stuttgart, where they finally quietly dispersed. As a last resort, an attempt was made to establish a Republic in the Duchy of Baden, with the hope, no doubt, of inducing other German States to follow the example. The military joined the movement in a body, and an armed intervention on the part of Prussia was the consequence. Some thirty, according to others, sixty thousand men, under the immediate command of the Prince of Prussia himself, invaded the Duchy, which defended itself with considerable valor. At the battle of Waghäusel, the Prussians were beaten back with great slaughter; but a regiment of Baden Dragoons refusing to pursue the retreating enemy, the prestige of

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victory was lost, and with it the confidence of success. The Duchy was subdued, the fugitive Grand Duke reinstated in his possessions, and the popular movement in Germany checked for an indefinite period.

During all this time Austria went through a fearful crisis. Hungary, which for four centuries had enjoyed a separate constitutional government, (the emperors of Austria were only *kings* of Hungary) and which had succeeded in obtaining a separate ministry, located in her own capital (Buda), began to distrust the sincerity of the Emperor, and, after many remonstrances, undertook to establish her entire national independence. This movement was the more destructive to Austria, as Hungary has always been considered the most considerable, and at the same time the most warlike, part of her empire, and because the whole Hungarian army at once joined the insurrection. Hungary was lost to Austria, and had to be reconquered. Twice had the Hungarians heroically beaten back the whole Austrian host, and if they were at last defeated, it was only through treason* and by the intervention of Russia. The Italian Provinces of Austria had previously risen and displayed the standard of independence; the King of Sardinia, Charles Albert, having entered Lombardy at the head of 40,000 men. Tuscany, Naples, and the Papal States had also joined the national insurrection; but the battles of Rivoli (July, 1848) and Novara, (March, 1849) after many partial successes of the Piedmontese, finally decided against the nationals, and reëstablished Austrian domination in Upper Italy. Charles Albert, with his characteristic chivalry, sought death on the field of battle; but not finding it there, abdicated the throne in favor of his son Victor Emanuel II., the present king. He died a few weeks afterwards, far from his country, in Portugal; leaving no other bequest, to his loyal and generous people, than a liberal constitution, which his son has since faithfully maintained. Venice, now isolated, con-

* All doubts about the conduct of Geörgey are now at an end; for he lives on an Austrian pension at Klagenfurt, and his name, at the commencement of the late war, was even suggested in high court circles for Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian army.

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tinued a hopeless struggle against Austria, even after the French had entered Rome (3d July, 1849); and had the honor of being the last Italian city which (24th August, 1849,) sheathed the sword drawn for national independence.

But the Italian struggle for liberty and national independence, is not an isolated fact—an incident called forth by the revolution of 1848. It commenced with the close of the last century, and continued, with innumerable sacrifices of blood and treasure, up to the present time. However meanly superficial observers and readers may affect to think of the modern Italians and their achievements, no other people of Europe has, in modern times, shown such a constant devotion to an elevated idea, such power of endurance under tragic misfortunes, and such an unbroken spirit under circumstances which would have driven every other nation to frantic despair.*

* Many of our modern Italian tourists, judging of Italy only by the cheating landlords, the rascally porters and coachmen, the lying picture dealers, selling you smoked modern daubs for valuable originals of the masters of the sixteenth century, and the cunning Jews swearing "by the Redeemer" to the genuine antiquity of cameos, may entertain different notions of the modern Italians. With these gentlemen, who look upon Europe from the window of a railway car, or from the top of a stage coach, we cannot enter into a discussion, and must necessarily leave them to the enjoyment of their own opinions.

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CHAPTER III.

THE DIVISIONS OF ITALY FROM THE PEACE OF UTRECHT TO THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

The present dynasties of Italy, with the only exception of that of Piedmont, owe their origin to the wars of the Spanish succession and the peace of Utrecht (1713.) The House of Savoy, alone, dates back to the year 1000. Its ancestors were probably Burgundian nobles; the present Prince Royal (born 1844) being named after *Humbert*, who died in 1050. German historians believe the House of Savoy to be of Saxon origin; deriving it even from Wittekind, the great opponent of Charlemagne; though the Piedmontese themselves, that is, the people on the south of Mont Cenis and St. Bernard were of Celtic origin, and at all times distinguished as a heroic race. The people of the plains are descendants of the Etrurians, Romans and Lombards. At the beginning of the war for the Spanish succession, Louis XIV. conferred upon his ally, Amadeus II. Duke of Savoy, the rank of French Generalissimo in Italy; but the Duke foreseeing his ruin if the King of France became master of Lombardy, which then extended to within a few miles of Genoa, formed an alliance with Austria, and obtained, in return for this service, first, by the treaty of Montferrat, Alessandria, the valley of the Sesia, and the Lomellina, (near Mortara;) and secondly, by the treaty of Utrecht, (1713,) the Island of Sicily. Savoy proper was also restored to him, with the Alps as its frontier against France. Austria received the diminished Duchy of Milan, Naples and the Island of Sardinia. (The Island of Corsica, had, some forty-five years previous, by the Republic of Genoa, been sold to France.) Philippe V., of Spain, or rather his wife, Elizabeth of Parma, reconquered Sicily in 1717; but was forced afterwards to cede it to Austria who, in exchange, gave the worthless Island of Sardinia to Piedmont. In the war for the Polish succession, (1733,) Spain conquered both Naples and Sicily, and re-

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tained both conquests in the treaty of Vienna (1735) for the Infant Don Carlos, who, after his accession to the throne of Spain, left the kingdom of the Two Sicilies to his third son Ferdinand, with the condition that it should never again be united to Spain. Piedmont, which had aided Spain and France in the last war, and which had been promised the whole of Lombardy, had to be satisfied with Novara and Tortona, to which were subsequently, at the peace of Aix la Chapelle (1748,) added pieces of Pavia and Novara. Tuscany, after the death of the last Medici, (1737,) was given to Francis Stephen of Lorraine, husband of Marie Theresa, of Austria, as a *secundo-geniture* of Austria, that is, with the condition that the Grand Duchy, in the absence of other heirs, should fall to the Arch Duke of Austria *next* to him who inherits the throne of the Empire. Parma was, by Austria, surrendered to the infant Philippe, of Spain, to which Sardinia also surrendered Piacenza; both Austria and Sardinia claiming to this day, in the absence of other heirs, the succession in that Duchy.* By these divisions and subdivisions, all hereditary Italian thrones, with the only exception of Modena, were occupied by foreigners; Milan, Tuscany and Mantua by Germans (Habsburgers;) Naples, Sicily and Parma by Spanish Bourbons, Piedmont and Sardinia by the House of Savoy; the Republics of Venice, Genoa and Lucca, and the Papal throne alone, had remained Italian. Finally a son of Maria Therese married, in 1769, Maria Beatrice of Este, hereditary Princess of Modena, by which that last Italian House of Princes was also replaced by an Austrian. Such was the condition of Italy previous to the French Revolution—the result not of her guilt, but of the wars between England, France, Austria and Spain, for European supremacy.† Yet Italy was happier in those days than she has since been by the consciousness of her degradation, and the constant efforts of her people to escape from it. Remarkable, for that period, is the attempt made by Cardinal Orsini, under Pope

* These claims are now probably settled forever.

† England acquired, in the peace of Utrecht, Gibraltar, Newfoundland, Hudson's Bay and the Island of St. Christopher, while France agreed to demolish the fortifications of *Dunkirk*.

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Pius VI., *to unite all the Italian States in a Confederacy, under the Presidency of the Father of the Church*—an idea analogous to that now again suggested by the Emperor Napoleon, and about to be realized.

The French Revolution, and the Empire which followed, produced in no other country more important changes than in Italy. In the first place, the French created a number of small Republics, modeled after the standard of France, then they united these Republics again into larger ones, which in turn were transformed into kingdoms with governments more or less national, yet dependent on France. The Republics of Venice, Lucca and Genoa, disappeared with the Duchies of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, &c. The King of Naples was driven to the Island of Sicily, where he maintained himself partly by Russian, but chiefly by British protection; while the King of Piedmont, after an honorable resistance, which challenged even the admiration of General Bonaparte, withdrew to the Island of Sardinia. Piedmont and Savoy were lost by the refusal of the King of Sardinia to sign the separate treaty of Basel. Venice disappeared without a blow, and was, by the treaty of Campo-formio, first given to Austria, but afterwards united to the Kingdom of Italy. Parma fell with the driving of the Bourbons from Spain; the Papal States, after various vicissitudes, were united to France. A few small Principalities were given away as presents to French Marshals and Diplomatists.*

Before Napoleon marched into Russia, Italy was divided as follows:—Two and a half millions of Piedmontese, half a million of Genoese, half a million of Parmese and Modenese, three and a half millions of Tuscans and Romans, two hundred thousand Corsicans, four hundred thousand Savoyards, and the County of Nizza, with two hundred thousand inhabitants, were annexed to France; seven millions of Lombards, Venetians, Romagnoles, Modenese, Istrians, South Tyrolians and inhabitants of the Legations, were united into the Kingdom of Italy, under Eugene Beauharnais, adopted son of Napoleon; the Kingdom of Naples, with five millions more, was

* Ponte Corvo to Marshal Bernadotte; Benevent, to Talleyrand.

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presided over by Joachim Murat, who had married Napoleon's youngest sister. One of the three principal islands—Sicily—was still retained by the offsprings of the Spanish Bourbons; the other, Sardinia, by the King of Sardinia; while Malta had been taken possession of by the British. The expulsion of the Austrians from Italy had been accompanied by no special act of tyranny or cruelty; it was simply the consequence of Napoleon's victories. The King of Sardinia had been driven from Piedmont with the regret of his subjects; but in Naples, after the momentary victories of Suwaroff, scenes were enacted under King Ferdinand and Queen Caroline,* which filled all Europe with horror, and laid the first foundation to that series of sanguinary tragedies by which the Spanish Bourbons have since soiled the pages of history.† When the Papal States were to be disposed of, the Duchess of Parma, afterwards Queen of Etruria, a Spanish Bourbon, proposed nothing less than to seize upon the whole patrimony of St. Peter; reserving to his Holiness the Island of Sardinia, the last refuge of the chivalrous House of Savoy. England, to protect the king, proposed to garrison the Island with British troops; but Charles Emanuel IV., declined the offer by fiercely demanding "whether the British ministry was mistaking him for a Hindoostanic Nabob?"

It was during this period of misfortune for Austria and Piedmont, that the foundation was laid to that fierce and uncompromising rivalry which has since marked the progress of the Houses of Habsburg and Savoy in Italy. As early as 1796 did each of these Houses aim at the total expulsion of the other from Italy. Austria triumphed first. When Suwaroff, in May 1799, after entering the City of Turin, wished to reëstablish the Kingdom of Piedmont under its legitimate ruler, Austria not only opposed it, but forbade the reassembling of a Piedmontese army under its

* Not to be confounded with Queen Caroline, the wife of Murat, above mentioned.

† The King of Naples refused to ratify the capitulation of 23d June, 1799, which allowed the Neapolitan Republicans to depart without molestation, for Marseilles, and ten thousand (!!) of them, among them the flower of the nobility of birth and mind, were slaughtered.

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former colors, and threatened with the withdrawal of her troops. Instead of restoring the King of Sardinia, Eastern Piedmont and Genoa were added to Austrian Italy. At first, England sustained the claims of Sardinia; but when Russia withdrew from the coalition, she yielded to the demands of Austria on condition that the latter should attack Toulon. Meanwhile Napoleon returned from Egypt, and, on the battle-field of Marengo, destroyed the plans of both England and Austria.

What, it has often been asked, have the Italians gained, during the French domination, by a change of masters? Their own historians have answered it. They were roused from their state of torpor, and made to participate in the great struggle for worldly power. They shared the activity, the success, the glory of their conqueror, who was himself in name and origin an Italian. The feudal tenures were abolished. They obtained laws adapted to modern society, equal and comparatively cheap administration of justice, public roads, security from robbers and bandits, and a well-appointed and disciplined army, alike available for offensive and defensive purposes.* From such an improved condition there was but one step toward national elevation and independence.

As early as 1809, Arch Duke John of Austria—the same who afterwards figured as Vicar of the German Empire in Frankfort—called upon the Italians to rise in defence of "*national liberty.*" His Proclamation was addressed "to the Italian people." He promised them a *Constitution* based "upon the nature of things," and asked them to follow the example of the Tyrolese and Spaniards. "Will you," said he, "become Italians? The word of that prince (the Emperor Francis of Austria) is as sacred and immutable as it is pure. It is Heaven itself which speaks to you through his mouth. We come not as inquisitors to punish, but to

* All European officers have borne testimony to the bravery and fortitude of the Italian troops in the various campaigns of the first Emperor Napoleon. They fell one by one, without a murmur, by the side of the French Imperial Guards on the icy plains of Russia. The few who returned (about a thousand out of 30,000) have ever since remained faithful to the national cause, and were on that account the special objects of *surveillance* of the Austrian police.

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liberate you."* *Per contra*, the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, addressed the Senate of the Kingdom of Italy, April 1st, 1809, as follows:—"Thanks to the arms of the Emperor there are no longer any small Duchies, Legations, or Republics in Italy, without power at home or influence abroad, separated from each other in language almost as much as in interest. There are, in reality, no Lombards, Venetians, Bolognese; but, at last, one nation—an Italian nation. The same Italian domain, so recently divided and torn, is to-day united by the same spirit, under one sceptre, under the same laws, embracing six millions of people." The Patriarch of Venice saluted Napoleon with these words:—"You have saved France; but you have created Italy!"

After the destruction of the great French army in Russia, Austria and the other former Princes of Italy again appealed to the love of "liberty and independence" of the Italians to shake off the "foreign yoke." They and their representatives issued proclamations "to the Italian people," and "to the Italian nation." Lord Bentinck, the British Commander and Plenipotentiary, vied with these effusions in patriotic fervor;† though when the allied troops had entered Paris, he was instructed by Lord Castlereagh to make no further appeals to the People, because the British Cabinet found it more expedient to join the absolute rather than the liberal governments of Europe.

One of these Proclamations, issued in the name of General Count Nugent, Commander of the Austrian-British forces, to the "Peoples of Italy," was dated Ravenna, 10th December, 1813, and headed *Regno d' Italia independente* (Independent Kingdom of Italy). In it, the "courageous and renowned Italians" were reminded that they had it in their power to reëstablish, by force

* "*Ora volete voi de nuovo divenire Italiani? La parola di quel principe è sacra ed immutabile comme ella è pura; egli è cielo che vi parla, per bocca di lui. Noi non veniamo nè per investigare, nè per punire; noi veniamo per rendervi liberi,*" are the identical words of the Proclamation.

† He promised the Genoese the reëstablishment of their Republic; but the Tory Ministry of England declared he had no power to make such promises, and advocated its union with Piedmont. In a similar manner did England abandon the Liberals of Spain and Sicily.

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of arms, the freedom, power, and happiness of their country. "Rise, Italians!" says the proclamation; "and if your arms are not sufficient to free you from foreign oppression *our* powerful arms are ready to assist you. Up, Italians! the day of liberty has come! You must become a united, independent Italy. Unite all your strength for the public good; and, if you confide in those who love you, and who, with such great exertion, devote themselves to your welfare, you will soon be great and happy. In a short time your lot will be *envied;* those who belong to you will be admired."

On the 25th of February, 1814, Field-Marshal Nugent again called upon the people and soldiers of Italy to coöperate in the battle for liberty and independence, assuring them that they will not change one foreign master for another. "No, Italians! that is not the aim of the Allied Powers. Among the many just causes for the present war is the demand for your independence—your political and social existence so blended with the rights of the legitimate Princes of Italy, that you shall form but a single body; a single nation worthy the respect of your neighbors, free from any foreign influence." * * * * "Without union, without armies, you have no country, no civil liberty, no rights. Instead of them a nation can only expect slavery from the despotism of foreigners. Italians! you show but too much the terrible result of these truths. The many deep wounds of your country, which can only be healed by peace, suffice to give birth to the universal wish to be united under one banner—the banner of honor, of happiness, of the regeneration of Italy."

There is no need of multiplying these extracts to show how the Allied Powers, but especially Austria and England, excited, stimulated and explored, for their own use, the national sentiments of the Italians kindled by the French—how they surpassed each other in promises to the Italian people, which their respective governments, with Metternich and Castlereagh at their heads, never meant to fulfil. The exiled Italian Princes remained not behind these "statesmanlike" efforts at systematic deception, while some of them even went so far as to join various secret societies for the

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subversion of the then existing governments. The King of Naples, for instance, from his British-guarded Island of Sicily, conspired with the *Carbonari* of Naples for the destruction of Murat and the establishment of a Constitution, while in Sicily he was constantly opposed to liberal institutions. There is no promise a king can make, which he did not lavish on his "beloved Neapolitans."

But the Sicilian Bourbons had sunk too low in public estimation to make any considerable number of proselytes, except among the Lazzaroni—the Janissaries of Naples. Murat, when he saw Napoleon's star declining, aimed himself at independence. He first offered to divide Italy with Eugene Beauharnais; but when he found Napoleon's adopted son unshaken in his loyalty to his sovereign, he conceived the daring project of making himself master of the whole Peninsula, which afterwards cost him his life. Changeable, however, as he was in his mind, he could not resist Austrian temptation; and, on the 27th of July, 1813, actually entered into a secret treaty with that Power and England, the principal stipulations of which were, that the Emperor of Austria was to take possession of the whole kingdom of Italy, including Milan, Venice, Modena, the Papal Legations and Ancona, while the Arch Dukes were to divide among themselves the remaining States of Upper and Middle Italy, with the exception of Piedmont. In return, Murat was to remain in possession of Naples; the Bourbon King was to retain Sicily. Murat, nevertheless, afforded the Allies but little assistance; while Eugene Beauharnais valiantly defended the kingdom of Italy. Finally, on the 11th of January, 1814, Murat concluded a formal treaty of alliance with Austria, which promised to recognize him as King of Naples, and to give him 400,000 of the Pope's subjects as an indemnity for Sicily, if he would advance with his army to the Po. But even then nothing was effected against Beauharnais; while Murat, deceived by the successes of Napoleon in February following, halted in his movements. At last, the Allied troops (31st of March, 1814,) entered Paris, and Napoleon abdicated on the 11th of April following. It was only on the 16th of April, and after the French Senate had already previously pronounced against Napoleon, that Eugene Beauhar-

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nais entered into an armistice with the Allies, and dismissed a portion of his army. Had Napoleon remained master of France, the Allies would not have been able to re-conquer Italy.

The presence of Napoleon at Elba, the place of his retirement suggested by the Emperor of Russia, filled England and Austria with fresh apprehensions. He might land in Italy, and carry out the idea of Italian nationality which British and Austrian agents had so recently taken pains to instil into the minds of the people; and having made himself master of Italy, he might regain the throne of France. Austria, therefore, did not yet break with Murat, but only entered (January, 1815) into a secret treaty with England and France (against Russia) for his dethronement. This she did when she had reason to fear that the Congress of Vienna would break up with a war among the Allies, and after Murat's intrigues with the secret societies had seriously alarmed the Emperor Francis. It was then that Metternich, with his usual fertility in diplomatic expedients—perhaps with a view of testifying his gratitude to England—suggested to Murat to content himself, in lieu of all his claims upon Naples, with the *Ionian Islands!*

Meanwhile the news had reached Italy that the Emperor Alexander of Russia had pronounced in favor of Eugene Beauharnais, provided the people of the kingdom of Italy indicated a desire to retain him as their sovereign. This was the signal for the most violent strife of parties, accompanied by popular tumult and bloodshed. Austrian emissaries were lavish in their promises, and inventive in calumnies against the existing government. But when Austrian troops in the midst of the anarchy and confusion which ensued, had taken possession of the whole kingdom in the name of the Allied Powers, and a deputation, representing all parties, waited on the Emperor of Austria, in Paris, for the purpose of obtaining a Constitution for the kingdom, the laconic reply was, that he was himself an Italian, and that he would send his *commands* to Milan.

Murat was now the only representative of the Napoleonic system in Italy. With the deadly hatred of the French and Sicilian

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Bourbons against him, the enmity of Wellington, Castlereagh, and Liverpool, the secret treaty of Austria and England, above alluded to, concluded for his destruction, his only reliance was upon Russia. In this situation he became reconciled to Napoleon, and on the return of the latter from Elba, (1st March, 1815,) once more entrusted his fate to the fortunes of war. Austria no sooner saw herself menaced by this new turn of events, than she declared, by public proclamation, that the emperor, firm in his predilection for his Italian States, has determined upon the erection of a Lombardo-Venitian kingdom, as a separate domain of his crown. "By this means," says the proclamation, "the nationality of his Italian subjects, which they justly prize so high, shall be protected and secured." Even a species of Constitution was granted to his "Italian subjects." Thus secured against the people, the Austrian army, in overpowering numbers, turned against Murat who, after various unfortunate engagements at last ordered two of his generals to sign a capitulation at Naples, in which he reserved nothing for himself and family, but secured the creditors of the State, and the purchasers of state and church property. A general pardon was promised to the officers who had served in his army. A few of these followed him first to France, then to Corsica, and at last to the coast of Calabria where he was taken, imprisoned, and shot, by order of the King of Naples. Thus were the territorial changes introduced into Italy by the French Revolution finally disposed of; but the profound agitation in the minds of the people—the hopes which had been awakened—the desire for liberal institutions and for nationality which had been kindled, continued, and involved the whole Peninsula in a series of national calamities.

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CHAPTER IV.

THE DIVISION OF ITALY BY THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

The Congress of Vienna assembled to divide Europe and its colonies. It was a mere council of princes and their plenipotentiaries, assembled for the avowed purpose of sustaining legitimacy and putting down resistance to the divine authority of kings all over Europe. The promises which had been made to the people—Germans, Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese—and by which these had been induced to take up arms in defence of "liberty and national independence," were wholly disregarded, and in their stead the foundation laid to that league of the great absolutist Powers which, under the name of the "Holy Alliance," was, in fact, a conspiracy of princes, not only against all political progress of their own subjects, but also against the liberties and independence of every other people, whose example might be judged dangerous to the then established order of things.* In the treaty of

* Had the United States then been at a more convenient distance from Europe, and had the different European Powers been less divided by mutual jealousies and dread of each other, the Congress of Vienna might have entertained even propositions for reëstablishing monarchical institutions in America. True, the right of *intervention* in the affairs of other States, subsequently claimed at Laibach, was, in a circular note of Lord Castlereagh, dated 19th January, 1821, in general terms *not concurred in;* but England, which disavowed the right did nothing to prevent its execution by the other powers. At the Congress of Verona, the Duke of Wellington, as the representative of England, again dissented from the doctrines laid down by the Continental powers; but England again contented herself with a strict neutrality, and allowed the constitutional Bourbons of France to come to the assistance of the absolute Bourbons of Spain. And yet, at that time, George Canning had already succeeded the Marquis of Londonderry. Nothing but the prospects of an increased commerce—perhaps the fear of having the anti-revolutionary theories of the Great Continental Powers applied against herself—induced, in 1825, the recognition by Great Britain of the South American Republics. "If the principle of Legitimacy preached by the Holy Alliance," said James McIntosh, in the British

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Paris, (30th May, 1814,) France had received the limits of 1792; nearly thirty-two millions of subjects, which the Republic and the Empire had added, were to be redistributed among the sovereigns of the coalition. The territories of the Republics of Venice, Lucca, Ragusa, and Genoa were included in this enormous booty; the restoration of these Republics being wholly incompatible with the objects of the Congress.

To prevent mistakes on that subject, Austria had already occupied Venice, Lucca, and Ragusa with her troops; while the British government had disavowed the political acts of Lord Bentinck, who had promised the restoration of the Republic of Genoa. In return for this favor, Austria consented to Malta becoming a British possession, and with a self-denial yet unexplained, allowed the fleet which, with the kingdom of Italy had fallen into her hands, consisting of seven ships of the line, and a number of frigates and smaller vessels, valued at fifty millions of francs, to rot in her docks. Austria had a care not to excite the commercial jealousy of her old British ally in the Levant.

Though all the sovereigns who had taken part in the coalition against Napoleon, were invited to join the Congress of princes, the four great Allied Powers, Austria, England, Russia and Prussia, claimed the exclusive right of preparing the work of territorial distribution, in a select committee of *Four*. Talleyrand, the representative of France, showed "the want of logic and consistency," in this arrangement, by insisting that the term "allies" could no longer be applied to powers at peace with France. It was a *war* term, no longer applicable to the relations of peace,

House of Commons, "is correct, then our King William was a robber of the crown, our predecessors who placed him on the throne were bandits, and our ancestors, who forced from *King John without Land* the *Magna Charta*, conspirators. All our institutions crumble into dust, this House loses its privileges, and His Majesty's occupation of the throne is but a prolonged usurpation!" Canning, in two letters, of the 28th February and 31st March, 1823, quoted by Wheaton, declared the alliance formed against Napoleon, "no union for domineering the entire world, or for the superior direction of the internal relations of foreign States"—a proof that England dreaded such an interpretation of it, and endeavored to prevent it.

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and, with its abandonment, France must be allowed a seat in the predisposing committee. This reasoning prevailed, because the four powers were divided in regard to Poland and Saxony; England siding with Austria, to which she was tied by the convention of Prague, previous to the last war, and Prussia and Russia appearing to have similar interests in Northern and Central Europe. The fifth power, France, therefore was admitted; but not to give France the casting vote, or too great an influence on the committee, the three smaller Powers, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, were admitted at the same time. The Italian States alone were wholly excluded, and the fate of the Peninsula once more left to the decision of those foreign Powers which, for centuries past, had disputed to each other the possession of her soil. The formation of a Germanic Confederation had been agreed upon in the treaty of Paris, and a German special committee, over which Metternich presided, was therefore not opposed at the Congress; but when Spain, through its minister, the Chevalier Labrador (whose rôle was probably prompted by Talleyrand) proposed a special committee on Italian affairs, Metternich disposed of this "incidental remark," as he was pleased to call it, with masterly dissimulation, by observing that "Germany was a '*body* of States,' while Italy, from the Po down, contained nothing but independent States, comprised under the same *geographical division.*" Metternich, who was chairman of the special German committee, could hardly expect to be made also chairman of the committee on Italian affairs. He dreaded the influence of the French, Spanish, and Sicilian Bourbons, and preferred to treat the Italian territorial questions separately, from State to State. Austria, in these negotiations, had, besides, the advantage of already occupying Upper Italy and the Papal Legations, which, in spite of the pathetic appeals of Cardinal Gonsalvi, and his support by the Protestant Powers of England and Prussia, she only restored to his Holiness after the return of Napoleon from Elba; retaining, however, certain portions on the left bank of the Po, the Polesina, and the right to maintain garrisons in Ferrara and Commachio, against which the Pope in vain entered his solemn protest. Murat, threatened as he was by

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France and England, had to surrender Bologna; but France retained Avignon, and Naples, Benevent, without any difficulty. Tuscany and Modena were again bestowed on the Austrian Arch Dukes; while Parma, which was claimed by the Bourbons for the Spanish Infanta, was retained for Napoleon's son, the Duke of Reichstadt, and administered in the name of Maria Louisa, wife of the Emperor Napoleon. But Emperor Francis of Austria, fearing that the Italian patriots might concentrate their hopes on this new dynasty, resigned the succession of his grandson in Parma, for the right of garrisoning Piacenza, a fortress of no small importance to the ulterior plans of Austria, after she had induced the King of Sardinia, under the fear of a French invasion, to consent to the demolition of the fortifications of Alessandria.* When the Bourbons claimed the former kingdom of Etruria, (Tuscany,) for the Spanish Infanta, in lieu of Parma, Metternich simply replied that this was a question of *war*, not of negotiation. The temporary possession of Lucca was all that could be obtained for that princess, till, after the death of Maria Louisa of Austria, she was again to be reinstated in Parma. How little the Pope's rights were considered in all these transactions, is also proved by the attempt of Prussia to quarter the King of Saxony on the Papal Legations! England, however, stood firm by Austria; in return for which, Austria assented to the British Protectorate over the Ionian Islands, and supported all her other claims to the European colonies she had seized during the long war. Russia, though the firm supporter of Piedmont in her conflicting claims with Austria, did not wish so far to diminish the territorial claims of the latter in Italy, as to induce her to seek compensation on the Danube.†

* Napoleon always considered Alessandria, Mentz, and Antwerp, as the three strongholds of his empire. The correspondence of Austrian general officers on the subject of Alessandria, shows that the great object of Austria was to make Piedmont strategetically so weak, that in case of a war with France, the latter could either be overrun by Austrian troops, or frightened into an alliance with her.

† Metternich had already, in a long letter to Lord Castlereagh, complained of the small portion of Italy which had fallen to his share, reminding his lordship of the promise of England, made at Prague, to consent to *any* territorial acquisition of Austria in Italy.

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But she aided Piedmont in extending her frontier toward Lombardy, to the shores of the Lake of Como, induced the early evacuation of the Piedmontese fortresses by the Austrian troops, and, in conjunction with France, frustrated Metternich's design to change the hereditary succession in Sardinia. That Metternich cherished such a plan, and expected to execute it, with the assistance of the *Queen* of Sardinia, herself a native Austrian Arch Duchess of Modena, has since been well substantiated;* and it was for this reason that the Salic law of succession, which secured the crown to Charles Albert, of the younger branch of Savoy-Carignan, was especially affirmed at the Congress. The first traces of Metternich's designs were discovered in London; the first steps to counteract it, were taken in St. Petersburg. The King of Sardinia owed the restoration of Piedmont and part of Savoy to the first peace of Paris, (1814.) The Congress of Vienna added the territory of the former Republic of Genoa, while the second peace of Paris (1815) secured to him the remaining part of Savoy, and forty millions of francs, in return for his part in the second coalition. A small portion only of his former territory he had to surrender to Switzerland, the more effectually to secure the neutrality of that Republic against France.

The inconsiderate conduct of Murat caused Austria, in April, 1815, to enter into a treaty with the Bourbon Ferdinand of Sicily, in virtue of which the latter was at the Congress of Vienna reinstated in Naples, as King of the Two Sicilies. So disgracefully unpopular was that sovereign with his people, that he stipulated for retaining, till 1817, 16,000 Austrian troops in his newly acquired kingdom of Naples; paying for them 4,944,000 ducati, (a ducato is about four francs and a quarter,) besides 6,000,000 ducati for the cost of the Austrian campaign against Murat, a pen-

* The plan was to bestow the crown on Beatrice, daughter of Victor Emanuel of Sardinia, and wife of the Austrian Arch Duke Francis of Modena, and it was pursued by Austria till 1828, when the French Minister, De la Ferronays, assured Metternich, through Baron Lebzeltern, that the exclusion of the Prince of Carignan would produce a profound commotion in Italy—"at the sight of a French army which would then appear on the summit of the Alps."

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sion of 60,000 francs a year to Metternich, another pension of the same amount to Talleyrand, and various other largesses to different Austrian generals. Some nine millions of francs were expended by him in diplomatic *douceurs* at Vienna.* It was impossible for the King of Naples to commence his reign under more unfavorable auspices.

By these dispositions of the Congress of Vienna, Italy, before the beginning of the last war (1859) was divided as follows:

States.		Inhabitants.
1. *Austrian Italy,*	Lombardy,	2,750,000
	Venice,	2,280,000
2. Sardinia,	Piedmont and Savoy,	4.800,000
	Sardinia, (the Island,)	500,000
3. Parma,		500,000
4. Modena,		600,000
5. Tuscany,		1,800,000
6. Republic of San Marino,		8,000
7. Roman States,		3,130,000
8. The Two Sicilies,	Naples,	7,000,000
	Sicily,	2,250,000
9. Corsica, (French,)		236,000
10. Malta, (English,)		130,000
Together,		25,984,000

* Schlosser, in his "History of the Eighteenth Century, etc.," speaks of the Congress of Vienna, which formed the basis of the new public law in Europe, as an "assembly of diplomatists, who divided lands and peoples as it pleased their respective courts, and as their dearly paid for intrigues, cabals, and tricks were more or less crowned with success."

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CHAPTER V.

THE ANTAGONISM OF AUSTRIA AND SARDINIA.

Of the different princes but one, he of Savoy, is by long (eight hundred years') adoption an Italian, and he possessed, until within a few weeks, but one-fifth of the whole country. Between this prince and Austria there is an hereditary feud—an instinct which tells them that one or the other must relinquish his grasp upon Italy. Austria, from the day she occupied Lombardy and Venice, felt that she must hold them and the rest of Italy, by military power; Piedmont was bound to gather strength from the national sympathies of the Italians. The antagonism was complete, and accepted as such by the rulers of both countries. Metternich himself, in his diplomatic cynicism, admitted that Italy would never remain quiet under foreign domination; "but," added he, "she has been struggling for a thousand years against it, and—in vain."

Metternich was not satisfied with the military position of Austria in Italy, and endeavored to strengthen it by alliances with other Italian States. The Austrian military dictatorship was to be extended to Naples, Tuscany, and Modena; in short, to wherever the rekindling of liberal ideas threatened to diminish Austrian influence and power. He judged shrewdly, if not wisely, that unless all Italy were equally subjected to absolutism, Lombardy and Venice could not continue that form of government. Hence his attempt, as early as 1815, and while the Congress of Vienna was yet in session, to lay the foundation of an Italian Confederacy under the presidency and protectorate of Austria. The plan was as yet kept secret from the princes and representatives of the other Great Powers, in order to prevent their influence on its organization; but the King of Naples, as early as April, 1815, at the treaty of Vienna, which secured to him his

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kingdom, and as an inducement to that treaty, promised Austria to introduce no form of government differing from her own; that is, to introduce no such constitution as he had promised, and was at the time still promising, to his people. On the 12th June following, he embodied that promise in a formal treaty of alliance with Austria, "for their mutual protection, and for maintaining tranquillity in Italy." Naples was to furnish 25,000 troops; (in 1819 their number was to be reduced to 12,000,) which, together with the garrisons of the fortresses, were to be placed under Austrian commanders; while Austria herself was, in time of war, to furnish an army of not less than 80,000 men, for the common defence. It was further agreed, that the high contracting parties should give each other notice of "internal dangers." A similar treaty had been entered into with Tuscany, (June 2d, 1815,) which promised to place 6,000 men at the disposal of Austria; but the proposition to join an Italian Confederacy was negatived, though Metternich himself had gone to Florence to urge it. In like manner did the proposed postal treaty fail; because the Tuscan Premier, from political reasons, found it "inconvenient to confide his mail-bags to Austrian officials." Treaties for mutual defence, however, and for the passage of troops, &c., were made with the Duchies of Modena and Parma, and thereby their dependence on Austria, if not their subjection to it, secured.

The King of Sardinia refused Austria every thing. He could not prevent the demolition of the fortifications of Alessandria, which was executed by the Austrians themselves, (1815,) who still held military possession of the country; but he refused to open to the Austrians the other fortresses of his kingdom, and to place his troops under their command. As to joining an Italian Confederacy under Austrian Protectorate, he not only declined it on his own behalf, but exerted the utmost diplomatic activity to prevent other Italian States from falling into the snare. Count Barbaroux, under some other specious pretext, was especially dispatched to Rome to warn the Pope, and was so completely successful that Cardinal Gonsalvi declined the Austrian proposal for two distinct reasons:—1st. Because the government of his Holiness, being

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one of peace, must be on good terms with all, and cannot expect to maintain itself by force of arms. 2d. Because the Head of the Church must not be placed in a situation which would oblige him to take part in conflicts with one or the other Power, without knowing the justice of the cause, and the motives which might govern the confederacy and its head.

When Metternich had ascertained the disposition of the King of Sardinia, he tried to deter him from his course by remonstrances addressed to him by England as an intermediary, and when these also had proved ineffectual, he renewed, through his minister Prince Stahremberg, at Turin, the old Austrian claims to the valleys of the Simplon, (the upper part of Novarese, with the towns of Domo-Dossola and Arona,) though these had, by the Congress of Vienna, been formally ceded to Piedmont. In this new dilemma, the king appealed, through his minister at St. Petersburg, to the Emperor of Russia, "as an Italian Prince, and a member of the European family of sovereigns—as a defender of justice and the faith of treaties." "Without the Emperor of Russia," argued the Sardinian minister, "there is no longer any political equilibrium in Europe. Italy disappears; the princes of Italy will become Austrian vassals, and finally cease to exist." Emperor Alexander wrote an autograph letter to Victor Emanuel I., and advised him against the Italian Confederation. He also promised to take the proper steps at Vienna to induce Austria to give up her pretensions, and to respect the faith of treaties. Alexander seems to have kept his word:—the Austrian pretension to the above-mentioned valleys were never renewed.

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CHAPTER VI.

THE REACTION IN ITALY, AND THE NEAPOLITAN AND PIEDMONTESE REVOLUTIONS OF 1820—21.

No sooner did the old Princes return to Italy, than the most absurd reactionary spirit was let loose over the whole Peninsula. Everything wholesome, introduced by Eugene Beauharnais or Murat was abolished; the abuses in Church and State which had accumulated before the revolution were reëstablished; the Napoleon Code, which was an undoubted improvement on the hundreds of volumes of useless, obscure and obsolete former law, was, with the exception of Naples and Parma, wholly superseded in every State, and even the substantial, material improvements introduced during the last ten years, set aside to obliterate the very memory of French rule. In some instances, lawsuits, which had been decided under the Napoleon Code, were reopened, and the decision of the judges set aside; property which had been lawfully acquired and passed into third hands, was outlawed, and the very deeds taken from the archives and scattered to the wind. Commerce, which had been facilitated by splendid roads built across the Alps, was forced back again into its old channels; schools which had been established were closed, the accountability of financial officers, which, under the French administrative system had been secured, diminished or destroyed by the reëstablishment of the old methods of collecting revenue, in short, nothing left unturned to put the seal of condemnation on whatever had been done either in imitation of the French Republic or under the direct auspices of the French Empire. Even the magnificent bridge across the Po, at Turin, was to be broken up because it was built "during the French occupation." Nothing but a church, standing on one of its sides, saved it. The lamps in the streets of Rome were extinguished because the French had introduced them, and inoculation was

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abandoned because it had been ordered by the French Emperor. Even the excavations at Pompeii were discontinued because they had been carried on with great zeal by the ex-king Murat. The immediate consequence of all these retrograde movements, by which the memory of the French Revolution was to be extinguished, was the reappearance of the old plagues of Italy—street-beggary, theft and highway robbery. Bands of robbers organized in the Roman and Neapolitan States, under regularly elected leaders, who, in turn, issued commissions to inferior officers, and laid whole towns and villages under contribution. These bands could only be subdued by stratagem, by the promise of offices of emolument, and by regularly organized *campaigns* against them. Many of the murderers and robbers were, nevertheless, pardoned "on account of their correct political opinions," and their "attachment to their legitimate sovereigns." Many men of property, who found themselves wholly unprotected by the law and the mode of its execution, joined the robbers in self-defence, and the police itself was, in many cases, in open league with them.* To all these calamities were added the famine of 1816 and 1817, which the absurd anti-commercial laws, enacted for its alleviation, only served to increase, and the breaking out of the oriental plague at Noya, in the Neapolitan province of Bari.

In the most fertile province of Italy, Lombardy, Austria was only able to establish a provisional government. Nothing seemed to be definite, nothing stable, except the purpose of making the Lombards forget their old, advanced civilization, the glorious recollections of their former history—the monuments of arts and sciences to which they could proudly refer. Every thing was to be controlled and supervised at Vienna; even projects of irrigation, the necessary construction of dikes, and other local matters which

* Prince Canosa, minister of Police in Naples, (1816,) was in league with the *Calderari*, (tinkers,) a set of robbers and thieves from the lowest dregs of the mob, and actually planned with them another Sicilian vesper, accompanied by universal pillage. He was only at the intercession of the Austrian and Russian ministers at Naples dismissed by the King—with a large pension and all the marks of high royal favor.

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the Milanese and Lombards understood far better than the Austrian officials at Vienna, had to be submitted to them, accompanied by reports of experts, in the Italian language, which were neither read nor understood. To prevent the rekindling of national sympathies, the administration of Venice was kept distinct from that of Milan, with such local advantages in favor of the former city, as were calculated to excite the envy and jealousy of the other. When the Emperor Francis I. towards the close of the year 1815, visited Venice, the people had made great preparations for his reception, with the hope of inducing him to make Venice a free port, and to grant a general amnesty to all political offenders; but they were disappointed in both. A "*voluntary* present" of 60,000 florins was *exacted* from the Milanese; but its acceptance coupled with the condition that the people must ask no other imperial favor! Emperor Francis, himself an Italian by birth, and the son of a Spanish Bourbon Princess, hated the Milanese for their revolutionary tendencies and predilections in favor of France, and treated them on all occasions as rebellious subjects rather than a people to be reconciled and attached to him by a just and wise government. His principal reliance was on the secret police, the trials of political offenders by inquisition, and the prisons of the SPIELBERG. It must be admitted on the other hand, however, that he did something for public instruction—that he established elementary schools; but the higher philosophical branches of learning, with the mathematical sciences, were wholly neglected. The only tolerable governments of Italy, in those days, were those of Maria Louisa (wife of the Emperor Napoleon) and that of the then liberally inclined Bourbon prince of Lucca. The ex-Empress, though an Austrian Princess by birth, did not persecute the men who had borne a distinguished part under Napoleon, and his code, with trifling amendments, was continued in the Duchy. Count Neipperg, who shared her government and her bed, was an enlightened nobleman, and evinced even some public spirit; but after his death the reaction made more rapid progress, and the fact that the administration of Maria Louisa was only temporary, prevented any substantial reform. Emperor Francis continued deaf to her

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prayer to allow the Duke of Reichstadt, her son, to reside in her capital. The Duke of Lucca was an amiable, at times liberally inclined yet weak young man, whose government was equally palsied by its temporary nature, and who afterwards became firmly attached to the Austrian policy.

The most absurd reaction had taken place at Naples, where the king himself (but recently a member of the secret society of the *Carbonari*) had been the very head and front of the conspirators against Murat. As Murat, previous to his leaving Naples, had given the people a constitution, and as similar promises had been made by King Ferdinand himself, while yet confined to the island of Sicily, he had, in conformity with the condition of his separate treaty with Austria, previously alluded to, nothing more sincerely at heart than to govern his newly-acquired country as an absolute despot. He trusted nobody; and none of his subjects trusted him. The officers of Murat's army were constantly in dread of being either dismissed or imprisoned; while the lives and property of all his subjects were constantly in danger. Various political "sects" in the shape of secret societies, were making a species of civil war on each other, but there was no understanding on public questions, and consequently no possibility of intelligent public action. The people felt that their political condition had become worse than it had been before; but there was no agreement, even among the better informed classes, on the measures of reform to be introduced with public safety. The officers of the army who, from a glorious career under Murat, were now condemned to hopeless inactivity, were most dissatisfied, and their feelings were soon shared by the whole army. When, therefore, in 1820, the Constitution of 1812 had been proclaimed by Spanish generals in Madrid, nothing was more natural than that a similar attempt at revolution should be made by the army in Naples. The movement commenced on the 2d of July, at Nola, and on the 6th the King was already induced to promise the desired Constitution. On the same day, the king deposed his power into the hands of the Prince Royal, who was made Vicar-general of the Empire. The *kind* of Constitution to be given, had not been agreed upon; but the troops deciding in

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favor of the Spanish Constitution of 1812, (of which not even a printed copy was then to be found in Naples,)* the latter was accordingly adopted. On the 13th July, the King, as Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies, pledged his oath to support that Constitution, adding to the formula which had been furnished him, of his own accord, these memorable words: "Almighty God! who with unerring eye readest the souls of men and the future, hurl at this moment, the thunderbolts of thy vengeance on my head, if I lie or break my oath," and he turned with apparent satisfaction to General Pepe, and added: "this time I have really sworn with a good heart."

Sicily did not follow the popular movement of Naples, but desired to be governed by a separate Constitution after the model of that of England. The civil war which ensued in consequence of this schism, did much toward weakening the common cause, and robbed Naples of a part of its force. The greatest difficulty however was presented by the secret societies—who had entered the army and destroyed its discipline.

The revolution in Naples led, in October, 1820, to the Congress of Troppau, assembled, as was announced by the Holy Alliance, to "preserve Christian civilization, public order, and the sacred principles of legitimacy." The Emperor Alexander of Russia, and Francis of Austria were present in person, and on the 19th November signed a Protocol which authorized the military occupation of the revolted Neapolitan provinces. France adhered, through its minister, to this monstrous resolution, which submitted the fate of the smaller States of Europe to the decision of the Great Powers; England dissented, but did nothing to oppose the movement. The Congress now adjourned to Laibach to be nearer to the seat of war, and the King of Naples and the other Italian sovereigns were invited to witness its proceedings. The Neapolitan Parliament at first refused to let the King leave the country; but when the latter promised to act as mediator between his people and

* The Spanish Constitution of 1812 is similar to the French Constitution of 1792. One house—the King with a limited veto; and a Committee (provisional Junta) during the recess of the Assembly.

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the allied Powers, and offered to invest his son with the Regency during his absence, the consent of the Representatives was finally obtained. The first steps of the Regent, who again pledged his oath to support the Constitution, was to induce the Parliament to *adjourn*, and the new minister of war, to stop the preparations for the military defence of the country. The Prince had evidently had his father for a tutor. The King embarked at Naples with the same Captain Maitland who had carried Napoleon to St. Helena, and shortly after his arrival at Laibach informed his Parliament, in writing, that there was no chance for the Constitution; to his army he conveyed the information that there was no hope of resistance. The troops were especially enjoined not to oppose the advance of the Austrians. It was now too late for the Parliament to assemble, and make provisions for resisting an army of 50,000 men under General Ficquelmont. There were volunteers, but no arms, and no money in the treasury. Forced loans brought little money, while the quarrels of the officers among themselves destroyed the availability of the troops. A guerrilla war was at last resolved upon; but the people did not join the movement in sufficient numbers, and in March following the Austrians already entered Naples.

While these events were taking place in Naples, a military revolution had broken out in Turin, where, after much hesitation and delay, the Spanish Constitution of 1812 was also finally proclaimed. The Republican writers of Italy, especially MAZZINI, accuse Charles Albert, Prince of Carignan, (father of the present King Victor Emanuel II.,) of having been the instigator of this revolution and of having betrayed it afterwards; but the historical facts warrant no such conclusion. The Prince was undoubtedly on terms of intimacy with some of the conservative noblemen who corresponded with the heads of the conspirators in Milan, Modena and Parma; but he hesitated in regard to the part assigned to himself, and he certainly had no idea of establishing a *Republic* in Piedmont. The plan, in Milan and Turin, was to reëstablish the Kingdom of Italy, "and to extend it over the whole nation," by attacking the rear of the Austrians after these should have marched upon Naples, and

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then to revolutionize Milan and the Duchies. After the Neapolitans had been beaten, this plan had to be given up, and with it the hope of success. Matters had, nevertheless, proceeded too far to prevent an outbreak. The Lombards promised arms and a general rising as soon as the Piedmontese flag should be unfurled before Milan; but the small Piedmontese army on its march thither was, at Novara, greeted by Austrian cannon.

The King of Sardinia, Victor Emanuel I., at the first sign of revolt, abdicated in favor of his brother Charles Felix, then at Modena, and until his return appointed the Prince of Carignan Regent of the kingdom. As such the latter, to avoid bloodshed, proclaimed the Spanish Constitution of 1812, and pledged his oath to support it; but did not exact either the troops or the civil functionaries of the government to take that oath. On the contrary, he wrote to Charles Felix to tender him his entire submission, and at the same time to ask for instructions. Charles Felix, in reply, annulled all that had been done, ordered the Prince to place himself at the head of the troops who had remained faithful to the king, and threatened the Constitutionalists with the intervention of the Holy Alliance. Upon the receipt of these instructions, the Prince resigned the regency, and with a regiment of horse and some artillery started for Novara where, by order of the king, he resigned his command into the hands of Count della Torre. The Constitutional army, about six thousand strong, arrived almost at the same time, in hopes of influencing the loyalits by its example. But Novara was already occupied, and the Austrians had taken possession of all important passes on the frontier. With the return of the Constitutionalists to Alessandria, the revolution was virtually at an end.

Two things deserve to be remembered in connection with this unfortunate attempt at revolution, on account of their bearing on the present position of the country. First—That no attempt was made at establishing a *Republic;* and, Second, that the revolution was almost entirely confined to the military. The king, who had abdicated in favor of his brother Charles Felix, remained all the time at Nizza, unmolested by the people. To limit the absolute

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power of the sovereign was undoubtedly the wish of the educated among the people; to abolish royalty was no part of their programme. The king, with his chivalrous notions of honor, had abdicated, because "the people, by resisting his authority, had offered him a deliberate personal insult;" and refused to re-assume his crown, though urged by his brother to do so, after the revolution was crushed. It is also worthy of notice that the Emperor of Russia, through his Minister at Turin, attempted to prevent the Austrian occupation of Piedmont by mediation; proposing to the Liberals that they should tender their entire submission to the king on condition of a general amnesty, and "some institution securing the public interest." Prince Carignan, who was thoroughly opposed to Metternich, and who preferred a Russian to an Austrian occupation, advised the acceptance of these terms; but only a portion of the Junta could be prevailed upon to accede to them, and while the negotiations were pending, the blow was struck by the Austrians.

Metternich, as we have already stated, had as early as 1814 conceived the plan of excluding the Prince of Carignan from the succession, and to unite, if possible, Piedmont to Modena, or to Austria herself. Piedmont was the greatest obstacle to Austrian domination in Italy. The geographical position of that kingdom, the warlike disposition of its people, the personal character of its sovereigns, all were opposed to Metternich's ultimate designs. Now, perhaps, was the favorable moment when he could accomplish his object. If the Emperor of Russia could be prejudiced against the Prince of Carignan, he might give his consent: the resistance of France might be overcome. All sorts of calumnies were now circulated at the expense of the Prince; he was surrounded by spies; but the charge of treason against the king could not be established. At the Congress of Verona, both France and Russia united in his protection. The French Minister had received special instructions from his government to insist not only on the speedy evacuation of Piedmont by the Austrians, but also on the speedy return of the Prince, who had been ordered (banished) to Florence. France argued that the successor to the

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throne of Piedmont should be on the spot, "lest his return to his country might be coupled with conditions unfavorable to the balance of power." This sort of reasoning was equally intelligible to Russia. The gravitation of States frequently overcomes the personal predilections of sovereigns; and the policy of the Bourbons was, in this respect, hardly different from that of the French Emperors.

The reaction which followed the military revolutions of 1820—21 was a fearful one. Secret tribunals were established in all the larger towns of Italy, to try political offenders; death or long imprisonment in chains were the usual sentences passed upon them. Those who had fled were hung in effigy, and their estates confiscated. In Milan, where the revolution had not broken out, but where the plans of the conspirators had been discovered by the government, some of the most prominent nobles (among whom Count Confalioneri) were either condemned to death, or to imprisonment for life in irons.* The nobles had been the principal instigators of the revolution, as they were those who most cherished the idea of Italian nationality: on them, therefore, did the Imperial vengeance most heavily descend. Duke Francis of Modena proceeded only against men of mark—professors, doctors and old officers; while the King of Naples, forgetting all honor and shame, revoked all previous pardons and amnesties granted by him, for the purpose of punishing the crimes committed against Majesty since 1793!! The Convention of Casalanza, concluded with the Muratists in 1815, and guarantied by the Emperor of Austria himself, was considered no longer binding. Criminal proceedings were instituted against several thousand persons; eight hundred of whom were actually executed—the rest had either fled or were imprisoned for a term of from 25 to 30 years. In the midst of these horrors, Austria declared that she had no knowledge of the infringement on the terms of the capitulation which she herself had

* What these prisons were, Silvio Pellico has sufficiently described. "Out of sixty who were there confined, all lost their health or their lives—but one, his honor."—Silvio Pellico, "*I miei prigioni.*"

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guarantied; but the Neapolitan hangmen averred that they were only doing the behests of the Austrian Minister. Even the torture was re-introduced to extort confessions. Books and pamphlets of a revolutionary character, among which the Italian classics themselves were numbered, on account of their liberal tendencies, were burnt in public; while the owners of libraries consigned them voluntarily to the flames to avoid being prosecuted. This reactionary rage, as might be supposed, rendered the presence of the Austrian troops necessary to public tranquillity; so that at the end of three years, when the occupation was to cease, a new one had to be agreed upon, which in 1825 had again to be extended for two years. The whole cost of this Austrian occupation, from 1821 till 1827, has been estimated at 157,000,000 ducati, or about $125,000,000! The Austrian commander-in-chief, General Frimont, received for himself alone a gratification of 220,000 ducats!*

The punishment of the conspirators in Parma consisted chiefly in imprisonment which, by the mercy of Maria Louisa, was soon changed into exile. In Tuscany the mildness of the Grand Duke, Ferdinand III., saw no causes for criminal prosecutions. He died in 1824, regretted by his people.

The successor of King Ferdinand I. of the Two Sicilies, Francis I., was even more cruel and blood-thirsty than his predecessor. He ordered whole villages, where the rebels or conspirators had taken refuge, to be leveled to the ground and, on their ruins,

* The chief instigator of all these enormities was the king's minister, Prince Canosa—the founder of the political sect of the Tinkers, whom the king had met at Florence on his return from the Congress of Laibach. It was this monster who first advised the king to revoke the amnesty of Casalanza, guarantied by the Emperor Francis himself; and his reactionary rage was only arrested by a ruse of M. Rothschild the banker. Naples, to pay the troops of Austria, wanted to make a "loan;" but Rothschild, who had already advanced some sixty-four millions of francs, refused to lend another penny unless Medici, who had been disgraced, were made Minister of Finance. Medici, in turn, refused to accept the office unless Canosa was dismissed, which was accordingly done. Medici, grateful for this service of the banker, concluded the first loan at fifty-six, the second loan at seventy-one per cent. Never was humanity discounted at so high a rate!

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public monuments of disgrace to be erected by the hangman. Every species of vice disgraced his court; justice, honors, and dignities were for sale; nothing so much disregarded as law.* "It is but too true," said the conservative Chateaubriand, then French Minister in Rome, in one of his dispatches to his government, "that the Neapolitan government has fallen to the lowest depth of public contempt."† What there was left of an army was so vile and decrepit, that Neapolitan sentinels are reported to have asked alms from strangers.

In Rome, Leo XII. had succeeded to the mild Pius VII. Under him feudal institutions were revived, and some five hundred Carbonari excommunicated and sentenced to imprisonment. No capital punishment, however, was inflicted. Conspiracy was *in future* to be punished by death; concealing arms, with twenty years' hard labor; and whoever suspected another of belonging to a (political) "sect" without denouncing him to the government, was to be sent for seven years to the hulks. The national men, nevertheless, praised Leo XII. for resisting Austrian influence, and this the more so as, under his successor Pius VIII. and his Secretary of State, Cardinal Albani, that influence began again to show itself in the lawless conduct of the "sects" and in the exercise of arbitrary power.

It is remarkable that Austria, with all the additional preponderance she had acquired from the unsuccessful revolutions of 1820 and 1821, was nevertheless unable to induce the Princes of Italy, including the Pope, to enter into a confederacy under her Protectorate. The only union she effected was the hatred of all Italians of her detested rule, and the universal execration of the monstrous doctrines of intervention, by which every liberal progress was not

* It was believed in Naples, and is mentioned by the historian Colletta, that Carobreso bought the place of Minister of Finance for 30,000 ducati of the king's valet. This wretch enjoyed the king's confidence—because he could neither read nor write. The ladies of the queen's bed-chamber carried on a similar traffic in offices.

† Another remarkable dispatch of Chateaubriand's on the state of Italy may be found in his *Memoires d' outre-tombe*, which we recommend to the reader.

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only crushed in Italy, but throughout Europe. The Congresses of Laibach and Verona, and the armed interventions in Naples and Piedmont, carried their moral into Germany, and there too, in spite of the Constitutions given by some of the smaller Princes, destroyed the hope of political regeneration. To crown her trophies in Italy, Austria concluded in 1822 a treaty with Parma, by which she acquired the right to garrison *Piacenza*. The strength of the garrison was to be determined by Austria. Parma was to furnish the buildings necessary for their accommodation; military stores and provisions were duty free. If Ducal troops were in the place, they were to be commanded by Austrian officers. When the Austrian commander declared the fortress in a state of siege, the Duke's officers had no jurisdiction except in civil suits. Austrian engineers alone had to dispose of the fortifications.

This is one of the treaties which have justly given umbrage to Piedmont and France, and which is now practically abrogated by the Peace of Villafranca.

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CHAPTER VII.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON ITALY.

We have now arrived at the period of the French Revolution of July, 1830, which terminated the reign of the restored elder Bourbons in France and promised all Europe a new and more liberal order of things. As the events which have since marked the history of Europe are yet fresh in the minds of most of our readers, a cursory review of them will suffice to comprehend the situation. Louis Philippe, who was called to the throne as the "Citizen King" of the French, and who has since by his friends and the men who served under him been called the "martyr of constitutional freedom," was a man of undoubted capacity, great shrewdness, great knowledge of men; but with very little faith in them and, from a long school of adversity, rather disposed to turn their weaknesses to good account than to trust them. He had put himself in correspondence with the British Ministry from the time Napoleon met with his first reverses in Russia, and it is not improbable that even at that early period he conceived the plan of making himself master of France. He knew the virtues and vices of the French people; he studied the art—so easy for a man in position—to make himself popular, and he had a thorough appreciation of the errors and crimes of European Cabinets. A calm observer of events, sagaciously discriminating between motives and men, and attaching the latter by ministering to their ruling passions, he had without exciting suspicion, and without as yet committing himself to their cause, won the confidence and good will of the leading men of the liberal party. His loquacity, the apparent freedom of his manners and the little restraint which marked his intercourse with all classes of society, gave the court as little concern as they

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did the watchful eyes of diplomacy, and he found himself at the summit of his wishes, before he seemed to have made an effort to attain them. For he added to his many substantial qualities the rare genius of patience. He saw the car of the elder Bourbons safely placed on the inclined plane, and he had the wisdom not to interfere till it had, by its own weight, descended from its elevated position. When, by the confiding weakness of General Lafayette, perhaps by the financial apprehensions of Lafitte the banker, he was finally invited to step into it, he at once seized the reins and, with the grace of a legitimate monarch, bid his friends to take their places behind him. No one could simulate surprise better than himself; no one appeared to be more at home in his new situation. The latter was sufficiently accounted for by his royal extraction; the former was shared by all Europe.

Louis Philippe was no sooner placed on the throne, than he employed the most energetic means of preserving it to himself and to his heirs. The power which had raised him was not that to which he could safely trust his preservation. His mind was too logical to believe in a republican throne; his knowledge of the French people too intimate, to believe that such a throne could satisfy them. He held, for a moment, an immense power; he could wield it to the destruction of all the old political institutions of Europe; but could he do this without destroying himself? It was the instinct of self-preservation, which a perhaps pardonable sophism identified with the preservation of France, which compelled him to disappoint his friends, even if he had no inclination to deceive them. If he would preserve his government, the personal conservatism of the *King* must triumph over the public radicalism of the *citizen*. After sacrificing to the idols of popular enthusiasm, with the sincerity and decency of a devotee, he sent the champion of Legitimacy at the Congress of Vienna, *Mons.* de Talleyrand, to London to secure, by all means, the friendship of that Power which alone could then organize a coalition against him; while, at the same time, his paternal solicitude was already turned towards a family alliance with some of the northern sovereigns. Some wit observed, at that time, that Louis Philippe made Talleyrand his

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minister to London, because he felt uneasy in his presence. The Paris stage was not large enough for two actors of such consummate skill. There was, besides, the danger of extemporizing; memory, especially of favors, being usually weak in old men.

As soon as Louis Philippe had hastily barricaded his throne with the recognition of himself by England, Austria and Prussia (Russia and Modena (!) were hesitating in regard to it) he commenced *fortifying* his position. This he did very skilfully by encouraging reforms abroad, and by impeding their progress at home. He suggested liberal institutions and promised support to the Italians, the Germans, the Poles and the Belgians; but as in Belgium alone there was a chance of providing for his family, the liberals of that country were the only ones who received his actual support. This conduct, while it embarrassed the sovereigns of Austria, Russia and Prussia, by bringing them in actual conflict with their own people, induced them to preserve relations with France; while on the other hand, the citizen king's good understanding with all the European powers, acted as a check upon the liberal ardor of his own people. It was now in vain for the Republicans to organize in the streets. The soldiery and the police did their duty, and the leaders of the movement excited no popular enthusiasm. The authorities were prepared, and the people had already learned to distinguish between an *émeute* and a revolution.

Neither was the piteous cry of "treason," now uttered by a portion of the French press until it was gagged, justifiable. Louis Philippe had been received without a pledge, except that of enlarging the franchise, which he kept; and he had promised nothing except that the charter should be a truth, which was to be demonstrated. It was not his fault or crime, if the accidents of his birth and training did not correspond with the beau ideal of Citizen Royalty as it existed, after a three days' fight, in the minds of a heroic people. There was no dignity in the public despair of Lafayette and his friends. Why did not the amiable old marquis study Macchiavelli's "Prince," instead of adding one to the number? The distance of Louis Philippe from legitimacy did not diminish that which separated him from the people; and he could

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not make war upon a principle which, however invaded, was the only substantial claim to the position he now occupied.

Louis Philippe saw, not without a certain degree of apprehension, the rising of Belgium, Poland, a portion of Germany and the provinces of Parma and Modena with nearly four-fifths of the population of the Roman States. He was, no doubt, in favor of limited Constitutional governments every where; but concerned lest the reforms about to be introduced abroad might create a taste for others, and in the end affect France. To prevent this, he sought to restrain rather than to encourage the popular impulse which the people of those countries had received by the French Revolution. He held out hopes, but delayed action; he freely volunteered his advice; but never supported it with the power of the State. This course, which was condemned by public opinion in France, involved his government in logical contradictions, and unavoidably lent it the color of reaction. It was now difficult for him to preserve the reputation of political honesty; while his government, no longer the exponent of popular sentiments in France, lost its momentum also in the councils of Europe.

As a means of favoring the liberal cause, and of restraining the action of the absolute Powers of Europe, the doctrine of Non-Intervention was now not only preached by all the diplomatic agents of the new French government, but openly proclaimed in a speech of the citizen king's minister of foreign affairs in the French Chamber of Deputies. But Metternich who, in the mean time, had read Louis Philippe, was not the man to be deterred from his purpose by a mere abstraction. The practical value of a principle of government depends entirely on the disposition and means to enforce it. So reasoned Prince Metternich; so, unfortunately, did not reason the Italian liberals. They rose in the Duchies, and in the Legations of the Papal States, while an Austrian army was already being collected to invade them. As a matter of form—perhaps to convince Louis Philippe that he was not deficient in diplomatic etiquette—Metternich had inquired, through the Austrian minister at Paris, what consequences might ensue if Austrian Imperial troops interfered in Italy? To which, imitating

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the language of the Delphic oracle, the Citizen King replied: "If the Austrians occupy Modena, war is *possible*, if they enter the Papal States war is *probable;* but if they enter Piedmont, war is *certain*." Without waiting for this answer, however, the Austrian army commenced its march.—The situation of Europe had not changed. Public law was still enacted by violence, and only subsequently squeezed into legal forms. Louis Philippe became the "Napoleon of Peace."

The rising in the Papal States began with the interregnum which followed the death of Pope Pius VIII., and assumed the form of revolution under his successor Gregory XVI. In Bologna, the insurgents had actually formed a provisional government, when Austrian troops compelled them to withdraw, and to surrender their power (on condition of a general amnesty) into the hands of the Cardinal Legate. Then, and not till then, France *protested* against the Austrian invasion. Upon this protest, the Austrians evacuated Ancona; but the Legations remained occupied, while the French government practised the Christian virtue of charity, by affording a scanty relief to some 1500 Italian fugitives. Reforms were now again proposed to the Pope, and conferences held for that purpose by the ministers of France, Austria, Russia, Prussia and Piedmont. England had sent a Commissioner. It was by such *proposals* Louis Philippe fought the Austrians in Italy; as to the doctrine of non-intervention, he merely applied it against himself. The result of the conferences, was a *memorandum* signed by all the ministers and presented to the Papal Government on the 21st May, 1831, in which the Plenipotentiaries recommended in substance the admissibility of laymen to civil and judicial offices of the government, municipal reform in the capital and in the provinces; and regulation of the finances of the State. But the Pope considered this an interference with his temporal power, and granted nothing but a general amnesty.* When the French minister insisted on the evacuation by the Austrians of the Papal Legations,

* Thirty-eight of the ringleaders of the revolution only were excluded from this amnesty. No confiscation of property took place.

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his demand was only acceded to on condition that the Austrians should be called back again if new troubles ensued. Even to this humiliating condition France assented for the sake of peace. No sooner, however, had the Austrian troops left the Legations, than fresh troubles, as might have been expected, *did* ensue, and the Austrians *did* come back to reëstablish order. But their presence gave the Holy Father some uneasiness; as they were a check on the Papal partisan soldiers as well as on the insurgents, and as he had reason to believe Metternich was entertaining the project of dividing the Legations and the Marks with Naples and Tuscany.

Louis Philippe, unable to prevent the military occupation of the Legations by the Austrians, and fearing the meeting of the French liberal chambers, now resolved to occupy Ancona as a "guarantee against Austria." He had, however, the prudence to communicate his resolution to Cardinal Bernetti who, with Christian resignation, made the following written reply:—"The Holy Father will not consent to it; but the Fathers of the Church have often been obliged to yield with resignation to superior force. The Pope has become used to the exercise of that virtue. No opposition will be made to an accomplished fact." This note, evidently dictated by the Papal fears of Austrian designs, and containing rather an invitation than a protest in regard to the proposed action of France, was confidentially communicated by Louis Philippe to Prince Metternich, and was the cause of Cardinal Bernetti being afterwards replaced by Cardinal Lambruschini. Being thus secured against all warlike complications, a French fleet with 1500 soldiers was dispatched against Ancona. After it had been long enough in sight to warn the commander of the place, the troops landed on the night of the 22d March, entered through an unguarded gate of the town, and actually succeeded in capturing the commander, who was fast asleep in his bed. The "Napoleon of Peace" had achieved a victory! The achievement was communicated in due form to the French Chambers, and received by them as an earnest, on the part of the king, to insist on liberal reforms in the Papal States. The country was satisfied. Both Austria and France had, in the mean

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time, assured the Pope that "the integrity and independence of the Papal States, were the objects of their deepest solicitude."

The presence of the French troops at Ancona, and the declaration of the French minister in the Chambers, inspired the Italians with fresh delusive hopes, and gave rise to new outbreaks, all over Italy. In Ancona itself, the free corps attacked the Papal *gens d' armes* and killed the Gonfalioneri, so that the French themselves were obliged to drive the liberals out of the city. Similar risings were put down by Swiss troops, and the prisons were again filled with political victims. The French occupation lasted several years; but it did nothing for Italy, except that it involved thousands of credulous men in conspiracies and ruin, without adding a particle to the lustre of French arms. Simultaneous with the revolution in the Papal States, those of Modena and Parma were put down by military force. Hundreds were executed; yet from that period, to the commencement of the last war, conspiracies and public manifestations continued. The prison and the scaffold had lost their terror to an agonized people in despair.

As in the Papal States, so was the policy of Louis Philippe in regard to Naples only calculated to bring discredit on French influence. As the uncle of the new King Ferdinand II., who had succeeded to the crown of the Two Sicilies in 1830, Louis Philippe undertook to advise him to establish a Constitutional Government after the French model. Metternich made a different proposition with better effect. The following is the answer which Ferdinand II. returned to the Napoleon of Peace. It is very striking, and deserves to be remembered:

"*Monsieur mon frère*, cousin and very dear Uncle! Willingly would I approach the France of your majesty, which can only be moderate and loyal; but I am tied by former treaties and alliances, to which I must remain faithful, and this the more so, as it is they, which came to my aid in the dark days of my family. To approach the France of your Majesty, if it can ever become a principle, it would be necessary to upset the organic law which forms the basis of our government, and plunge into the abyss of the politics of the Jacobins, for the sake of which my people has more

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than once proved faithless to the House of its Kings. The revolutionary spirit has always been fatal to the family of the Bourbons, and I, for my part, am resolved to avoid, at all hazards, the fate of Louis XVI. and Charles X. With God's aid, I hope to promote the welfare of my people, and to administer the government honestly. But I shall be King. I shall be alone, and always King.

"His Majesty the Emperor of Austria had some flattering words for me, together with some propositions as an Italian Prince for the maintenance and consolidation of the political system, and *concerning the territorial limitation of the Peninsula.* Not having the ambition to increase my State, I shall not suffer that others overstep the limits prescribed by treaties. I shall listen to everything that it may please the Prince Metternich to communicate to me; but I shall always act according to the dictates of my heart, and in the interest of my Kingdom.

"In the mean time, I confess to your Majesty, with all sincerity, that in everything which concerns the peace and loyalty of the political system of Italy, I incline to the ideas which long experience has shown to Prince Metternich to be salutary and efficient. I have inherited much anger, many senseless desires, all manner of faults and weaknesses from the past; I must begin the work of restoration, and this I can only do by approaching Austria, without subjecting myself to her will. The Bourbons are old, and if they were to remodel themselves after the fashion of the new dynasties, they would become ridiculous. We will do as the Habsburgers. If fortune betray us, we will, at least, not betray ourselves."

The Citizen King seeing that his advice was disregarded, had recourse to menace—through a third person. He sent the King, through his minister in Naples, a memorandum written by William Pepe, in which the latter threatened Naples with a dreadful revolution, but offers to prevent it if the King would grant a Constitution. The King, in reply, assured the French minister of his readiness to put the revolution down, and to ask *the aid of the Austrians only in the last extremity.* To prevent the necessity of Austrian aid, Louis Philippe had William Pepe arrested at Mar-

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seilles, just as the latter was proceeding to Ancona to organize a corps for the insurrection of Calabria. Louis Philippe preferred to support the Italian Refugees in France, rather than allow them to expose their lives in dangerous attempts at revolution in their own country.* A few isolated attempts at assassination, and a "storm petition" of the Notables in Naples, including the name of the Minister of Police, Intonti, was all that followed; but France being quiet, all was crushed, and the petitioning minister Intonti himself packed off to Vienna.

* He practiced the same liberality toward the Polish Refugees of 1830, and offered pious vows for the national independence of Poland in his annual speech from the throne.

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CHAPTER VIII.

THE SUCCESSION OF CHARLES ALBERT TO THE THRONE OF SARDINIA.

Charles Albert Prince of Carignan succeeded, in April, 1831, to the throne of Sardinia. It is difficult to describe the character and actions of this prince, in regard to whom the Italian historians themselves so widely differ. The Radicals, the partisans of a red Italian Republic one and indivisible, with Joseph Mazzini at their head, represent him as a hypocrite and a traitor, who first promoted and then betrayed their cause, or give him at best credit only for favoring the nationality of Italy to increase his own territorial possessions. The German historians,* who treat the matter more philosophically, the Piedmontese historian Count Balbo, Farini and others equally entitled to credit, have come to a different conclusion. That his acts, as Prince of Carignan, and afterwards as King of Sardinia, were contradictory, appears on record; but to judge of them correctly, the political position of Piedmont and its king must be taken into consideration. For years, as we have seen, Metternich sought to exclude the prince from the throne, then an attempt was made, and only frustrated by Louis XVIII., to exile him for a number of years from his own country. After that he was surrounded by Austrian spies, and he knew that these were among the highest classes of society, and among the very ministers of state and of his own household. The pompous letter of Mazzini, addressed to him at the time of his succession, as from an equal to his fellow, and the many public manifestations of sympathy, on the part of the people, with the principles proclaimed at the French Revolution, were not apt

* Especially the German historian Reuchlin, who is even by the Austrian champions quoted as the most impartial of all, and whom the author has largely consulted.

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to strengthen his confidence in the moderation of the popular party and its leaders; while Metternich's positive declaration, through his minister at Turin, that Austria would never suffer the return of the exiles of 1820—21, or the granting of a Constitution, necessarily arrested his plans in that direction. He had no army to resist an Austrian invasion, no finances so regulated as to create one, and his diplomatic relations with the other Great Powers of Europe had not improved since 1820. At that time, France and Russia earnestly espoused his cause; while the revolution of 1830 had again united Austria and Russia, and while his open espousal of the Salic law of succession in Spain and Portugal—the law by which himself had succeeded to the throne—threatened even a rupture with England. Under these circumstances, Charles Albert could not but hesitate with the execution of his plans of reform. He stood between invasion and revolution, between a reactionary and a republican party; or, as himself wrote, between the poison of one sect and the poignard of another. In the mean time conspiracies, real or manufactured, were discovered by the police, (the head of which, La-Scarena, was suspected of being an Austrian agent,) and its objects revealed to the king, as a warning against liberal concessions; whilst Mazzini publicly announced that he had money and men enough to invade Savoy. Mazzini actually arrived with a few hundred men and a Polish general in Switzerland, from which he issued his "Proclamation to the Italian Nation." But Mazzini, on this occasion, and later at Rome, proved that he was not intended by Providence either for a captain or a soldier, and that a man may be very sincerely and honestly devoted to a great cause, without being qualified for a leader. The insurrection turned out to be nothing but a conspiracy, and proved a miserable failure. The fact is proved, beyond all controversy, that some of the men in Mazzini's camp, and apparently the most zealous among them, were actually Austrian spies in disguise, who betrayed his plans long before they were executed. Mazzini's movements served to embarrass the King of Sardinia, and contributed in no small degree to further, unknown to himself, the designs of Prince Met-

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ternich. The only result attained by this ardent and confiding devotee to Republican freedom, was the ruin of some hundred families by execution, imprisonment or exile, in order, to use one of the misguided patriot's own phrases, "that despair might seize upon many, and thereby prepare a general resistance to the government." How the substantial Austrian army was to be got rid of, how a force capable of resisting it was to be organized and maintained, was beyond the plan of the conspirators. They were persevering and, to a certain extent, successful agitators; but never effected more than a partial rising in one or the other province. "Young Italy," no more than "Young Germany," appreciated, at its just value, the power to overcome, or the means required to accomplish such an end; neither do they seem to have understood the employment, *ad interim*, of antagonistic forces to obtain approximate results. They were in hot pursuit of a political beau ideal, no matter at what cost, or with what chance of success. The teachings of statesmanship were excluded from their councils; for "Young Italy" admitted no man as a member who had passed the age of forty. They were all Spartans, without Spartan respect for age and experience. Placed between the antagonistic influences we have described, the King of Sardinia, Charles Albert, did all that could reasonably have been expected of him. He introduced the strictest economy in his finances, and he created an army capable, if necessary, to defend the independence of his States. After the warning Metternich had given him, he knew that to make liberal concessions to his people was to declare war against Austria, and he had sense enough to know that war against Austria could not be waged with undisciplined troops and an empty treasury. Metternich at once guessed the meaning of these preparations, and, through his agents in Turin, did all in his power to divert the king from his purpose. But Charles Albert persevered, and such was the order, regularity and economy introduced into the public treasury that in 1834, just one year after Gioberti and Garibaldi* had attempted to revolutionize his country, and while

* Both were, in 1833, exiled for conspiracy.

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Mazzini was threatening with the invasion of Savoy by the Republicans, he was able to obtain at home a loan at 12½ per cent. premium; while Rothschild, in 1838, offered for another loan a premium of EIGHTEEN per cent.! The condition of his army in 1840 was already such that when Austria, which, on account of the Egyptian question, had assumed a hostile attitude toward France, sought a union with Piedmont against that Power, the king could threaten with calling out the reserves, and with maintaining an armed neutrality. This, at all events, was acting with more decision than Louis Philippe, with a single exception, had ever exhibited in his mode of treating Italian questions.* On another occasion, when Austria urged him under threats to some unjust concession, Charles Albert declared "he would sooner be flayed alive than dishonor his crown," and on still another occasion, after he had refused to receive a dispatch couched in improper terms, he avowed "that, in the worst case, he and his two sons would mount on horseback and play the part of Schamyl, rather than yield to Austria."

While the King of Sardinia was thus gradually preparing for a mortal conflict with that Power, which up to that period had shown itself able and determined to crush, by military force, every attempt to establish liberal institutions in Italy, Mazzini and his organs denounced him as a "tyrant" and "traitor" whose only object was to increase his own power. The only element of national defence against Austria was the army and military spirit of the King of Piedmont; yet both were systematically discredited by "Young Italy." While yet groaning under the tramp of the Austrian soldiery, they already feared to be subjugated by the King of Sardinia!

We have seen how Austria defended herself against the best army in the world united to that of Piedmont, and with all the

* The exception here alluded to consists in the declaration of the French minister, the Duke de Broglie, to the three monarchs of Russia, Austria and Prussia assembled at Munchen-Gratz in Bohemia, that his master would not suffer an armed intervention in Belgium, Switzerland or Piedmont, and that an Austrian army would meet a French one in the last named country.

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people of Northern and Central Italy arrayed against her almost to a man; and yet Mazzini hoped to overthrow the Austrian host in Italy by a simple insurrectionary movement! His motto is—*L'Italia fara da se* (Italy will do for herself). He wants to reconstruct Italy on the principles of "Liberty, Equality, Independence, Humanity, and Unity," without reference to her former history. In a more general sense, Unity, Republicanism, and Democracy form his political Trinity. He unites the mysticism of the Germans, with the glowing imagination of his Southern nature, and he possesses the essential qualities of all prophets—he believes in himself and in his mission. He is, nevertheless, a *product* of the unfortunate situation of modern Italy, not the man who is destined to change it. He is, in spite of his fiery composition, an amiable though not a harmless German dreamer. Let the governments of Italy be established on a more liberal basis—let them approach that union which is the hope, the thought, the faith of every political heart in Italy, and Mazzini's abstract theories will soon vanish into thin air. Himself will be obliged to become practical, and to assist in rebuilding and remodeling, instead of destroying the political institutions of his country.*

In 1835 the cholera appeared in Italy, and committed dreadful ravages; but it neither diminished the conspiracies nor the number of their victims. In Sicily the rebellion was crushed by military force and the government of the island definitely united to that of Naples. The Austrians had evacuated the Papal States; but in 1841 conspiracies were again rife in the Legations. Bands of armed insurgents had beaten the Papal troops, but the expected

* The last letter addressed by Mazzini to the present King of Sardinia, since the conclusion of the late war, in which he offers him the support of the Republican party on certain conditions, is an approach to returning common sense; but the conditions imposed are as impracticable and extravagant as ever. Why does not Mazzini take a lesson from Garibaldi? The Mazzinists did their best to ruin the cause of Charles Albert in 1848—49; and their movements in Lombardy and Naples at that period only helped the cause of despotism by dividing the forces of the liberals. Has the experience of the past no warning for them? When will Mazzini (born in 1808) be of the age which, by the statutes of the society, excludes him from the association of YOUNG ITALY?

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simultaneous rising in Naples did not take place, and all ended again in useless bloodshed. No more fortunate was the attempt of the brothers Bandiera to revolutionize Calabria. Republican virtue increased the number of its victims; the state of Italy remained as desperate as before.

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CHAPTER IX.

POPE PIUS IX. AND THE ROMAN REVOLUTION.

The most important epoch in the modern history of Italy commences with the election of Pope Pius IX. on the 16th of June, 1846. His election had been brought about against Austrian influence, and his inclinations were evidently toward France. One month precisely after his election he published a general amnesty, embracing all political offenders—a measure of benevolence which extended to more than two thousand unfortunate persons till then either in exile or in prison. The scene which followed is indescribable. The people surrounded the Quirinal and on their knees asked the Holy Father's blessing. "It was," says Reuchlin, "as if the angels in chorus saluted Christmas morning; to those who left their dungeons, it was Easter and they left their tombs." On that day many new converts were made to the Catholic faith, many sceptics cured of their scepticism.

The Pope evidently meditated reform. He commenced by diminishing the rigor of censorship of the Press; he allowed the people peaceably to assemble and express their wishes, and he struck patriotism and Italian sentiments from the list of political crimes. Austria, or rather Metternich, as yet unwilling to oppose these measures openly—perhaps afraid lest such an open opposition might cause a general rising in the Austrian provinces of Italy—resolved to defeat the liberal movement by pushing it to extremes. In league with all the reactionary factions, his agents sought to persuade the people and their leaders that instead of *petitioning* for reforms they must boldly *demand* them, and by exhibiting power, cut off the chance of a refusal. Metternich shrewdly calculated that the Pope possessed no military force to oppose a violent popular movement, and that in case of an outbreak, no troops

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could be relied upon but those of Austria. Pius IX. had not been on the Papal throne one year, before Metternich offered the Pope's Nuncio at Vienna the intervention of Austrian troops. When that offer was declined, and while the popular enthusiasm for the Pope was at its height, Austrian troops, seven hundred strong, with three pieces of artillery, entered the Papal City of Ferrara. Though the special Treaties of Vienna, already quoted on several occasions, gave Austria the right to garrison the *place* (which term, in French, may apply either to the citadel or the town), nobody could for a moment doubt that the occupation was intended as a political demonstration with a view of intimidating the Pope and the liberal Cardinals. To the British Minister in Vienna Metternich openly declared, in justification of this act of violence, that the Emperor of Austria had *no idea of giving up Lombardy*. The same declaration was made in a circular note of the Austrian Premier to the four Powers—England, France, Russia, and Prussia. The note reiterated the declaration made at the Congress of Vienna, that Italy is nothing but "a body of Independent States, comprised under the same geographical denomination."

Metternich, it is now conceded, labored, on this occasion, under an optical delusion. He really believed the Pope had ulterior views—he expected nothing else than a federal national Italian league with the Holy Father at its head; and feeling that Austria, with the system of government established in the kingdom of Lombardy and Venice, could not enter that league, he was determined to oppose it. In this manner he almost prompted the cry of "away with the Austrians!" which was now raised in every part of the Peninsula. His conscience actually conjured up the spirit of revenge which he dreaded—the phantom of Nemesis seemed to demand its victim.

And what did France—we mean the government of Louis Philippe—do to sustain the Pope? Absolutely nothing. The Citizen King was anxious to remain on good terms with the Holy Father who was the spiritual head of the church of his subjects; but he took care not to urge him to farther reforms, or to give him substantial assurances of his support. Louis Philippe advised reforms when they were

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opposed; when he found the Pope predisposed in favor of them, he dreaded their sudden introduction. His fleet, sufficiently strong to overawe Austria, remained at Naples (why was it not sent to the Adriatic—to Ancona?), while his Minister in Rome, who was at the end of his diplomatic resources, wrote long reports to Paris, and demanded further instructions. That Austria intimidated the Pope—that she was in league with the reactionary minister Margherita in Turin, Abercromby's dispatches to the British government express in so many words;* while Metternich's own letter to Cardinal Ferretti, the Pope's new Secretary of State, plainly avows his disposition to look with favor on the correction of abuses, but not on the "introduction of new ideas which are worse than the abuses themselves." The new *idea* here referred to was the Italian nationality. As to France, the Roman statesmen perceived soon enough that Louis Philippe, with his designs on Spain (as evinced by the marriage of the Duke of Montpensier his son with the Spanish infanta Louisa) could not afford to pick a quarrel with Austria; while England, on the contrary, whose alliance with France had been considerably weakened by this marriage, had an additional interest in furthering the independence of Italy. Hearing of the friendly disposition of that country, the liberal Cardinal Secretary of State is reported to have exclaimed: "All hail, England! We have now both Providence and England on our side!"

The liberal sentiments of Pope Pius IX. gave Metternich more concern than all the Secret Societies, and all the Committees of Young Italy, Young Poland, and Young Germany put together. By the process of intimidation, by agents in the very Cabinet of Charles Albert, and by fomenting difficulties between the Sovereigns of Modena, Tuscany, and Parma, he had succeeded in preventing Constitutional government from being introduced into any of these States; but when the head of the Catholic Church himself had become the champion of reform, when his praise was reëchoing, not only in every part of England, but in Protestant Germany

* They quote the language employed by the Sardinian Minister, and leave no doubt as to the truth of Abercromby's statement.

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and in Mahometan Turkey,* nothing short of an armed intervention seemed to be able to arrest the progress of liberal ideas. The power of the spiritual sovereign of Rome, when wielded for the temporal benefit of Italy, became irresistible; religious differences themselves seemed to melt before it, and the glorious idea of reuniting the Church dawned once more upon the minds of the faithful. Father Ventura, afterwards chaplain to the Emperor Napoleon, at the funeral sermon, preached in the church of St. Andrea della Valle in Rome, over the dead body of Daniel O'Connell, who had gone to Italy to receive the blessing of the Pope, but who died at Genoa on the 15th of May, 1847, used these fiery words:—"Despotism is a Heathen element; liberty is the Christian one. If the Sovereigns of Europe, those successors of old barbaric chieftains, persevere in their irreligious despotism, then the Church will turn towards Democracy; it will consecrate the lowly maiden and say: Rule!—and Democracy shall rule." Had there been statesmen, then, to guide and restrain the passions of the Roman people, as there were agitators and agents of Mazzini who filled them with distrust against the Pope—had the demands for reform been always couched in terms not to alarm the sense of security of the sovereign—had the Roman Patriots been content with instalments, and not pressed forward for payment in full of a long outstanding debt, the probability is the Papal States would now enjoy a better temporal government. The Pope had already adopted the great—the capital measure of introducing laymen into his civil government; he had instituted the *Council of State*, with the exclusive privilege of reporting directly on all financial measures (the essence of every state not governed by absolutism), and his whole conduct had given proofs of his sincerity in promoting the welfare not only of his own people, but that of the people of the whole Peninsula. The force of his example was irresistible. It had given rise to peaceable reforms in Modena, in Parma, in Tuscany, and in Piedmont; the resistance of the King

* The Sultan had sent an Ambassador to Rome, to assure the Pope of the protection, by the Sultan, of the Catholics in his dominions.

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of Naples alone led to open rebellion. During all this time the first Catholic power, France, did nothing to sustain the Pope; England promised more than she intended or was able to fulfil; while the very fact that the liberal reforms in the Papal States were supported and encouraged by England—a Protestant power—was taken advantage of by the Austrian reactionary party, to impeach the sincerity of the head of the Catholic church. His orthodoxy was now questioned, and hints thrown out that he aimed at exchanging his spiritual power for a worldly one. A Vienna paper went even so far as to express the hope that he had not been "tempted by Satan in being shown the kingdoms of this world." In this manner the Pope was made to doubt the correctness of his own course; his conscience was troubled, and the moment precipitated when he believed he had to choose between Religion and Reform. Instead of avoiding, at that critical moment, whatever could alarm or excite the suspicion of the spiritual sovereign of Rome, Mazzini, in a letter dated Paris, 25th of November, 1847, called upon the Pope "to place himself at the head of the national movement, which would otherwise turn from the cross and go its own way." While Mazzini thus threatened to forsake the Pope altogether, Austria and Naples intimated to him that his course, if persisted in, must necessarily lead to a schism in the church, as they had no idea of following in his footsteps.*

As early as January, 1847, Count Lutzow, Austrian Minister at Rome, inquired of Cardinal Ferretti, whether the Holy Father would permit the passage of Austrian troops through his States for the protection of the King of Naples. The worthy Cardinal refused in the most positive manner; adding that, if Austria were to attempt to force such a passage, he himself would go to the frontier and defend it to the last drop of blood. The ambassador, not satisfied with this answer, wanted to see the Pope who, though in a milder

* This may explain why the Emperor Napoleon, at this moment, lays such stress on Austria recommending reforms in the Papal States, and why this recommendation on the part of Austria, was made an article of peace at Villafranca and Zurich. The Emperor of the French insists that the Pope shall no longer be threatened with a schism in his church.

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form, made the same reply. It is to be remarked that Metternich had previously promised the English Minister, Lord Ponsonby, at Vienna, that Austria would not interefere with the Italian States, whose sovereigns were *inclined to introduce reforms*. The King of Naples, being *opposed* to them all, constituted, no doubt, the mental reservation of the Austrian Chancellor of State. Tuscany was in constant dread of an Austrian invasion; the King of Sardinia alone offered to send an army for the protection of the Pope.

It was under these circumstances that the inhabitants of the Papal towns began to arm themselves for the purpose of "repelling the Austrians"—that the necessity of union and armed resistance to Austria was felt throughout Italy—that the issues which were afterwards distinctly presented on the battle-field of Lombardy in 1848, were, in advance, accepted by the Italian mind. In December, 1847, Austria concluded with Francis V., Duke of Modena, and Louis II., Duke of Parma, an offensive and defensive alliance, by the terms of which these two Duchies "*entered into the line of defence of the Austrian Provinces*," and allowed Austria to occupy any important military point within them. By this treaty, Genoa itself was threatened. The King of Sardinia protested against it; but instead of giving any explanation, Austria increased her army in Lombardy.

The display of armed force, the muster of the National Guards, the division of the male population of Rome into sections, led by Heads of the People, (*capi-popolo*,) on one side, and the pressure of the reactionary party, together with the doubts of perhaps the majority of Cardinals in the interest of Austria, produced, at last, that degree of apprehension in the mind of Pius IX. which the leaders of faction were but too apt to construe into fear or a disposition, on his part, to betray the popular cause. On the evening of the 1st of January, 1848, as the people of Rome were preparing for a torch-light procession, to salute the Pope on the advent of a New Year, the news was suddenly circulated that the Quirinal was surrounded by soldiers. The Pope, as it afterwards appeared from the correspondence of Lord Minto, believed himself betrayed and

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his life in danger; but Prince Corsini, then eighty years of age, interceded with the Holy Father, who promised to show himself the next day to the people. He drove past the civic guards, surrounded by an enthusiastic crowd; while the popular coachman, *Ciceruacchio*, so baptized by the humor of the Romans, jumped up behind, and held a flag over his head, with the inscription, "Holy Father, confide in your people." Then it was that the cries, "Long live Pius IX.—*alone!*" were first heard in the city of Rome. The Italian historians relate that, on that day, the Pope's face was pale, and that he trembled. The power of the State now gravitated toward the masses—the reforms, toward revolution. A few weeks from that period, the Italian tri-colored flag was planted by the people, amid the roar of cannon, on the Island of Sicily. The King of Naples, the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the King of Sardinia were obliged to grant constitutions to their people. In February, 1848, Louis Philippe himself was driven from Paris, and the kingdom of France changed into a Republic. At this last event, all Europe stood aghast; but the Holy Father observed with great calmness: "Perhaps the French Republic will be less opposed to religion than Louis Philippe, who, at heart, was always an infidel."

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CHAPTER X.

THE SECOND FRENCH REPUBLIC. THE SARDINIAN CAMPAIGNS. HOW THE ITALIAN CAUSE WAS RUINED IN 1848 AND 1849.

With the French Revolution of 1848, a new era seemed to dawn on the whole European Continent; but it is a mistake to suppose that France, in this instance, gave the first impulse. That impulse, no matter how the radical party in Europe may endeavor to disguise it, was given by the Pope more than a year previous, and had produced its effect on every Italian State. Before there were any symptoms of revolt in Paris, Naples, Turin, Milan or Florence, the Holy Father had granted a general amnesty, instituted his Council of State, his Ministerial and Municipal Councils, and awakened the idea of Italian nationality. But he was not, and could not, from the sacredness of his calling, be a conqueror through the instruments of war, and it was a gross mistake in the radical party to assign to him such a part. His example, nevertheless, had elevated the hopes of the People and produced the emulation of Princes. Naples, Tuscany and Piedmont had already liberal constitutions when Louis Philippe was driven from Paris. The Italian Republicans are wrong in stating that these revolutions would have been effected without the Pope—without the influence which the head of the Church of Rome necessarily exercised on the rulers and people of the other Italian States. It was in his name that the people assembled—it was in his name, and after his example, that reforms were asked for in those States, and it was by his name that the demands for reform were sanctified. Instead of conspirators, there were now patriots avowing their sentiments; instead of secret tribunals, there was a public opinion to approve or condemn men's political actions. Then came the time of trial—the time when statesmen were required to give force and direction to public opinion, and to enjoin that moderation on all

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which, in view of the limited means possessed by the people of Italy, and the magnitude of the object in view, were indispensable to success.

The Italians had risen to drive the Austrians from their soil. They knew that as long as Austria was powerful, they would be treated as subjects, their princes as vassals of that Power. They knew also that she was unrelenting, that she was opposed to constitutional progress in any form, and that, above all things, she was the uncompromising foe of Italian nationality. As long as Austria exercised power in Italy, there was no hope for liberty or national independence. She was now threatened in her own strongholds; the people in her oldest and most loyal provinces had risen to demand reforms, a feeble monarch had been compelled to grant them, and the demand for national institutions threatened the dissolution of her empire. One strong, combined, organized effort might now force her to relinquish her grasp on the Italian Peninsula. The only organized force in all Italy disposable for a movement of that kind was the army of the King of Piedmont, and the king was resolved to employ it for that purpose. But here he was again met by the two opposite factions which, from his accession to the throne, had thwarted his plans, and impeded the progress of reforms. Both the reactionary and the republican party impeached his motives, and represented him to the people merely as a military chieftain thirsting after conquest and territory. Mazzini stigmatized the king's partisans "as the Royal Sardinian party," which was no more to be trusted than the Austrian reactionary party itself.

These aspersions and calumnies had their effect on the people. They dampened their ardor, filled them with distrust and suspicion, and prevented that unity of action which was indispensable to success. When Charles Albert marched his troops into Lombardy, the rural populations did but partially espouse his cause. They neither flocked in overwhelming numbers to his standard, nor were they willing to make the necessary provision for his army which, in consequence, was but indifferently fed and cared for during the

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whole campaign of 1848.* In addition to all this, the Piedmontese army was chiefly composed of new levies; while the Austrians, under Radetzky and Hess, had experienced troops under old generals of established reputation and acknowledged military genius. The odds, assuredly, were largely against the Italians, if the Austrians could hold the fortresses till they were reinforced. The whole number of Italian volunteers in that first campaign against Austria, did certainly not exceed twenty-five thousand, and was probably below that estimate. The King of Naples had sent 15,000 regular troops, the Papal States 10,000 (partly Swiss), the other central Italian States perhaps as many more, to reinforce the King of Sardinia. The Austrians under Radetzky may have been, at the commencement, some forty-five or fifty thousand strong; but they were subsequently considerably strengthened by the troops sent to their relief. The principal difficulty in the way of success, however, consisted in the little reliance which the King of Sardinia could place upon his allies. The Dukes of Tuscany and Modena, though yielding to the popular pressure of the moment, were at heart Austrians, and the instructions given to their commanders partook no doubt of that dubious character, which corresponded to the situation, and was least of all calculated to stimulate their military ardor. Parma, as we have already related, had, by the treaty of December, 1847, been as good as sold to Austria; while the solemn Encyclia of the Pope, declaring that the mission of the Vicar of Christ was one of conciliation and peace, and not of war, was nearly, if not quite, equal to an injunction on his army. But the most disastrous blow inflicted on the Italian cause was the counter-revolution in Naples (15th May, 1848), effected by the king's troops the very day on which Parlia-

* The Austrians expected the same lethargy on the part of the rural population of Lombardy during the last war; but they were mistaken. The people of Central Italy had profited by the lessons of 1848 and 1849; they knew that they could never rise under more favorable auspices. The Republican committees and leaders in foreign countries had lost their influence upon them, and the example of Garibaldi inspired every one with hope and confidence in the sincerity of the King and his new powerful ally.

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ment met, and the consequent dispersion of that Parliament. Absolutism being thus reëstablished in Naples, the Neapolitan troops stationed in Lombardy were recalled, and Radetzky relieved of their presence. Thus forsaken by the sovereigns of Italy, Charles Albert had nothing but his own gallant army and the Italian volunteers to rely upon, who, from distrust of the king, and instigated by republican leaders, obstinately refused to enlist in the regular army, and, in their undisciplined state, were no match for the Austrian troops of the line.

The Austrian quadrilateral having, since the peace of Villafranca, acquired fresh notoriety and importance from its bearing on the Italian question, a short sketch of the campaign of 1848 may, perhaps, serve to illustrate its strength and the advantages resulting from it to an army using it as the basis of its defensive or offensive operations. We quote from a military authority which will hardly be questioned.*

After the revolution of Milan, the defection of the Italian regiments in the Austrian service, and the passage of the Piedmontese across the Ticino, Radetzky marched his army, 45,000 strong, to Verona. Having garrisoned this strong place with 15,000 men, he had still a force of 30,000 at his disposal. Opposed to him, between the Mincio and the Adda, stood 60,000 men—Piedmontese, Tuscans, Modenese and Parmese. In his rear stood the army of Durando, 45,000 men—Neapolitans, Romagnese and volunteers, principally from the province of Venetia. Nothing remained in his possession but the communication with the Tyrol, and even that was (though feebly) threatened by the free corps from Lombardy. Radetzky, nevertheless, maintained his position. The observation of the two fortresses Peschiera and Mantua, required so many Piedmontese troops that on the 6th of May, in their attack on the position of VERONA (battle of Santa Lucia) they could only dispose of four divisions—from 40,000 to 45,000 men. Radetzky, with a part of the garrison of Verona, may have had

* A complete military description of the Austrian quadrilateral was furnished by J. I. Bande, and published in Paris, 1859.

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36,000. The respective forces of the belligerents, therefore, considering the strategical advantages of the position of the Austrians, were already equalized, and the Piedmontese were beaten. The counter revolution in Naples (above alluded to) freed Radetzky from the presence of 15,000 opposing Neapolitans, and reduced the army opposed to him in Venetia to 30,000, composed of 5,000 Papal Swiss, 5,000 Papal troops of the line, and some 20,000 Italian volunteers. The Austrian army of reserve, which had been formed in April, under Nugent, on the Isonzo, easily broke through these troops and, on the 25th May, 20,000 strong, effected its junction with Radetzky at VERONA. Radetzky, thus reinforced, achieved his celebrated flank march to MANTUA, (27th March,) debouched (May 29th) on the right bank of the Mincio, stormed the enemy's line at Curtatone, and advanced (30th May) to Goito, in the rear and flank of the Italians. At Goito he was beaten; but the Piedmontese derived but little advantage from this victory though, on the same day, they took the fortress of PESCHIERA. The weather becoming unfavorable, and not feeling strong enough to risk a decisive battle, Radetzky marched his army back again (4th June) through MANTUA to the Adda, sent the corps of reserve to VERONA, and went, with the balance of his troops, over LEGNANO to Vicenza, which was occupied and fortified by Durando with 17,000 men. On the 10th he attacked Vicenza with 30,000 men, and on the 11th May, Durando capitulated after a brave defence. The second *corps d' armée* took Padua and rendered itself master of the valley of the Brenta and of Venetia generally, after which it followed the first corps to VERONA. A second Austrian *corps de reserve*, under General Welden, now came from the Isonzo. In the mean time, the Piedmontese bestowed great attention to Rivoli, which had played an important part in Napoleon's campaign in Italy, and at the same time laid siege to *Mantua*. Radetzky now conceived the plan of breaking through the Italian centre. On the 22d July, he ordered Rivoli to be attacked, which was evacuated by the Piedmontese on the 23d, and on the same day marched with 40,000 men from VERONA to Sona and Soma Campagna, where, the Piedmontese being but

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14,000 strong, he broke through their whole line of operation. The left Piedmontese wing was, on the 24th July, entirely thrown across the Mincio, while their right wing which had, in the mean time, advanced towards the Austrians, was beaten as Custozza. On the 26th July the whole Austrian army crossed the Mincio, and defeated the Piedmontese once more at Volta. Thus ended the campaign. The Piedmontese evacuated Lombardy and retreated across the Ticino. Through the mediation of France and England an armistice was now concluded, by the terms of which Sardinia surrendered all Northern Italy to the Ticino, including the Duchies which, with Venice, had united themselves to Sardinia. But Venice did not accept these terms, and under the dictatorship of Manin continued its resistance to Austria.

Meanwhile the affairs of Austria proper had taken a pernicious turn, and the progress of the Hungarian rebellion again encouraged the hopes of the King of Sardinia. Both parties prepared for another—a last struggle. Hostilities were resumed on the 16th March, 1849; but the campaign lasted but seven days. At Novara (23d March) the fortunes of war again decided against Charles Albert, who was this time fighting without an ally, and the Powers whose mediation had produced the first armistice felt again called upon to arrest, by diplomacy, the progress of the victors. They effected another armistice for ten years (equivalent to a peace) to which Austria the more readily assented, as she herself had hardly any hope of subduing the Hungarians without the assistance of a third Power.

Thus ended the *campaigns* for Italian independence in 1848 and 1849; but the risings of cities continued, though they were all crushed in turn, and only served, by their many heroic victims, to write in blood the It lian protest against Austrian rule. We have given this short sketch of the military operations of that period, to show what strength Austria still possessed at the time of her greatest embarrassment, and how vain the hopes of the Republican party must have been, to dislodge that Power, without preconcerted action, by the mere effect of popular insurrections! "The Piedmontese," continues our military authority, "had to detach so many

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troops before the quadrilateral of fortresses, that their strength, for offensive purposes, as was proved by the battle of Santa Lucia, was already broken; while Radetzky, the moment he had received his first reinforcements, could already move with perfect ease between the four fortresses; now taking Mantua, now Verona, for the basis of his operations; to-day alarming the rear of the enemy on the right bank of the Mincio, and to-morrow taking Vicenza, and commanding, in all these movements, the initiative. The Piedmontese, it is true, committed many faults; but it is precisely the strength of a position which embarrasses an enemy and obliges him to commit blunders. To observe the fortresses, and to lay siege to one of them, compels the enemy to divide his forces, and to weaken his offensive power; the rivers oblige him to repeat this division of forces, and render it impossible for the corps, thus detached, mutually to assist each other. What force is not required to lay siege to Mantua, as long as the Austrians have an army in the field capable of debouching from the detached forts of Verona!" We beg the reader to take note of this argument, as it had undoubtedly its weight on the wise determination of the Emperor Napoleon, to offer the Emperor of Austria the terms of peace agreed upon at Villafranca. The strength of the four fortresses, as long as Austria is permitted to hold them, can only be counterbalanced by an Italian army in the field, or at least ready to take the field, (the manœuvres of an army in the field being the only defence against an army ensconced behind fortifications) and by the alliance of France.

While the military operations of the King of Sardinia were thus brought to a disastrous conclusion, while the Austrians were increasing their army in Lombardy, and the King of Naples was fortifying his newly acquired despotic power by new enlistments and additional numbers of foreign mercenaries, a new detached revolution broke out in the Papal States. The people of Rome, on the 16th November, 1848, demanded of the Pope an *Italian Constituent Assembly*, a declaration of *war against Austria*, and a ministry ready to carry out both these measures. The Pope, in conceding these demands, yielded but to physical force. He had no

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longer the means to refuse anything, and it is but natural to suppose that the majority of the Cardinals, who had already protested against the surrender of the power of the Church, should not have considered the Pope bound by promises extorted from him under such circumstances. Besides, how could the Holy Father make war upon Austria after the allied Princes of Italy, with the King of Sardinia at their head, had been so signally discomfited? What were his resources, with a handful of troops, an empty treasury and a government of which he was now only the nominal head? In this dilemma, the man of peace fled to Naples. With his flight, the Republicans had everything their own way; but it must have been plain to the humblest capacity, that the Republic of Rome could not act in concert with the King of Sardinia, and that its antagonism to Austria and Naples must soon involve it in war with either or both these Powers. The pious vows of the Pope for one party or the other, could not change the military aspect of things, and the men who divested him of all substantial power, can hardly make him responsible for seeking the protection of those who professed to be his friends. The Pope has no hereditary successor; he is not governed by the ordinary motives of ruling Princes, and he cannot, without ceasing to be Pope, become a Prince by virtue of a *constitutional compact* with his people. It was, therefore, the essence of logic, though ungrateful to the ears of his subjects, when he declined the title of Constitutional Prince which the latter wished to bestow on him. The Pope, in his spiritual capacity, was no more qualified to perform the part which the Republicans had assigned to him, than the King of Sardinia was able to solve the military problem reluctantly entrusted to his hands.

The King of Sardinia, when marching into Lombardy to take the lead in the Italian national movement, had a right to count on the support of the other Italian Princes; but the Republicans, who wished the movement to proceed directly from the People, not only prevented the rising of the masses, but also hinted to the Dukes of Central Italy, and to the King of Naples, that if Charles Albert were successful, they would be mediatized, or at best

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become his vassals. The King of Naples, as we have seen, took the hint at an early date, and acted accordingly; the others went as far as was safe, considering the circumstances in which they were placed. The Piedmontese officers relate, and Republican writers confirm it, that treason existed even in the quartermaster's department of their own army, and that in the bread which was distributed to the troops the day before the battle of Novara, slips of paper were found with the words printed or written upon them: "Piedmontese soldiers! what are you fighting for? You and your king are betrayed!" That Charles Albert was surrounded by conspirators and traitors at his own court—that he had spies and Austrian agents in his own Cabinet—has been clearly established;* that there were men in his army who, entertaining different political views, only obeyed him from "fealty to the king," can hardly be doubted. But the fact that such conspirators and traitors existed in the immediate vicinity of the king, among his own confidential advisers, proves that those who knew him best were most convinced of the sincerity of his devotion, and feared his success. That he hesitated for a long time before he granted a constitution to his people, is true; but we have also stated the reasons which were well calculated to make him pause before he took that important step. To grant a constitution was to declare war against Austria, and the melancholy events which followed that act sufficiently justified his apprehensions.† Charles Albert was indeed an unfortunate sovereign. While yet Prince of Carignan he was, by the intrigues of Prince Metternich, threatened with being excluded from the succession. Then—perhaps from his very hatred of Austria—he was induced to join the pop-

* We have already alluded to the reactionary Count Margherita; also refered to in Abercromby's dispatch to the British government.

† A great point was made by the Republicans of the fact that the King of Naples granted a Constitution ten days sooner than the King of Sardinia. But the Constitution of Ferdinand II. was a *ruse*, and that of Charles Albert, a truth, tantamount to a declaration of war against Austria. Charles Albert, as events have shown, was alone too weak to measure swords with Austria and felt only sure of the assistance of Naples when the King had granted a Constitution. He was nevertheless deceived by him, and by all his other allies.

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ular cause. After that he was exiled by Charles Felix, and only permitted to return by the intercession of France and Russia. When, at last, he succeeded to the throne, he was again threatened by Austria and by contending factions in his own country. A number of attempts were made on his life; others were reported and exaggerated for the purpose of intimidating him; and he was, besides, the special aim of the poisoned shafts of Mazzini who, as a native Genoese, shared the dislike of his countrymen for the monarchical rule of Piedmont. The memory of the glorious days of the Republic yet lives in the minds of the people of Genoa, but the present King Victor Emanuel II. has appeased their hatred of Piedmont and its dynasty.

In extenuation of the faults of Charles Albert, we may yet plead that he considered himself bound by his word—a virtue which he inherited from his ancestors—and that, therefore, he naturally hesitated before he made promises to his people. None of the Piedmontese kings, from the time the French Republic had driven them from the continent to the Island of Sardinia, sought popularity with his subjects by promising them liberal reforms; none, therefore, could be accused of having broken his pledges. This cannot be said of any other Italian sovereign, and least of all of the kings of Naples.* Neither was Charles Albert in league with any reactionary faction in Italy. His natural hatred of Austria, as well as his national Italian sentiments, clear him of all such humiliating suspicions. Only once in his life—perhaps from gratitude for the protection which Louis XVIII. had afforded him against Metternich—he drew the sword against liberty; but it was in Spain, not in Italy. He joined the French army which, under the Duke of Angoulême, in 1823, invaded that country for the

* *Circelli*, one of the ministers of Ferdinand, King of the Two Sicilies, when the latter on the night of the 5th July, 1820, was pressed by the people to grant a Constitution, conjured the King to yield to an unavoidable necessity: "I love your Majesty," said he, "as a father loves his son. Listen and follow the counsel which comes from faithful lips. Grant immediately a Constitution and thus avoid the danger of the moment. May God afterwards aid the most pious and innocent King to recover the rights of the crown from a guilty people!" The King followed the advice of his minister to the letter.

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purpose of reinstating Ferdinand VII., and was present at the storming of the Trocadero. This feat of arms was, perhaps, necessary to facilitate his return to his native country. The French and the Spanish Bourbons could now intercede in his behalf, and he could claim the alliance of Russia. Without the intercession of these Powers, thus sought and obtained, it is highly probable that the Dukes of Modena, that is to say, Arch Dukes of Austria, would now securely occupy the throne of Sardinia—and that Austrian domination would extend over the whole Italian Peninsula.

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CHAPTER XI.

THE POLICY OF PRINCE METTERNICH CONTINUED IN ITALY. VICTOR EMANUEL II. DOWNFALL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC. THE CRIMEAN WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Having thus far sketched the leading events which produced the situation of Italy previous to the last war, it remains for us only to state that we have honestly labored to perform our task without prejudice or partiality. We have consulted Italian, French and German authorities, and among the latter especially *Reuchlin*, who, as the historian most favorable to Austrian views, has been especially commended and quoted by the papers and periodicals in the interest of that Power. But we have not been able to arrive at that author's conclusions. On the contrary, the facts which he relates, and the authorities he cites with the usual honesty and disinterestedness of a German writer, only serve to confirm us in the opposite opinion. It is an error to suppose that the misgovernment of Italy, of Germany and of Austria proper, is merely the result of Metternich's policy, and it is a romantic delusion to imagine that that policy was buried with the Austrian Chancellor. The Austrian policy is of Spanish origin—it is a system inherited from Charles V., which will endure as long as a Habsburger occupies a throne in Europe. Metternich was nothing but its able exponent during a long period of years, which identified him, in the eyes of his contemporaries, with the principles on which he acted. His predecessors and successors have pursued the same policy; though none but Prince Kaunitz, under Maria Theresa, has enjoyed a similar opportunity of arriving at signal distinction. Austria is the living embodiment of the reactionary principle in politics, and all her statesmen must act in that sense. Progress, except in a material direction—which is perfectly compatible with moral decline—national elevation, liberty are her natural enemies, which she is compelled to oppose, to preserve the territorial integrity of her Provinces. When the conquests of the first Napoleon

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drove all Europe into a reactionary coalition, the representative of reaction—the Prime Minister of the reactionary Power *par excellence*—was, for a time, invested with the diplomatic dictatorship; but even that was only in appearance. England exercised the real power behind the scene. As long as Metternich followed in the wake of British statesmen, he was successful; when he separated from them, or rather when England, under the influence of more liberal statesmen, pursued a different policy, better adapted to the spirit of the age, Metternich committed nothing but blunders. That he possessed no political forecast, is proved by the fact that he was surprised by every revolution, until he was at last shaken by the thunder of the insurgents in his own palace. He never had the skill or tact to prevent an outbreak, and he had but one mode of crushing it:—military force. In his negotiations from State to State, he was artful and cunning; but in the execution of his designs seldom employed other than temporary expedients. Napoleon I. characterized him well, when he said: "*Monsieur de Metternich croit faire de la politique, quand il fait de l'intrigue.*" (Prince Metternich thinks he is a great diplomatist when he resorts to intrigue.) To compare him to *Macchiavelli*,* would be doing a monstrous wrong to that preëminent Florentine historian and statesman. Macchiavelli was endowed with the wonderful faculty of deciphering the hieroglyphics of the past, while his divinatory power actually approached to prophetic vision. He was painfully conscious of the calamities which had befallen Italy, and devoting all the energies of his mighty mind to the discovery of the means to unite and save her; while Metternich himself furnished the most damning comment on his statesmanship, by the vulgar motto: "After me, the Deluge."†

* It need hardly be observed in this place, that history has long since cleared the memory of Macchiavelli of the reproaches some of his contemporaries have heaped upon him. No well-read man now doubts his patriotism or his love of liberty. His "Prince," in which, with a masterly hand, he traces the portrait of royalty, has always been at the head of the list of prohibited books in Austrian Italy.

† We are too seriously inclined to jest, much less to *pun*; but if the Deluge is to come *after* Metternich, were not he and his policy necessarily—antediluvian?

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The Austrian system of government in Italy underwent no change by the retirement of Metternich from power; its severity was hardly tempered by the high personal quality of the Arch Duke Maximilian. The Italians must cease to be Italians, before they can become loyal Austrian subjects. Austria must abandon the Peninsula, before she can be just to the Italians. It is sheer nonsense to talk of Italy being obliged to acknowledge either French or Austrian supremacy, and that an Italian revolution can only produce a "change of masters." As well might it be said of Germany, that she must either acknowledge French or Russian supremacy, and that a revolution whose object is union, would only end in a change of masters. No country in Europe, except England, has such natural geographical limits, corresponding so exactly with the limitation of the language of its people, as Italy; and the Italian population exceeds that of Great Britain, and very nearly equals that of the United Kingdoms. If Prussia, with her sixteen or seventeen millions of people, and the most exposed frontier of any State in Europe, can maintain the relations of a Great Power; why should not twenty-six millions of Italians, united under a strong government, be able to preserve their independence? That the Italians look to France as their natural ally, is unavoidable as long as Austria has a foothold in the Peninsula; and the French Republic of 1848 committed a terrible blunder when it did not come to the assistance of Lombardy. It might, then, have accomplished, almost without bloodshed, what has since been the fruit of a most sanguinary war, and it might, by such a step, have prolonged its own existence. But the Italian policy of *Monsieur de Lamartine* and General Cavaignac did not differ much from that of the Bourbons, and merely aimed at a counterpoise to Austrian influence in the Peninsula. For that purpose Rome was occupied, after a most skilful and heroic defence, as an offset to the Austrian successes in Central Italy, and with a view, no doubt, of not being eclipsed by Louis Philippe, who had once rendered the Pope a similar service by the occupation of Ancona. But when the French Republic intervened in Rome, Italy was already prostrate; the battles for national independence at Rivoli and Novara were

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lost, and it was but a few disjected members that continued the struggle, after life had fled from the body. France entered to dispute the spoils to the victors. Austria was not to have it all her own way in Italy; in Vienna, not in Rome, was the French invasion to be felt. If the French had not gone to Rome, the Austrians would have gone there, and the result would have been worse—the future hopeless. The double invasion by France and Austria was a terrible infliction on the Papal States; but the antagonism between these two Powers was the last hope of Italy.

Charles Albert, as we have already related, abdicated the throne* after the unfortunate battle of Novara (23d March, 1849,) and his successor, the present King Victor Emanuel II. succeeded him, after the truce concluded through the mediation of France and England. This chivalrous Prince, now scarcely turned forty, and still in the full vigor of manhood, was not bowed down with the calamities which had befallen his House; but resolved to continue the struggle for the liberation of Italy from the Austrian yoke. As his success at Goito—where, the year previous, the Piedmontese had achieved a splendid victory, and where he himself had received several wounds—had not elated him, so did the crushing defeat at Novara, which placed his country at the mercy of the conquerors, not depress his spirits. With unaltered resolution, and stroking his huge moustache, he stood firm and erect, a prince and a soldier, before the year-stricken form of the Austrian Field Marshal Radetzky, at the interview which took place between them after the battle, in an old farm-house; and the Austrian officers assert that in beholding the two men, it was difficult to say which of them was the victor—which, the vanquished.

The first care of the new king, after he felt secure on his throne, was to reaffirm the Constitution, and to surround himself with men

* The Kings of Piedmont seem, at all times, to have been willing to abdicate when the interest of the State, or their personal honor, demanded such a sacrifice at their hands. It is difficult, in the history of European Dynasties, to find a line of sovereigns more imbued with the sentiment of responsibility to the State and of personal honor, than the Princes of the House of Savoy. They may indeed be called the *Plantagenets* of Italy.

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of decision and experience, earnestly devoted to the liberal cause. No Italian comprehended the situation of Italy and of Europe better than Count *Cavour*, the eminent Sardinian statesman whom Victor Emanuel II. soon selected as his Prime Minister and Counsellor. Austrian pens have been employed to revile him—to represent him as a speculator, an adventurer, a political gambler, a madman; while the Republican exiles have been equally lavish in their abuse of his grasping monarchical predilections. But he heeded one party as little as the other, and pursued his object—the creation of an opportunity to renew the conflict with Austria under more favorable auspices—with a steady hand.* His first object was to continue the political antagonism between Sardinia and Austria, by imparting as much progress and political vitality to the constitutional government of Turin, as there was reaction and political death in Milan. The Constitution must be a truth, the liberties granted must be honestly maintained, in order not only to satisfy every reasonable aspiration of the People and to afford the widest scope for the development of all national resources, but also, by contrast with the other governments of Italy, to stimulate the general desire for liberal and national institutions. The greater the freedom in Piedmont, the more intolerable were the despotisms of Milan and Naples, and the means employed to maintain them. Austria, whose logic of State

* Count Cavour is probably the first living statesman of Europe. He not only understands and appreciates, at their just value, the political, moral and military elements of Italy; but, with a single exception to which we need not point, surpasses his contemporaries also in intimate knowledge of the secret springs of action of the public men of other countries. He is descended from one of the oldest noble families of Piedmont, and numbers St. Francis of Salis among his ancestors. In spite of this high, conservative descent—we say this in all humility and piety—Count Cavour evinced from his early youth an unconquerable predilection in favor of liberal principles, and an ardent devotion to the cause of Italian independence. An eloquent speaker and a persuasive public writer, he soon became a popular leader; though there were many who, from the fact that his father belonged to a different school of politics, questioned the sincerity of his motives. But ten years' constant devotion and labor in the cause of Italy, during which he was the body and soul, not only of the foreign diplomacy of Piedmont, but also of every measure of public interest and improvement at home, have at last identified his name with the cause of Italian freedom, and he enjoys at this hour, the undivided affection and admiration of his countrymen.

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consists in artillery, added new fortifications to Peschiera and Verona; Sardinia rebuilt and enlarged the fortress of Alessandria. Austria strengthened her garrisons; Sardinia nearly doubled her army. Austria complained of Sardianian provocations; Sardinia replied with the fable of the wolf and the lamb, and looked, imploringly, for protection to other Powers. But the Sardinian Secretary of Foreign Affairs was a statesman, not a conspirator, and as such knew how to bide his time. He knew that Victor Emanuel II. had not a single ally among the Princes of Italy, and that the People, whose blood had so recently drenched the battle fields of the Peninsula, required repose to gather strength for a renewed effort. He also knew that Piedmont alone was no match for Austria, and that *political* Italy—something more than a mere geographical division—had as yet to be created. Italy was a beau ideal; the political problem was to introduce her corporeally into time and space.

The new Republic of France—"*la Republique honnette*"—was in the mean time approaching a metamorphosis. It had lost the Democratic sympathies of the people by its weak, temporizing, heartless foreign policy,* and it could not make its peace with the adherents of the system which it had displaced. It played no important part in the tragic scenes which riveted the attention of the

* The French Republic of 1848 evinced as little sympathy for the national cause of the Germans, as it did for that of the Italians. The German minister, Baron Von Raumer, sent to Paris by the provisional government at Frankfort, was not even officially received by the acting President of the French Republic. He was introduced by the Prussian minister, and General Cavaignac received him with an unceremonious "How do you do, my dear Baron; I'm delighted to see you." The literary reputation of the German ambassador, no doubt, entitled him to this charming familiarity on the part of the "Conqueror of the Barricades." Perhaps, too, Cavaignac was a sceptic, who did not believe in the visible ambassador of the invisible German Empire. Koelle, in his "*Diplomatic Aphorisms*" advises young *Diplomates*, when embarrassed, to utter some monstrous absurdity, which generally so disconcerts the other party, as to afford the speaker time to collect his thoughts. "A German *diplomate*" continues Koelle, "need never be at a loss for such a thing. He need only speak of the union of Germany." Unfortunately for the German cause, the German literary ambassador to the French Republic did not even dare to profit by so sensible an advice.

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world, and it emitted no new ideas capable of rallying the nation in its support. The National Assembly was without a Mountain or a Plain—it possessed neither the men to dare, nor those to resist a great movement; while the Socialist principles, which it attempted to enact, struck at the root of all political organization. A catastrophe was unavoidable, and the Empire of 1852 was inaugurated without a desperate struggle either in Paris or the Provinces. The real Democracy of France had become indifferent to the fate of the Republic; the Orleanists were disgusted with it, and the army, with its historical reminiscences of the Empire, decided in favor of LOUIS NAPOLEON. Even the laborers of Paris, expected better things from a Democratic Cæsar, than from the humanitarians, philanthropists and poets of the Republic. To suppose that the immense majority which NAPOLEON III. received at the popular elections, could be obtained by mere intimidation and intrigue, is to betray a very limited knowledge of the French people, and the means possessed by any government of France to prevent the manifestation of public opinion. The army of France is not a separate institution. It is itself a large and most influential part of the people; representing always its youth, its vigor and its actuality. The *Zouaves* and the *Chasseurs de Vincennes*, as martial as they look, and as brave as they are, are after all but French peasants and artisans in red trowsers, and never cease to fraternize with the plow and the workshop.*

The new Imperial government of France adopted at once a firm and decided policy; one of its early acts being the formation of an alliance with England, for the purpose of checking the threatened aggressive movement of Russia against Turkey. The *entente cordiale* which, from that day, has subsisted between the two great Western Powers of Europe was, at first, the object of considerable

* What contributed in no ordinary degree to the downfall of the second French Republic, was the want of security which began to be felt by nearly all classes of society. "Thank Heaven!" exclaimed a sarcastic Parisian lady, at a morning visit from the writer, shortly after the 2d of December. "Thank Heaven, our government is no longer in the street; we have at last found a place to put it in."

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anxiety to the United States;* but Italy and Germany and the Scandinavian Powers of Europe felt reassured by its announcement. The *entente cordiale* between Orleanistic France and England was a mere diplomatic arrangement; but that between Imperial France and England was an historical *event* which promised action and corresponding changes in the future. The circumstances under which it was concluded (on the eve of warlike complications) showed that both governments were in earnest—that Great Britain had overcome her inertia, and that France was about to give vent to her actuality. Had the Emperor Nicholas of Russia appreciated the spirit and vigor of the new government inaugurated in Paris as correctly as he understood the decline and decrepitude of the sick man in Constantinople, and had he, at the same time, put a proper estimate on the recuperative power of Austria, so often illustrated during the progress of the last and present century, it is more than probable he would have pursued a different policy from that which has led to the Crimean war. He would have nursed *two* sick men instead of one, and on the ruin of Austria and Turkey, and in conjunction with France, attempted the solution of the Oriental question. But the Emperor Nicholas, since the Polish insurrection in 1830, was the enemy of all national aspirations, and mistrusted the expansiveness of Democracy even in a monarchical form. If he counted upon the gratitude of Austria, he must have read history to very little purpose.

The Russian war allowed Sardinia to give the world the first manifestation of renewed political vitality. The King may have felt grateful to France and England for the mediation which assured his throne; but his joining the allies was undoubtedly dictated by reasons of State, and by a more intimate knowledge of the character and designs of the French Emperor. It was the first step toward the reëlevation of his kingdom, and to his own reintroduction into the family of ruling European sovereigns. The Piedmontese troops, standing their ground against the acknow-

* The alarm of the United States, on that occasion, seems to have been unreasonable; no alliance having ever outlived the purpose for which it was formed.

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ledged valor of the Russians, regained their lost prestige; the people, their courage. Italy was once more associated with the great events of Europe; she was represented in the council of the Great Powers, and might, in a future struggle, secure an ally to her cause.

But there were yet other considerations that might have influenced the course of Victor Emanuel II. and his minister Count Cavour. Up to the period of the Crimean war, Russia was the dominant Power of Europe. The dread of the Cossack palsied the resolution of the liberals not only in France and Italy, but throughout the continent of Europe. It was the fear of the Cossack which, more than the ghost of 1793, terrified the French Republicans, confounded the German Parliament at Frankfort, and kept Poland from manifesting her sympathy for Hungary. The Czar had put down the Hungarian insurrection in 1849, and it was Russia which, in 1820—1821, assembled a hundred thousand men to assist Austria in crushing the rebellion in Naples and Sardinia. There was no hope for the liberal cause anywhere on the European continent, if Russia remained what she was—a semi-barbarous, yet eminently warlike Power, subject to the will of an energetic autocrat. Sardinia, in joining France and England to prevent the further encroachments of that Power, sacrificed blood and treasure not only for herself, but (as was at that time distinctly admitted even in Germany) for all Europe. That the King of Sardinia and his ministers should, in this new situation, be found the *quasi* allies of Austria, not only attests their consummate statesmanship, but also proves that they possessed that absolute and supreme control over their personal feelings, which could postpone the gratification of revenge to a period when it could be indulged in with less danger and greater profit to the State.

The Emperor of the French, too, whatever may have been his personal motives, advanced the cause of civilization by his war against Russia. He had the tact to perceive that France, under whatever form of government, was not safe from invasion as long as the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia remained in full force. The doctrine of intervention, which that association

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of Sovereigns had proclaimed, and on which it had acted for more than a generation, had at one time (under the restored Bourbons) received the assent of France; while England, though honorably dissenting from it, contented herself with a mere feeble protest against it. The Holy Alliance, therefore, had to be severed, and it was severed by the Crimean campaign. The war, while it evinced the great endurance and defensive strength of Russia, also proved to Europe her little aggressive power, and the extreme difficulty with which (in the present imperfect state of her railways and river navigation) she can concentrate a considerable military force on a given point. Russia, by the Peace of Paris, lost the absolute control over the Danubian Principalities (which are now placed under the protection of the Five Great Powers), the formidable navy which she had collected in the Black Sea, and the command of the mouths of the Danube. These things were sufficient to diminish her prestige in Europe, and to allow Austria to assume, for a time (till the commencement of the last war), the special protectorship of Turkey. Practically, Russia lost nothing that she will not regain in a little time, especially as the ally of France; but, for that purpose, she must introduce great political reforms into her government and develop her internal resources, which she is now doing under the auspices of an enlightened and humane sovereign. Russia, after changing the serfs of the nobles into crown peasants,* and after completing the system of railways

* Among the many plans for emancipating the serfs, the following appears, perhaps, to be the most feasible and just. Let the lands which the serfs occupy, and the income which the nobles derive from them in the shape of rents and labor, be appraised, and let the government issue to the nobles an amount of stock which, at the rate of three per cent. *per annum*, will indemnify them for the loss of that income. To enable the government to pay that interest, let the serfs be assessed, to a corresponding amount, in the shape of direct taxes, secured by the real estate of which the serfs will, by this process, become holders in *fee simple*. By such an operation, provided the appraisers are sensible and honest men, neither the State nor the nobles would be subject to loss; while the serfs would hereafter enjoy the benefit of the improved lands. To the nobles it would be a convenience, because it would enable them to realize, at once, their annual income, or to dispose of it altogether, with the property itself, by the sale and transfer of the stock; while the possession of the lands would stimulate the industry of

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now projected or in progress of construction, will be twice as powerful as she was before the Crimean war, with natural facilities not shared by any other nation except the United States. But for the present, Russia is occupied at home, and obliged to regain her lost influence by diplomacy rather than by force of arms.

This, then, is what France gained by the Russian war:—She has destroyed the Holy Alliance, created permanent jealousies and causes of mutual distrust and resentment between Russia and Austria, and destroyed all chances of another European coalition against her government and people. But she has gained even more than this. She has positively made an *ally* of Russia, by siding with her in all matters bearing on the Oriental (Turkish) question, including, as is charged by Austria, some of the very points which led to the Crimean war. She secured the friendship of Russia by her conduct during and after the war, by the manner in which she concluded peace, by the time at which that peace was concluded, and by the conditions of it, which, though apparently hard, yet left Russia in possession of all the essential *elements* of her former power. In this Crimean war, England seems to have shared the fate of Sardinia; for the war was not continued a day longer than was "compatible with the interests of France." What

the serfs. The Bonds of the State, with *coupons* attached to them, would have a ready sale on every Stock Exchange in Europe, and the sums thus realized might be invested in commercial and manufacturing enterprises, for which the Russians have a great natural aptitude. Politically, the State would not be a sufferer, because the Russian serf is of the same race, and belongs to the same human variety, as his master. He possesses the same qualities, physical and moral, and is in many respects, even now, a successful competitor with him in every species of human industry, in the fine arts and in science. There are serfs in Russia who are merchants, traders, artisans, and ingenious mechanics. Female serfs are actresses and *prime donne*, engaged at the principal theatres; and one of the best writers—the Homer of Russia—is said to be a serf. The men who are now serfs, some centuries back, were as free as their present masters on the same soil; the law which forbade their migrating from one place to another, leading, by its abuse, to the present state of servitude, never contemplated by the Czar who gave it. To draw a parallel between the serfs of Russia and the Africans held to labor in the United States, would be preposterous and absurd. In Russia there is but one race; in America there are two—of which one is physically, morally, and intellectually inferior to the other.

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was accomplished, was not so much for the lasting benefit of England, as essential to the extension of European civilization into Asia and Africa. Russia and Austria, with France for an umpire, may now at any time settle the Oriental question their own way; England, with all the navies of the world combined, could not resist its settlement. Russia and France seem to be already agreed as to their future policy in the East: will Austria hereafter support the British policy in the East, without reciprocal British protection against French or Russian encroachments?

We must yet consider the last Russian war in another light. Russia menaced Europe, because her policy was distinct from that of every other European nation. The Russians were looked upon as a semi-Asiatic people, from whom another exodus was constantly dreaded. With the emancipation of the serfs—which has been induced by the late war—the latter will become property-holders, attached to their homes, and thereby disposed to cultivate domestic manners and habits. Civilized Russia will weigh heavily in the Council of States; but her name will no longer be a terror to other civilized nations. As to Italy, the Russian war has benefited her to the extent that hereafter she will only have *one* foreign Power to contend against instead of three, and that in all reasonable questions which she may bring before the forum of European Cabinets, she will have a friend, instead of an enemy, in Russia. The attitude of Russia, ever since 1856, has been such as to encourage Sardinia in her resistance to Austrian dictation, as it had no doubt its weight in predisposing the Emperor Francis Joseph to accept the recent overtures of peace. There is, as Russia well knows, a close connection between Greece and Italy, dating from times almost immemorial; and as the Turkish question draws near its solution, the cognate one of Italy, affecting the whole political *status* of Europe, waxes in importance and influence. To carry out her designs upon Turkey, Russia must have friends in the Mediterranean; it is there rather, than in the British Channel, that the future battles for naval supremacy will be fought.

We are disposed, then, to look upon the Russian campaign as an introduction to that of Italy; for we certainly find, from the

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day of the Paris conferences, a growing understanding between Russia and France in all matters appertaining to the Danubian Principalities and the navigation of the Danube, and a constant resistance, on the part of Austria, to all the propositions jointly advocated by the diplomatic agents of those Powers. The double election of Couza for Moldavia and Wallachia, the election of Milosh as Prince of Servia, were opposed by Austria to the last moment; while Prince Danilo (the Montenegrin) found his strongest and most kindly-disposed protector in the Emperor Napoleon. In 1857, a French fleet sailed with sealed orders for the Adriatic, and from that moment up to the 1st of January, 1858, the relations between Austria and France were of the most unsatisfactory nature. Men in the immediate vicinity of the Emperor Napoleon spoke of a war with Austria as among the most probable occurrences; while, at Vienna, measures were taken to secure the alliance of England in such an event. The Austrian army was placed on a footing capable of resisting, if need be, France and Russia; while every effort was made to enlist the sympathies of Germany in the impending struggle.

It was this position of things, of which Count Cavour, the able Sardinian Minister of State, took advantage, to further the cause of Italy. He showed to the Emperor Napoleon that Austria was not merely a Solavonic-German, but also an Italian Power, and that she might as well be attacked in Lombardy, as on the coast of Dalmatia;—that in fighting Austria in Italy, the national aspirations of the Italians, their deadly hatred of Austria, public sentiment in England and in a *portion* of Germany at least, would be on the side of Napoleon, and that France, in paralyzing Austrian influence in Italy, would diminish that influence to a still greater extent in Europe, and in the same ratio add to her own. These were rational, tangible arguments, and they must have had their weight with the French Emperor. Piedmont was openly arming for the conflict. France was merely introducing "*improvements* in her artillery, and in other branches of her military service." Her peace establishment being on such an enormous scale, the facilities of increasing her army by the system of conscription so great, and

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the means of transporting troops by railway to any point of the empire so abundant, that no extraordinary preparations were needed to render from one hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand of the best troops immediately available for any warlike purpose. When matters had proceeded thus far, Baron Hübner, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, was snubbed on New Year's Day.

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CHAPTER XII.

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR—DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF FRANCE, AUSTRIA, RUSSIA, AND ENGLAND—POLITICAL ATTITUDE OF THE FIVE GREAT POWERS.

The effect of the French Emperor's morning salutation to Baron Hübner was terrific throughout Europe. The Emperor Francis Joseph, aware of the unfriendly feelings which had subsisted between him and the Emperor Napoleon, and of the causes which had produced it, at once prepared for war. He answered the ungracious treatment of his minister in Paris by sending a whole *corps d' armée* (some 30,000 men) with corresponding artillery to increase his army in Lombardy, which was done in less than three days. A second corps of the same strength soon followed, and a third, fourth, fifth, and sixth corps took the same direction. All the fortresses which Austria occupied in the Papal States and in Parma received additional garrisons, while fresh fortifications were thrown up on the Venitian and Dalmatian coasts of the Adriatic. The public funds in Europe declined to the amount of several thousand millions of francs in a few weeks. The Emperor Napoleon still declared that he was not arming—that he was for peace; but that he insisted on a revision of the Treaties of 1815, and especially those which Austria then and subsequently concluded with the minor Italian States. For this purpose, he invited Austria to another European Congress. This course of the emperor seemed to be so reasonable that it met at once with the support of Prussia, Russia, and England. Austria was now isolated;—the head and front of the former Holy Alliance was in a minority of one in the Council of the Five Great Powers of Europe. Sardinia completed the fortifications of Alessandria and Cassale, raised her army to 100,000 men, and commissioned Gari-

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baldi as General of the "Hunters of the Alps." England prepared to send Lord Cowley on a special mission to Vienna.

All European diplomatists now agree that a European Congress, if it had met, would have decided against Austria; and it is also probable that with the withdrawal of the Austrian garrisons from Ancona, Ferrara, Piacenza, and Pavia, and with the abrogation of the Austrian treaties with the Duchies and with Naples, peace, for a time, would have been preserved. Piedmont alone could not have gone to war; she could not, under any circumstances, act otherwise than on the defensive. Neither would she have had a just cause for war. Her chief complaint against Austria was that the military attitude of that Power was constantly threatening the smaller States of Italy—that there was no safety anywhere in Italy as long as the Austrian garrisons, in the numerous fortified places she occupied, were alone sufficient to overpower the standing armies of all the other Italian sovereigns. Those garrisons amounted, in the aggregate, to more than a hundred thousand men; and the peace-establishments of all the other Italian States, taken together, were no match for such a host. Austria, very naturally, was satisfied with things as they were. She held the fate of the Peninsula in the palm of her hand, and she knew that any change of position, attempted by the Italian States alone, was worse than useless. Austrian statesmen and generals alike ridiculed the pretensions of Piedmont; the other Italian States were either vassals or allies of Austria. If Austria submit the situation of Italy to an European Congress, she admitted that there was something wrong in it which required to be made right—and who could have committed that wrong, who could be made answerable for it, but Austria, who had directly or indirectly governed Italy for the last forty-four years? Austria foresaw that the Congress would recommend the abrogation of the special treaties she had concluded with the smaller States; that it might recommend other reforms if urged by France, and that, if she refused, she exposed herself to a coalition. The Emperor Francis Joseph therefore, in the most positive manner, declined the proposition of

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a Congress made by France, and still further increased his army in Italy.

Lord Cowley's mission to Vienna, it was soon ascertained, was a failure. Austria, relying on the strength of her army in Lombardy and Venetia, would not listen to any proposition from England unless it was accompanied by a guarantee that, if accepted, it would be maintained by the aid of British Power. Lord Cowley had no instructions to commit his government thus far, and while negotiations were pending, Russia renewed the proposition to submit the Italian question to an European Congress. This new proposition, coming from Russia, was far more embarrassing to Austria than that of France. It was now evident that she must submit to a Congress, or go to war without an ally, and with public opinion enlisted in favor of Italy. Why she did not at once march her troops into Sardinia, is still an unexplained mystery. To make the matter worse, it was now ascertained that there was a disposition on the part of Russia—perhaps also of Prussia—to propose an European Congress *without* Austria. The intimation came undoubtedly first from St. Petersburg, and it was a service rendered to France and Italy which will not easily be forgotten. It was now very plain that Austria had no alternative but the sword, and she was resolved to draw it.

The Emperor Napoleon had long since foreseen that his adversary would prefer war to negotiation, without a reliable ally on his side. He knew that the Emperor Francis Joseph was a young man, proud and chivalrous in his bearing, absolute and uncontrolable in his temper as all the Princes of the House of Habsburg, brave and daring as the young army he and *Feldzeugmeister* Hess had raised at an expense of nearly a thousand millions of florins, and strong in his conceit that that army was invincible. He also knew that Prince Metternich, who had built up the Austro-Italian policy during the long period of forty-five years, though retired from public life, was still all-powerful, not only with the Emperor, but with the whole Austrian court, and as much the prompter of *Count Buol Schauenstein*, the then minister of foreign affairs, as in 1845, when the latter, as minister to Turin, was acting under his

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instructions. The Emperor of Austria could not send a Plenipotentiary to the proposed Congress, and allow England, Russia, France and Prussia to sit in judgment on his acts and those of his predecessors, without surrendering his power and ceasing to be the umpire of Italy. And the Austrian "officious" and semi-official press further proclaimed that the Emperor would never submit the rights he had acquired by treaties, to the arbitration of the Five Powers; and that he could still less descend to have his Plenipotentiary occupy a seat by the side of the minister from Sardinia, whose King, after the battle of Novara, held his crown only by his forbearance and generosity. Austria, in a Congress, might have had some hope of England; but the mission of Lord Cowley had not increased her confidence in that Power, and she expected nothing from the rivalry of Prussia, or the ill-disguised enmity of Russia. The proposition to admit the smaller Italian States was equally objectionable; because they could only be summoned as witnesses, not as voters on the questions submitted to the Congress.

While these negotiations for a Congress were going on, without either party knowing its precise object, or the Powers that were to be represented at its deliberations, the winter drew to its close and, with it, the chances of surprising Piedmont. Austria had two hundred thousand troops in Italy, France as yet not one man, and the fortifications of Alessandria and Cassale—the only ones that could shelter the Piedmontese army till assistance arrived from France—were still requiring improvements to withstand a siege. The military position of Austria was too tempting, the diplomatic prospects almost hopeless. At this crisis, the war party at Vienna triumphed: Piedmont was summoned to disarm within three days, or take the consequences of a refusal.* To comply with this summons was physically impossible: Had Victor Emanuel II. been a Neapolitan diplomatist, he might have issued the required order to his army, with a secret injunction to the commanding General, not to execute it; but such a diplomatic subterfuge never entered the mind of the

* Austria previously proposed that Piedmont should disarm on condition of being represented at the Congress; but the proposition was rejected as unfair; Piedmont being the smaller Power and, from her weakness, naturally exposed to invasion.

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royal soldier; if it had, he would have lost all the prestige his name had acquired in Italy. With the spirit which pervaded the army, the volunteers and the people of Piedmont, it is highly probable that submission to Austria, at that period, would have lost him his throne, if not his life. Piedmont, therefore, instead of obeying the summons, called upon France for assistance.

Thus far, the immediate provocations to a war seemed to have come from Piedmont; but by the last unfortunate move of Austria, the latter appeared to act as the aggressor, and, by declining the propositions of the other Powers, to forfeit all claims to their support. England, in her over zeal for peace (a zeal which had ruined the cause of Italy in 1848 and 1849,) Prussia, in the hope of avoiding all responsibility, protested against these proceedings; while Russia, not without visible satisfaction, considered herself absolved from all further obligation toward an ungrateful former ally. England now tried what she could do by herself. She sent a special messenger, with fresh propositions of peace, into the Austrian camp; but effected nothing but an otherwise unaccountable delay in the advance of the Austrian army. This last act of England, undoubtedly well intended, exasperated the Austrians. As a diplomatic move, it was hopeless; in a military point of view, its effect was disastrous to the result of the campaign. It prevented the Austrians from reaching Turin, before the French were in position to oppose them. The Piedmontese hardly expected to save their capital; and had already began to remove the archives and other public property to Genoa. In less than three days, however, after the Austrian summons to Piedmont had been telegraphed to Paris, the French Liberating Army was crossing the Alps; General Niel, one of the best military engineers of France, had previously been dispatched to Alessandria, to inspect and strengthen that important fortress. The war had commenced, and Austria was waging it—alone.

The great object of the Emperor Napoleon had been to isolate Austria, and in that he was completely successful. Neither England nor Prussia had now any other object than to confine the war to Italy; the smaller German States, though partly sympathizing

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with Austria, had no means of making themselves felt as European Powers. The war was regarded as a match between two great military nations (France and Austria) and it was expected that both would be punished in the contest, without establishing the preponderance of either. Austria held the strategical position of Upper Italy with all the principal fortresses; France had the best appointed army, with the most dashing spirit of chivalry; no one supposed that the people of Italy, crushed as they had been by the tragic termination of so many previous revolutions, would take a very active part in the struggle. The assistance derived from the Free Corps, under Garibaldi and other popular leaders, were, neither by the Austrians nor by the French, set down for aught in the contest. We know what Wellington thought of the Spanish guerrillas and their leaders during the Peninsular war; but the French ought to have judged Garibaldi differently. They might have known that, when defending Rome, after having conquered 16,000 Neapolitans led by their own King, he compelled 20,000 Frenchmen under General Oudinot to lay siege to a simple walled town, and that he had driven them out of bastion No. 8 of that town, after they had taken it at the point of the bayonet. We say these things not to the discredit of the French, whose chivalrous bearing and martial spirit are matters of history; but simply in honor of Garibaldi, whose military genius and bravery were as conspicuous then, as they have been since the commencement of the last war; though they were far less admired and rewarded.

While Europe was quietly looking on the progress of the belligerents, every pen which Austria could command was put in requisition, to describe the act of the Emperor Napoleon as a wanton outrage against the peace of the world. The Derby ministry of England, whose sincere desire to preserve peace, cannot for a moment be doubted, was accused of siding with Austria; while public opinion in England, though sympathizing with Italy, pronounced in favor of strict neutrality.* Yet England was appre-

* The German journalists and pamphleteers in the Austrian interest, abounded in vulgar abuse and grotesque nonsense with regard to the conduct of England. Nothing would satisfy them but a British declaration of war against France, and

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hensive and arming. She had increased her Channel fleet, strengthened the garrisons and fortifications of Gibraltar, Malta and Corfu, and increased her squadron in the Mediterranean. What did all this mean? Surely not to advance the cause of Italy. Surely not to intimidate Austria or to protect Turkey. The attitude of Great Britain was a demonstration against France! It was an injunction on French victory, should the arms of France be carried beyond a certain point. To that extent the British government, in spite of the Italian sympathies of the people of England, *opposed* the cause of Italy. England, as far as Austria was concerned, acted as her second in a German student's duel; allowing her to be wounded, but not to be mortally hurt. "Austria," said the old Tory statesmen of England, "is necessary to the balance of power in Europe, and as a check upon Russia."

The attitude of Prussia was peculiar, and can only be explained by her rivalry with Austria, and the attempt of the smaller German States in the interest of the latter Power, to resist Prussian hegemony. Austria, from the time her minister, Baron Hübner,

a great naval fight ending in the destruction of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. England, which seems to have grown tired of hiring or subsidizing German troops and Princes, was represented as the "Spice-Island," the "Cotton-Cobden England," the "shopkeeper's country, which will not fight except for some American cotton bags, or a sack of pepper dropped into the Adriatic." The spirit of William III., of Chatham and Pitt had fled from Albion; nothing was left but the spirit of the Pelhams, Addingtons and Aberdeens, and the agitator Palmerston! By such eloquent appeals did the Austrian press attempt to change the resolution of the British statesmen of the present day. Not improperly could the London *Post* refer to the Diet of Frankfort as the "toyshop of the infant political mind of Germany." The insulting language applied to the Emperor Napoleon, was even more ridiculous and absurd, on the part of journals partaking more or less of an official character, and which, but a few years previous, had hailed Napoleon III. as a special Providence to whom the world was indebted as the "Savior of European Society." Even the United States, though at a considerable distance from the scenes about to be enacted, were raked by the terrible fire of this literary artillery. It was the "Star-spangled Banner—the historical symbol of revolution—which set the example of low, commercial egotism, and was now corrupting the once high-minded and far-sighted statesmanship of Great Britain. The lofty character of the British Parliament was running a degrading race with the selfish vulgarity of the American Congress." *Sic!*

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had been snubbed in Paris, was using all the arts of her experienced Diplomacy to secure the coöperation of the smaller States of Germany, in the approaching contest with France. She represented, through her press and through some of the leading journals of Germany, among which the *Augsburg Gazette* figured most conspicuously, that nothing less than the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine was the immediate object of the French Emperor—that she, as a German Power (Austria always is a German Power when she is attacked by France), was defending the shores of the Rhine on the Po, and that she had, consequently, a right to expect that the Germans would defend the Po on the Rhine. She was now glittering in arms to defend German honor and the integrity of the Germanic Confederation, against the Power she had fought (by the aid of British subsidies) for nearly a quarter of a century, with such varied success! And she was this time entering the arena without a penny from England (ungrateful Albion!) and a bankrupt treasury of her own. If she were defeated, then the bulwarks of Germany against France, the veteran army of Austria, would be destroyed, and no other standard bearer left in Germany but feeble Prussia, whose fate in 1806, after Austria had been defeated in 1805, should be a warning to all Germany. If Austria lost another Austerlitz, Prussia was sure to lose another Jena, and the result would be the humiliation of the common Fatherland.

This argument was specious and plausible, and had an immense effect on the German mind. It was the text of ten thousand political sermons, preached in the press and the pulpit, (perhaps the confessional,) and its effect was irresistible. Never, since 1813, had there been such a national uprising in Germany. The dreamiest and drowsiest of the Teutons now became suddenly convulsed with the desire of immediate action. Artisans left their workshops, learned men their professions, students the universities, to enlist in the army. "Germany must be defended against the ambitious designs of the French Emperor."—"She must not be degraded as she was from 1805 till 1814"—"not an acre of German territory must be surrendered; nay, more, Alsace and Lor-

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raine must be given up by France, because she ought not to have retained them in 1814, when Germany had a right to claim what had once been her own." Such was the language of the German Princes and the people. But there were three parties to this public manifestation of revived national sentiment. One party was that of the princes and nobles in the interest of Austria; the other, that of the partisans of constitutional liberty, comprising principally the commercial and industrial classes attached to Prussia, and there were yet the utopists of Germany who, like their brethren in France and Italy, cherished the idea of the "one and indivisible Republic." This latter class of enthusiasts, though extremely small and without an organ to speak its sentiments, gave the smaller princes of Germany the most concern. It showed the danger of agitation to their own persons; for while, if the Austrian or Prussian party succeeded, they were threatened with absorption by the larger States, they were, if the Republicans triumphed, altogether expelled and exiled from their hereditary possessions. The smaller princes of Germany, therefore, took ground either for Prussia or Austria; all of them comprehending the impossibility, in case of a war with France, to pursue any other policy than that of submitting to one or the other of these Powers. Thus, the mere prospect of a war with France did that for Germany, which the German Parliament of 1848 in vain endeavored to accomplish:—it wholly united the people of all the States as against any foreign country, and it produced the conviction in the minds of the German princes, that it was impossible for them hereafter to exercise separate sovereign power in a national struggle. The only question which remained was this:—Shall Germany be sunk into Austria, or into Prussia; or, which is the same thing, shall the future ruler of Germany be a Habsburger or a Hohenzollern? The Germans had taken an immense step toward national organization, and they had taken it without any previous concert among themselves. It was the energetic expression of the resolution of a whole people, including every class of society, to maintain its NATIONALITY, as the only means of defence against invasion and foreign conquest. France, in preparing

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for war in Italy, had roused the national sentiment of twenty-six millions of Italians in her favor; but she had, at the same time, united forty-five millions of Germans, with an organized army of half a million of men. This was an element of opposition which the Emperor Napoleon had to take into account, lest the war might "assume proportions incommensurate with the interests of France."

The Prussian party in Germany, from its aversion to the absolutist principles of the House of Habsburg—perhaps from a desire to see Austria humbled, was not altogether displeased with the war in Italy; and it is quite certain that this feeling was shared by at least some of the members of the Cabinet of Berlin. There were Germans who would not have regretted to see Austria lose every foot of ground in Italy, and Hungary to boot; because, with such a diminution of her territory, and the loss of Austrian prestige which must have followed it, the dualism of Germany would disappear, and the supremacy of Prussia established, without a contest, as the natural result of political gravitation. A Germanic Empire, with the King of Prussia at its head, was then possible, and the suppression or mediatization of the smaller princes an unavoidable conclusion. To that extent, but no further, did the Prussian party sympathize with Italy. If Napoleon III. went a step further—if, after driving the Austrians out of Italy, or as a means of accomplishing that end, he attacked any of the German provinces of Austria, the case was reversed. Then Prussia, with all the smaller German States, must have taken the field to protect the territorial integrity of the Germanic Confederation against insult or conquest. The attitude of Prussia, therefore, like that of England, though not absolutely hostile to France, and not improving the position of the Austrians in Italy, was, nevertheless, an injunction on French conquest.

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CHAPTER XIII.

THE SITUATION OF GERMANY DURING THE WAR. THE ARMY OF THE CONFEDERATION IS PUT ON THE WAR FOOTING. INDUCEMENTS TO PEACE.

At the commencement of the war, and even as early as January, 1859, the Emperor Napoleon, through his ministers at the different German courts, and through the columns of the *Moniteur*, gave the Germans the most earnest assurances of his peaceable intentions in regard to them; but these assurances were received with great distrust, and were purposely discredited by Austria and her agents. The Emperor of the French took every possible care not to rouse the warlike enthusiasm of the Germans; but all his endeavors in that direction proved fruitless. "If," said the presses in the Austrian interest, "the Emperor Napoleon is really disinterested in Italy, as he says in his proclamation, it is because he intends to make *Germany* pay the expenses of the war. If he wants no Italian province to be annexed to France, it is because he prefers the left bank of the Rhine, with the fortress of Mentz, which the elder Napoleon considered as one of the keys to his empire. If he succeeds, the line of military defence on our frontier is changed, the Germanic Confederation dismembered." These arguments were substantially the same which had been employed in 1840, when Alphonse Thiers (on the occasion of the bombardment of *St. Jean d' Acre*) declared that "France must seek to regain on the Rhine the influence she lost in the East," only that being in this case employed against a *real* Napoleon, they produced an incredibly greater effect, than when used against the poetical fiction of the "Napoleon of Peace."

Neither was the progress of the war calculated to appease Germany. After the Austrians had failed to take Turin, all military men of note predicted an unfortunate campaign for Austria; but

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when the Austrians were beaten on the banks of the Sesia—when Garibaldi, followed by the corps of General Cialdini, had turned the right wing of the Austrians—when the Lomelina was evacuated, and the battle of Magenta won by the French, a perfect panic seemed to seize upon the Germans. The cry now was, "Austria is beaten *too fast*. The victories of his army, which follow each other in rapid succession, will embolden Napoleon; and if he ever coveted the left bank of the Rhine, his success in Italy will encourage him to attempt this new conquest." Some of the German Princes considered themselves already conquered, others conceived themselves threatened with revolution; all of them dreaded, alternately, the Gallic Cæsar and their own people. Then it was that the different States of Germany, after contracting heavy loans, which were cheerfully voted by the Chambers, put their respective armies on the war footing. The little kingdom of Bavaria alone furnished 115,000 men, Wurtemberg some 36,000, Baden 20,000, Hanover 30,000, Nassau 6,000, &c., Prussia mobilized six entire *corps d' armée*, something like 240,000 men, to which were subsequently added three more corps, amounting to an additional force of 100,000 men. The federal army could, no doubt, have been made to exceed largely half a million of men. Nothing was wanting but the money to pay and support them in their own country.

But the army of the Germanic Confederation was not united in spirit, and the different States which had contributed to its formation, were not on the best terms with each other. The Kings of Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg and Hanover were in close league with Austria; the other Northern Protestant States of Germany generally sided with Prussia, and, satisfied with Prussian protection, exhibited less of a warlike temper. Prussia, it is believed, armed as much to preserve her position in *Germany*, as to repel a French invasion. It is indeed very doubtful whether the new ministry, which the Prince Regent of Prussia had summoned to his aid, really apprehended a French invasion at all; but a large number of Germans believed in it, and the Austrian press would not be satisfied with anything short of the actual march of the

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federal army on Paris. The pressure of public opinion, not in Prussia, but in the smaller German States, and especially in Bavaria and Wurtemberg, at last induced the Cabinet of Berlin to declare officially, that she was arming to defend, with her whole power, the entire Germanic Confederation, in which the German provinces of Austria, the Tyrol, and Illyria with the port of Trieste, were necessarily included.* On this point, however, Prussia had no choice, if she considered the act of confederation (which included these provinces) as binding upon her. By the terms of that act, the Confederation was *obliged* to declare war if any of those provinces were attacked by a foreign enemy; and Prussia, therefore, only reiterated what she had already solemnly promised in 1814. The act of confederation also stipulates that after war is once declared by the Confederation, none of its members shall have the right to conclude peace except with the unanimous assent and simultaneous act (of peace) of all the others. But the Confederation, as such, had already once been broken up in 1848, and although subsequently reëstablished, was only looked upon as a loose, temporary arrangement. The official declaration of the Cabinet of Berlin, therefore, was necessary to prove that Prussia still adhered to the federal compact; but it did not satisfy the court of Vienna. An advancing French or Russian army might *compel* a separate peace, and a special treaty with a foreign Power might secure impunity to a recusant member. Austria had no faith in treaties, except between a greater and a smaller Power, where the former had the means of enforcing compliance with its terms. What the Emperor of Austria wanted from Prussia was simultaneous *action*—a war on the Rhine, while he was fighting on the Ticino, the Po, and the Mincio—not promises what Prussia would do in a certain contingency which might never arise. On the other hand, M. von Schleinitz, the Prussian Secretary of State (successor to Baron Manteuffel) insisted that the question of Italy did not concern Germany, and could not legitimately be brought before the Federal Diet. Italy concerned Austria as a

* See note to page 19.

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European Power, not as a member of the Confederacy; and Prussia must, in regard to it, also act as an European Power. Her proper course was to have a friendly understanding with England, and avoid being isolated, as Austria was. When Prussia, in spite of the special mission of the Arch Duke Albert to Berlin, could not be moved from her position, Austria applied to Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Hanover and Saxony, to take the initiative and to compel Prussia either to follow the popular movement, or, by remaining inactive, to lose her prestige in Germany. This last move of the diplomacy of Vienna had its effect. Prussia armed as if for a general war, and pointed with pride to the completeness of her army; while some of the smaller States, which had been loudest in the cry for war, had not even completed the clothing of their troops!

The army of Prussia gave a fearful momentum to the popular enthusiasm in Germany, and excited the military emulation of the other States. The year 1813 seemed to have come back with all its terrible historical recollections, which the repeated blows, struck by the French army in Italy, only served to render more glaring and effective. The different political parties tried to excel each other in their denunciation of the French Emperor and his "thirst for conquest." The reactionary party hoped everything from the success of Austria; the liberal party relied on the embarrassment of the Princes, which they hoped to turn to good account. Whatever part the latter may have had in stimulating the enthusiasm of their subjects, it was now quite plain that they could no longer control it:—they scarcely seemed to have another choice than between an aggressive movement against France, or a revolution. Besides, how were half a million of soldiers, of whom more than one half were *Landwehr** taken away from their agricultural and industrial pursuits and quartered upon the people, to maintain discipline without military occupation? The thing was impossible; the attempt, involving an expenditure far exceeding the financial resources

* Soldiers who have served their time in the regular army; but who are still liable to be called out in time of war. They constitute the great *corps de reserve* of the Prussian army.

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of Germany. "The army must be led into France," cried the orators in the German Chambers; "lead us into France!" echoed the troops in the barracks and encampments. The Emperor Napoleon had done nothing to provoke this feeling in Germany. Though compelled to organize an army of observation, to watch the movements of Prussia and the other German States, he had removed the head-quarters of that army to CHALONS in Champagne—at a considerable distance from the Rhine, while the fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz, between which and the German frontier cities the transit was never interrupted, were almost entirely ungarnished of troops. Napoleon knew too well that two great armies, filled with hostile sentiments against each other, could not, for any length of time, be in sight of each other, without creating the occasion for war, and he was determined not to provoke it.

The situation had now become extremely difficult, and war, if the campaign in Italy continued, was inevitable. Was the German confederate army to be idle on the Rhine, and exhaust the resources of the country, till Austria was completely prostrate—till she was driven from her strongholds in Lombardy and Venetia—till Verona and Mantua received French and Piedmontese garrisons, till the army of Francis Joseph was retreating through the Tyrol to defend the Austrian capital? Were half a million of Germans to ground arms till the victorious French army, led by the Emperor Napoleon himself, recrossed the Alps, or were they to strike while the best French troops were yet engaged in the plains of Italy? Were they to wait for the destruction of the Austrian army, or save that army by an aggressive movement which would oblige the French Emperor to divide his forces? There was but one answer to these questions, and no one anticipated it more shrewdly and correctly than Napoleon himself. He spoke the naked truth, from the fulness of his heart and mind, when he assured his army that the war threatened "to assume proportions, no longer commensurate with the interests of France."

About that time, there appeared, in Germany, an anonymous pamphlet "Po and Rhine," evidently written by a superior officer, which treated the question of war in a purely military, passionless

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way, and for that very reason produced a most profound impression. It was, in a measure, refuting the proposition that the Po must be defended on the Rhine, and *vice versa;* but the argument on that point was not conclusive; because it merely proved that if the Po were lost, Bavaria would still be a sufficient bulwark against an army that might attempt to attack the Southern frontier of Germany, and that the Rhine could be defended without occupying a position in Italy. But it showed that the left bank of the Rhine was indispensable to the military security of France, whose frontier, by the loss of Mayence became *indented*, and that France, therefore, must naturally covet its possession. The Northern and North Eastern frontiers of France, the author argued, offer no military line of defence; because the triple line of French fortresses on the Belgian frontier, built by Vauban, do not occupy positions which could not now be easily turned; they do not support each other and, in their present condition, are incapable of resisting the effect of modern siege artillery. France recognized that weakness at an early day, and, for the purpose of remedying it, turned her capital into an immense fortress, behind which, with all the available resources of her rich Southern provinces, she may bid defiance to a foreign invader. The French, says our author, have done right in fortifying Paris—a place which can neither be enclosed nor turned by the largest army Europe has as yet marshaled in the field, and before which there may be fought a dozen battles, any one of which, if unfortunate to the assailants, might involve their destruction. It would not be so with a retreating French army, which would always find quarters, protection and reinforcements under the guns of the capital. The French army, moving in a smaller circle round the capital, and aided in this respect by three *concentric railways*, could always select its point of attack, and meet the enemy when at a greater distance from his supports; while an attack on a particular position of the French, would always be resisted by combined forces, and, if need be, by the whole population of Paris. These arguments, however, only proved that France was already strong in a war of defence against Germany, and the conclusion was irresistible that she must not be allowed to

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increase her aggressive power by acquiring a fortress on the Rhine, where she was now weak. Instead of dampening the warlike ardor of the Germans, it only served to increase it. As the troops of Wurtemberg and Baden were being drilled and inspected, symptoms of insubordination began to manifest themselves, and it is a fact, though it did not appear in print, that the troops demanded to be led against France, instead of making "a show on parade, while their Austrian brethren were slain and sacrificed on the plains of Lombardy." The question of war absorbed every other thought in Germany. Sensible men expected that the new German levies would be beaten by the French; but they relied, as in 1813, on the recuperativeness of their countrymen. That the Prince Regent of Prussia, up to the battle of Solferino, was able to maintain not only perfect discipline in his army, but also the entire confidence of the people, though the nobility, without reserve or stint, openly espoused the cause of Austria, showed the strength his government had acquired in the few short months of his reign, during which the Constitution was faithfully observed, and the laws honestly executed, in the spirit in which they were enacted. But would he have been able to remain master of the situation if the war had continued much longer? Could he have restrained "his people in arms"* if Verona and Mantua had fallen? And what, if the French, after laying siege to Verona and Mantua, met with a reverse? Would not a victory achieved by Austria have brought things in Germany to a crisis, and carried armies and Princes irresistibly along with her? As the war approached those Austrian provinces which make part of the Germanic Confederation, the danger of a struggle in which all Germany must be engaged became imminent. The people of Southern Tyrol, from Bolzano and Trent down, are Italian. They sympathized now, as in 1848—49, with Italy. They are, moreover, as the inhabitants of the Veltlin, which was once a part of Switzerland, a brave and warlike people, who, in a national cause, cannot easily be restrained. The Veltlin had risen against the Austrians, and the South Tyrolians were on

* This is the expression which the King of Prussia used in referring to his subjects.

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the point of rising. How could the Emperor Napoleon have prevented one or the other of the Italian Free Corps from coming to the rescue of the insurgents? And would not this have constituted a case of war, according to the text of the Germanic Confederation which we have just quoted? And could Prussia then pause without incurring the charge of treason against the Confederation?

The position which the Emperor Napoleon occupied before Verona resolved itself to this:—That fortress, or rather fortified camp, which can shelter an army of from 50,000 to 100,000 men, and from whose many gates 25,000 troops may debouch in half an hour, is so situated at the foot of the mountains that it may receive constant reinforcements and supplies by the fortified military roads of Tyrol; while the fortresses of Mantua, Peschiera and Legnano which mutually support each other, would give to an army in the field the faculty of resisting double the number of the enemy; taking either Verona or Mantua for the basis of its operation; and acting either on the defensive or offensively in the direction of Venice or Milan.* Even if Peschiera and Mantua had fallen, an Austrian army in Verona was safe as long as it maintained its connection with the Tyrol, which the French and Piedmontese must not attack, on pain of having half a million of Federal German troops cross the Rhine. All the passes of the Tyrol, by which an army might debouch into Lombardy and turn the French and Piedmontese flank, were in the hands of the Austrians; but the French must be content with waiting for them as they descend into the plains, lest the combined resources of the Germanic Confederation are employed against them in the direction of Paris. What general, under such circumstances and with such restraints on his military operations, would have undertaken the siege of four such fortresses as Peschiera, Verona, Mantua and Legnano? And was it not military foresight, in the Emperor Napoleon, when he told his troops that the further prosecution of the war involved "proportions incommensurate with the immediate interests of France?"

Nor was this all, an inuendo was thrown out, first in diplomatic

* Compare the Sardinian campaign of 1848, page 82.

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and court circles, but soon repeated in ordinary conversations, and at last circulated by the press, that a secret understanding existed between the Prince Regent of Prussia and the Emperor Napoleon, by which it was agreed that Prussia should not come to the assistance of Austria during the Italian war; in return for which Prussia was to take possession of Hanover, which she always coveted, and of Saxony, which she demanded at the Congress of Vienna; and these possessions should be guarantied to her by France. There was even a talk of further Prussian acquisitions, with the river Main as the future frontier of that country. By these means, Prussia was to be made the preponderating Power in Germany, in the same manner that Piedmont was to be made the preponderating Power in Italy. Of course, these insinuations were thrown out with great caution, and always accompanied by the reservation that they were mere *rumors* which nobody believed; the character of the Prince of Prussia being the best guarantee that such an act of "*treachery to the Confederation*" was not only never contemplated by him; but that his patriotic heart would indignantly reject such overtures if they were ever made, or contemplated to be made, by the French Emperor. The Austrian press, and even the affiliated *Augsburg Gazette*, stoutly asserted that there was nothing in the conduct of Prussia "*as yet*" to give the least color of truth to the report; much less any ground for suspecting the sincerity of the Regent. Yet these very defences of Prussia helped to spread the report, and excited suspicion in the minds of those Princes whose States were to be so unceremoniously disposed of; while their subjects were, perhaps, less inclined to disbelieve it because they wished it to be true. The new government of Prussia had revived the constitutional system and given it the form, if not the substance, of a liberal government. The example of the Prince Regent struck terror into the small Princes, who had either infringed on the terms of the Constitutions of their States, or suspended their lawful operation altogether, as was the case in Hanover and Hesse Cassel. He was now stigmatized as an agitator—another Victor Emanuel, whose sole object in professing liberal principles was the increase of his power at the expense of his neighbors, and the humiliation

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of Austria, as a means of establishing the supremacy of Prussia in Germany.

It required much tact, much character, and a good deal of forbearance, on the part of the Regent of Prussia, to give a practical and yet unspoken denial to these charges by his acts. Prussia, true to the policy of the great Frederic, and to her indisputable mission, must undoubtedly endeavor to acquire the basis of a great Power, if she would continue to discharge the obligations of one; and it is equally true that the foundation of a great Power does not merely consist in moral elements and their skilful combination, but also in the necessary extent of territory, and in material means. How delicate, then, was the position of Prussia—how difficult the task of maintaining her ascendency among such conflicting interests, and almost in sight of the enemy's camp! As a Frenchman, the Emperor Napoleon could not regret the growing alienation between the Prussian and Austrian parties in Germany: as a statesman he must have rather nourished than counteracted them. But what more effectual means could be employed to force them to become friends, than to continue the war against Austria? Peace, in Italy, was certain to continue the feud in Germany; for as matters then stood, it was only on a common battle-field, in view of a common danger, from a common enemy, that the Emperor of Austria could have been cordially reconciled to the Regent of Prussia. Was it then not wise in the Emperor Napoleon, not to allow the war to assume "proportions no longer compatible with the interests of France?"

Again, suppose the French, after an immense sacrifice of blood, had succeeded in forcing the celebrated quadrangle—suppose they had taken Venice and the whole province of Venetia, and that the Austrian army had, in tolerably good order, (as they have always done) retreated into the Tyrol; would the war then have ended? Assuredly not. Could not the Emperor of Austria, from his fortresses in the Tyrol, have invited the French to follow him; knowing that the first French footprint on Tyrolese soil would bring 500,000 Germans to his aid? And was the possession of Lombardy and Venice, by the French and Piedmontese, secure as long

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as there was an Austrian army in the Tyrol, and a Bavarian one ready to coöperate with it, ready at any time, to descend, through the mountain passes, upon Brescia, Milan and Verona? Was it not more prudent, then, and in the end more beneficial to Italy herself, that the German army on the Rhine should be disbanded (as it now is) than that further conquests should be attempted which, if successful could not be maintained except by a general war, and if frustrated, might involve all that had previously been gained?

We now come to another important consideration, and that is, how would the continuation of the war have affected Russia? We have seen that Russia, ever since the Crimean war, has been on excellent terms with France; though this seems rather to be the result of position, than of any personal predilection of either of the two Emperors for the other. There is a natural gravitation of Russia and France toward each other, based on material interests, and on the maritime position of the two countries in the Black Sea and Mediterranean respectively. In a territorial point of view, they have also many sympathies in common, as well as a very natural aversion to influences alike hostile to both of them. There is a basis large enough for an alliance, or at least a good understanding, between Russia and France for tens of years, perhaps generations to come. The First Napoleon's march to Moscow and the Crimean war, had disturbed these relations; but when the perturbing causes ceased, the natural attraction between the two Empires reassumed its sway. Russia performed some good offices for France. In the first place, she avoided everything that could produce the impression that she was *reconciled* to Austria, and then she went a little further, by giving publicity to her *determination* not to be reconciled. The regularly accredited Austrian minister at St. Petersburg might furnish some interesting illustrations of this fact; the *extraordinary* minister to St. Petersburg, whom the Emperor of Austria appointed as the Italian question became entangled, never left for his place of destination. Meanwhile there was something quite positive in the declaration of Prince Gortchakoff that, should war actually ensue between France and Austria, his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias

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would pursue the same line of conduct towards Austria, which the Emperor of Austria, with so much apparent success, had pursued in regard to Russia, during the Crimean war. There was no actual treaty of reciprocity between the two Powers; but the principles on which they acted was understood and practically enforced. Another kind office, which Russia performed in the interest of France, consisted, as we have already observed, in the proposition to submit the Italian question to an European Congress, when a similar proposition made by France, and supported by England and Prussia, had been virtually declined by Austria. This generous act of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, was also one of kindness to the Derby ministry; because it prevented the public announcement of the failure of Lord Cowly's mission to Vienna, and protected the British government from the charge of showing too great partiality for Austria. But when, in the prosecution of the war, it was deemed expedient to threaten the Emperor of Austria with a new insurrection in Hungary, Russia, it may safely be presumed, was not quite so ready to coöperate with France in the execution of that design. The Hungarians, crushed as they are by an angry sovereign, might, as between Russia and Austria, prefer the present enlightened autocratic rule of Emperor Alexander II. to that of the Emperor Francis Joseph; but with the prospect of entire independence, that partiality would have ceased, to make room for more national sentiments. In case of an Hungarian rebellion, the old sympathies between Poland and Hungary might have been rekindled which, based on parallel interests, could only have been counteracted by a display of force. The Sclavonic population of Hungary, to whom promises were made during the last Hungarian revolution, which the Emperor Francis Joseph has since forgotten to fulfil, is now less favorably disposed towards Austria than the Hungarians themselves, and might join Hungary in a rise. In such an event it would be difficult to manage, not only Gallicia, but also Russia, Poland and the Duchy of Posen. Here, then, a point of departure was presented to the respective policies of France and Russia—a positive danger to the silent workings of that affection which, as yet, had found no language to express its warmth. The attitude

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of Russia in regard to Austria and her German allies, the determination of the Emperor Alexander to place an army of observation on his Western frontier, undoubtedly favored France and Italy; but if Russia were alienated, and the pressure of that Power on Austria and Germany removed, might not the war assume proportions altogether "incommensurate with the interests of France?"

When Russia charged Austria with the magnitude of her ingratitude, the statesmen of Vienna replied, that Austria had no need of acknowledging obligations for services rendered purely in the well-understood interest of Russia herself. Russia, in aiding to suppress the Hungarian insurrection, only prevented Poland from joining the rebellion; while the marked civility, nay *distinction*, with which the leaders of the Hungarian rebellion were treated by the superior Russian officers,* were anything but gratifying to the Austrians, who had only thought them fit company for the executioner. Austria and Russia have, on more than one occasion, bandied these charges of ingratitude with each other; and the probability is, they will have occasion to repeat them hereafter, as their respective policies will lead to fresh complications and conflicts. Russia charged Austria with ingratitude during her war with Turkey (1828). Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Minister, wrote from Paris, November 28th, 1828:—"Italy was at the Congress of Vienna entirely abandoned to Austria; partly by real territorial concessions, and partly by allowing her to control everything not immediately subject to her domination. When the Neapolitan revolution threatened Austrian supremacy throughout the whole country, from the Alps to Sicily, it was again Alexander who, by his intercession, dissipated the storm." And yet, in return for all these services, Austria would not coöperate with Russia in her designs upon Turkey! There is as little gratitude among sovereigns and statesmen, as among politicians. It is the nature of their calling, which deprives them of that noble virtue;

* Hungarian officers, it will be remembered, were even invited to dine with the commanding Russian Generals, and allowed to pledge the health of the Czar.

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and this holds not only of individuals, but of parties which control them.

To sum up, Russia had an old score against Austria, which had been largely increased by the attitude of the latter during the Crimean war; but she was unwilling to have it paid at her own expense. A Hungarian insurrection, which might involve Poland, never entered into the combinations of Prince Gortchakoff; especially at this period, when the emancipation of the serfs already sufficiently agitated the whole Russian empire. If, then, the Emperor Napoleon, to prosecute the Italian war, must tolerate the organization of a "Hungarian Legion," and avail himself of the services of the late Governor Kossuth to induce the people of Hungary to rise in arms, it is, at least, questionable whether the ardor of his new allies would not have checked the resolution of his old ones, and whether such an exchange would have inured to his immediate benefit. The Emperor of the French could hardly afford to become the leader of revolutionary bands, or the instigator of revolutions; for who could say that these revolutions would not extend to *France* if he met with a check from Austria? Napoleon aided Italy for the avowed purpose of making her his friend; but he could not, as the established sovereign of France, sacrifice himself, or the cause he had espoused, to an indefinite future. Between Garibaldi and Kossuth there was a wide difference. Garibaldi, as a native of Nice, was born a Piedmontese subject. He had conspired against his sovereign and was exiled, but afterwards pardoned. He had then again entered the service of his sovereign, and was regularly commissioned by him as a General in the Piedmontese army. He was, if taken by the Austrians, entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war; not so Kossuth or Klapka, who, if the fortunes of war delivered them into the hands of the Austrians, would most unquestionably have died by the hangman. With the enthusiasm of patriots, they might have staked their lives in such a cause; but their deaths would have led to reprisals, which must have added to the cruelties of war, and stained the reputation of the sovereigns engaged in it. If the war could be honorably ended without such a calamity, it was a saving of

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lives, in the interest of humanity, at which we cannot but rejoice. The Hungarians may feel disappointed; but the Emperor Napoleon never promised to liberate Hungary. If Hungary had risen, and peace had been concluded afterwards, without a stipulation for a general amnesty, the Austrian prisons would have again been crowded, and the executioner employed to overwhelm a country already sufficiently drenched with blood; while the very amnesty which France would have been bound in honor to insist upon, as one of the conditions of peace, might have proved an insurmountable obstacle to its conclusion.

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CHAPTER XIV.

THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO—CONCLUSION OF PEACE. WHAT HAS ITALY GAINED BY IT?

It was in this situation of things, and while all Europe was arming for a general war, that the Battle of Solferino was fought—honorable to both armies, but ending in the complete triumph of the French and Piedmontese arms. An armistice followed, and to the real or affected surprise of all Europe, peace was concluded in the space of a few days. What could have been the motives of the Emperor Napoleon, that prompted him to this act? asks the one. Why did the Emperor of Austria submit to such terms? demands the other. That the Emperor Napoleon had good reasons for concluding peace; and that he spoke the truth when, in his Proclamation to the army, he said that the war had "assumed proportions no longer commensurate with the interests of France," we have endeavored to show in the preceding pages. The further prosecution of the war, on his part, menaced him with a European coalition, required another loan of at least a thousand or fifteen hundred millions of francs, and threatened to give to the revolutionary tendencies of Europe such an impetus, as to endanger the political status, not only of Italy and Germany, but also of France. His military successes in Italy, had already been discounted by public opinion in Paris; and he must have pushed them to the very capital of the Austrian empire, if he would reconcile the French people to new sacrifices of blood and treasure. The peace with Austria which *France* wanted, could only be *dictated* at Vienna; at any place short of the Austrian capital, it was only to be obtained by mutual concessions. On the part of Austria, the principal reason for concluding peace was undoubtedly the deranged state of her finances, and the impossibility of raising money except by

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forced loans. The Austrian army, though discomfited in four large battles, had not suffered more than the French; it had lost nothing of its ancient prestige; and though its leaders had made many blunders, it came out of the contest without loss of reputation or military honor. But the Emperor of Austria, if he continued the war, must have ungarnished the discontented provinces of Hungary, Transylvania, and the Military Frontier* of troops, and thereby completely abandoned Turkey and the Danubian Principalities to the influence of Russia. There has always been a party in Vienna, that wished the emperor to abandon his Italian Provinces altogether, if he could add Servia, Moldavia, and Wallachia to his empire. In those provinces, Austria might have a mission of civilization; in Italy, she has none. To rule any portion of Italy—Venetia for instance—in the Italian sense, will prove an unprofitable and hopeless task, and will weaken Austria where she will soon have use for all her strength. To rule Venetia, hereafter, in the Austrian sense, is impossible, and would require the presence, in that province alone, of at least a hundred thousand troops, inclusive of the garrisons of the fortresses. Austria, in spite of the immense contributions of war which she imposed on Lombardy, Venetia, and Piedmont, in 1848—49, and the heavy war taxes she has levied on her unfortunate Italian subjects for the last ten years, in spite of confiscations and forced loans, has found her Italian provinces a drain upon her treasury; and Venetia, exhausted as she now is, will afford no relief to her finances.

Austria made peace, by sacrificing a province which she only held at the point of the bayonet: and she would have given up Venetia to boot, but for the quadrangle of fortresses which she deems indispensable to the defence of her south-western frontier. There existed, therefore, good reasons on both sides for making peace. Piedmont alone had an interest to prolong the war so auspiciously begun, and the Italians generally thought and felt with the King of Sardinia.

It would undoubtedly have been better for the security and in-

* That Province of Austria which borders on Turkey.

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dependence of Italy, if Austria had entirely withdrawn from Italian soil; but if this could not be effected without weakening France, or exposing her to new great dangers, then Italy cannot complain of "treachery." Such a charge has indeed no foundation in fact. The Emperor of the French had promised assistance to an ally, and has kept his word to the extent of bestowing on that ally the richest and most fertile province of Italy. If he could not add Venetia to his gift, it was, as himself expressed it, a source of regret to him; for which, at some future period, he may, perhaps, make suitable amends. But it must be recollected that the assistance rendered, on the part of the emperor, was without a consideration; while, at the same time, it exposed him to a coalition that might prove fatal to France. If France were beaten on the Rhine, or if, by dividing her forces and withdrawing a portion of her troops from the Peninsula to defend her own soil, the army in Italy suffered a severe check, to whose lasting discomfiture would it have inured, but to that of the Italians? No obligations, however solemnly contracted, can bind a state to do that which is to her own ruin; and no enlightened government, whatever may have been its nature, has ever committed such an act of political suicide. Inability to perform, is a good plea under the law of nations; though, from pride, few nations have resorted to it. They generally tax their ingenuity with discovering some other reasons for not complying with their engagements.*

Frederic the Great, in the preface to his work, "*The History of my Time*" (1746), denies even the obligation of *Treaties* between

* Portugal, in the case of the brig Armstrong, might have pleaded inability, at that period, to perform the duty of a neutral power; but her pride would not allow her to do so. King John VI. of Portugal was, at that time, little more than a British pensioner. A British fleet had carried him to Rio Janeiro, and protected him there; British troops fought for his crown in Portugal, and British power alone could prevent the loss of all his colonies. In what condition was he to protect an American privateer against an act of violence committed under that flag, which alone maintained his existence as a king, and the integrity of his territory? Yet Portugal never pleaded inability to do her duty as a neutral Power, and was therefore justly held responsible for the damage.

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States, when they no longer answer the public good. We quote the passage:—

"You will see, in this work, Treaties made and broken; and I am bound to tell you that, in regard to this matter, we are bound by our means and faculties. When our interests change, we must change with them. Our business is to watch over the happiness of our people. As soon, then, as we find danger or hazard to them from an alliance, it becomes our duty to break it off, rather than to expose our people. In this, the sovereign sacrifices himself for the good of his subjects. All the Annals of History furnish examples of this sort; and it is, in truth, difficult to conceive how men should act differently. Those who so loudly condemn this conduct, are people who look upon a given word as a sacred thing. They are right, and I agree with them, as far as the rule applies to private matters; for a man who pledges his word to another, though he may have inconsiderately promised a thing which may turn to his greatest disadvantage, ought to keep it, since honor is above interest. But a Prince, who pledges his word, commits not only himself (which would render the matter a private one), but also exposes great states and great provinces to a thousand calamities. It is therefore better, rather than that the people should suffer, that the sovereign break his Treaty. What would be said of a surgeon, who, foolishly scrupulous, would not cut off the gangrened limb of a man; because cutting off a limb is a bad act? Is it not worse to let a citizen perish, whose life he might have saved? I hold that it is the circumstances under which an act is committed, everything that accompanies and everything that follows it, which must be considered in order to determine whether an act is good or bad; but how few persons judge thus, with a proper knowledge of the case! Men are like sheep. They follow blindly their leader. Let a man of mind say a good thing, and it will suffice for a thousand fools to repeat it."

Far be it from us to endorse these sentiments, though they are those of the Great Frederic—the model monarch of modern times. We have quoted them merely for the purpose of showing that the

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charges now preferred against Napoleon III. belong to a class which apply to all sovereigns, and more especially to those who have distinguished themselves in history. Frederic, in the above quotation, evidently justified himself and his motives, in a manner much more positive and direct, than the Emperor of the French in his late proclamation. The Emperor *excused* himself to the people of Italy, for not fulfilling all he had *promised*. Frederic would have *justified* the act, if he had *stipulated* for it, as one required by the public interest of his country; and he would, by his own confession, have considered it a duty to do so, regardless of all consequences. The Emperor Napoleon certainly never made a *Treaty* with the King of Sardinia, to conquer all Upper Italy for him. He could only promise to do what he *believed* he was able to perform; no more. And of that ability, France being the greater Power, the Emperor alone must be the judge. Neither was he bound, in faith or honor, to fulfil all *at once*, if it was possible for him to do more hereafter at less cost. The safety of France, and of his throne, must necessarily be paramount to every other consideration; or he would be unworthy to be the ruler of France! The late war in Italy was not a war against Austria, waged by a coalition for a common purpose. There was nothing to be divided between France and Piedmont after the victory. The sacrifice was necessarily greater on the part of France—the greater Power; the gain was all to Piedmont—the smaller one. Events, thus far, have proved the disinterestedness of the Emperor Napoleon; though, at the beginning of the campaign, the whole world charged him with having provoked a war of conquest for his own aggrandizement! This, nevertheless, is the second war he has waged with success, and without adding an acre of land to the territory of France; though thousands upon thousands of Frenchmen have perished in them, and millions upon millions have been expended to attach victory to his Eagles. For more than a thousand years have the Italian States been the theatre of war, and the spoils of foreign conquerors. England, France, Spain and Germany have divided her as their booty; the last war was the only one which was waged for her benefit; the victor surrendering his spoils.

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What has France heretofore—beginning with Louis XII. and his pretensions to Milan—done for Italy? What has Spain done for her, after holding one of the finest parts of her, in actual possession, for more than two centuries? What have the German Emperors effected by their descents into the plains of Lombardy? England, after abandoning all Italy to Austria, in return for her joining the coalition against the First Napoleon, contented herself with Malta as her share of the plunder. In vain did the Sicilians ask her intercession to preserve the constitution which, during the war, had been established under British guarantees—in vain did the Genoese insist on the promises made to them by Lord William Bentinck—useless was the dissent of Great Britain from the Resolutions taken by the Holy Alliance at Laibach and Verona, without an arm raised to oppose their execution—without result, the appointment of a British Commissioner to the Pope, in 1831—and pernicious, the roving mission of Lord Minto to Turin, Florence, Rome, Naples and Palermo. England only encouraged the Piedmontese, the Tuscans, the Romans, the Neapolitans, and, alas! the poor Sicilians, to risk their lives and their fortunes in the attempt at establishing liberal institutions, without being aided by a British ship, or a British soldier! The fine speech of Lord Napier, from the balcony of the British embassy at Naples (Feb. 15th, 1848) did not save the Constitution, which even then was a dead letter and a farce; the powerful fleet under Admiral Parker did not prevent the massacres at Messina and Palermo (though the British government was very prompt in demanding compensation for the damage done to her ships in those harbors), and the suspension of her diplomatic intercourse with Naples had no effect on the resolution of the King, to govern his country despotically, by the aid of foreign mercenaries. The fine writings of the British consul in Sicily, the dispatches of Mr. Abercromby and of Lord Minto, and the classic memorandum of Mr. Petre to Lord Clarendon (July 26th, 1856), produced no result favorable to the Italians; because England was known to be unwilling to take an active part in any of the revolutions which agitated Italy from 1820 to 1849. She did much to provoke and encourage them;

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but when pressed, by the popular leaders, to come to their aid, declared with great composure that she had no idea of interposing between the sovereigns of Italy and their subjects. The truth is, England deceived the Italians; though it may not have been her intention to do so. She advocated, indeed, the introduction of reforms, and the formation of liberal governments in the separate Italian States; but she had no idea of promoting their union into an Italian Power. When the decisive moment had arrived—when the King of Sardinia had declared war against Austria, and Milan, Venice, Tuscany and Rome had sent troops to assist the Piedmontese arms; did the British government not exert itself to prevent the King of Naples who, in the meantime, had given a constitution to his people, from joining Charles Albert with any considerable force?* A simple naval demonstration in the Adriatic, at that critical period, might have induced Austria to yield up Lombardy and Venice, (the former she was at one time willing to cede to Piedmont;) but England had no intention to weaken Austria, and thereby give the least advantage either to France or Russia. As to the Italian policy of Louis Philippe, we have already characterized it in its proper place. The "Napoleon of Peace" looked upon a war between Rome and Austria as "the ruin of the Catholic religion;" while Guizot, in the midst of the liberal movement in Italy, (1847—1848) and almost on the very day that the King of Naples granted a constitution, declared, in the French Chambers, that "Italy could not possibly acquire representative governments under twenty years."

Such was the aid which "Free Albion," under a liberal administration, and Constitutional France, under her Citizen King, rendered to the cause of Italian liberty and independence. No statesmen in either country had the most distant thought of assisting the

* "But England," says Horner, (History of the Kingdom of Naples, 1734—1825, by Pietro Colletta, translated from the Italian by S. Horner, with a Supplementary Chapter, 1825—1856) who was in the anomalous position of being at once the friend of liberty, and the friend and ally of despotic Austria, (to whom she was fast bound by her aristocratic tendencies, as well as by her commercial dread of war), "England now threw every difficulty in the way of sending aid to the Sardinian King."

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Italians in the driving the Austrians out of Italy; and yet they must have known that without ridding Italy of the supremacy of Austria, it was impossible to introduce lasting reforms. The French Republic desired only to counterbalance Austrian influence in the Papal States; the Emperor Napoleon, alone, struck a decisive blow for the independence of Italy!

Nor is England now willing to intervene, in the affairs of Italy, otherwise than by advice and council. The pressure of the material interests of the country is so great, the practical turn of British statesmen so thoroughly opposed to war, and the feeling of the nation so exclusively English, that the hope that England will ever sacrifice her interests to an abstract idea—and that too, a *foreign* one—must necessarily prove delusive. On the other hand, we are bound to admit that England has seldom, if ever, made professions of that sort; and that a British minister would but ill recommend his policy to the nation, if he were to represent it as "disinterested" and "magnanimous" to other countries. The English people are not carried away by glory. Glory is no marketable article. It will not pass current from hand to hand, and the tradespeople of England do not receive it in payment of their dues. Even George Canning, when advocating the recognition of the Independence of the South American Republics, had to assure the British people, that he had no other but British interests at heart. We do not find fault with this policy, which is, perhaps, the only one which a statesman of a great country may adopt with safety; but we object to Englishmen and English journals charging the statesmen of other nations with selfish motives, which they justify in themselves. England, at the commencement of the last war, was as much an ally of Piedmont as France; yet England armed and offered her good offices to Austria; because it is not her *interest* to see the power of Austria diminished. She keeps her eye constantly on the Oriental question—the question which must now soon be settled, and which will eventually decide the fate of her Empire in India. By the side of the magnitude of that interest, the fate of Italy dwindles into insignificance. England may have kind words, the British people

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may have generous sympathies for the Italians, and Great Britain may endeavor, by Diplomacy, to meliorate the condition of Italy; but to suppose that, from a pure sense of right and justice, she will ever sacrifice a regiment, or incur any considerable national expense for Italy, is to betray a lamentable ignorance of British history, and the character of British statesmen.

Italy, in the war of 1859, *had no other reliable ally but France; while France, in espousing her cause, had, with the exception of Russia, the whole of Europe against her.*

The Emperor of the French had every imaginable motive ascribed to him. The Germans accused him of designs on the left bank of the Rhine; the Belgians feared for their safety, and wanted to fortify Antwerp; the Austrians accused him of coveting a portion of Italy for himself, and a kingdom for his cousin. All denounced him for his love of conquest, inherited from his uncle, inherent in, and inseparable from, the Empire. The greater the successes of Napoleon's campaign in Italy, the greater were the apprehensions of the neutrals that their turn will come next;* the more imminent, therefore, were the dangers of a coalition against France.

This is the proper stand-point from which to consider the peace of Villafranca. What would the Italians have gained if France had been attacked and overpowered by a coalition? Would an-

* As an illustration of those fears, we cannot refrain from describing a caricature which, shortly after the battle of Magenta, was published in a humoristic journal of Berlin, called "*Kladderadatsch*"—a name not easily pronounced by American lips. It represented a barber's shop, with the *Emperor Napoleon* as *barber*, and *Count Cavour*, as his *apprentice*, engaged in preparing the lather. The Emperor of Austria *occupied the chair*, already well lathered by Cavour, and ready to be shaved. The Emperor Napoleon was represented as about to perform that operation *in person*. In the back ground were two customers already served; the first, washing his face and looking rather wry, was the *King of Portugal*; the other, better pleased with the operation performed upon him, and already washed, was adjusting his cravat before the glass. This was the *Emperor of Russia*. Other potentates, such as the King of Prussia, the King of the Belgians, the King of Naples (the delicacy of the German artist in omitting the *Queen* of England was remarkable!) were crowding upon the French Emperor; but Count Cavour (the apprentice) assured them, with a gracious move of his arm, that they need not be impatient, because *each of them shall have his turn!*

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other Treaty of Paris, or another Congress of Vienna, have treated them with more consideration than in 1814, when Prince Metternich discovered that Italy was only a geographical division? Can it be doubted that Austria, if again master of Italy, would have swept Piedmont from the Peninsula, and confined the dominion of her King once more to the Island of Sardinia? And what would have become of the hopes of Italy, if the chivalrous King of Piedmont, and his gallant army were no longer at the head of the Italian movement? Mazzini and his Red Republican friends will probably answer: "The King of Piedmont is of the House of Chambery; he is a Frenchman, not an Italian; and Italy, to be free, must get rid of him and the Austrians both." We do not deem it necessary to refute such an argument. With the fall of Piedmont, Italy would for centuries be plunged back again into the old despotic system of government; and as to foreign domination and its melancholy consequences, we must not forget that the Italians have fretted, and agitated, and fought against it, for centuries, without being able to get rid of it. Was not, then, an immediate substantial payment on account, preferable to a renewal of the long deferred hope of being payed in full? To suppose that Italy, after centuries of foreign and domestic misrule, can, by one single campaign, be made free and happy, is simply absurd. We read of lovers who, after many sad and vexatious disappointments, are finally united, to be separated no more; but the Goddess of Liberty delights in constant courtship, and will only bestow her favors on those who, in return for her affection, are unremitting in their attention. The Italians must make up their minds to continue the struggle a little longer. Their efforts in their country's cause must not be allowed to flag, nor their readiness for self-sacrifice to abate; and the very means which they will be obliged to employ to acquire freedom, will, after its acquisition, serve to preserve it.

Let us now ask, what has Italy gained by the late war and the peace of Villafranca? This is our answer:

1st. The French delivered Piedmont, which had been invaded, from its foreign enemy. They thereby helped the constitutional

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cause; for Piedmont was the only constitutional Power of Italy, and the very cause of the Austrian invasion was the liberal government established at Turin.

2d. Austria, which has been the arbiter of the fate of Italy for nearly half a century, has resigned her paramount influence on Italian affairs, and expressed her willingness to become merely a member of the projected Italian Confederation.

3d. The Emperor of Austria is to join that Italian Confederacy, not as an European Sovereign, but only as an Italian Prince, and with a voice only corresponding to the Province of Venetia.

4th. The separate treaties which Austria, since 1815, has concluded with Naples, Tuscany, Parma and Modena, and which gave Austria the right of intervening in the international affairs of the smaller States, are abolished, and the people of those States left to establish their own form of government without dread of foreign invasion.*

5th. The Emperor of Austria, though retaining the fortresses of Mantua, Verona, Peschiera and Legnano, surrendered the fortresses of Piacenza, Brescello, Pizzighettone, Rocca d'Anfo, Ferrara and Ancona, with that portion of the Venetian Territory which extends towards Volta on the right bank of the Mincio.

6th. Austria gives up Lombardy, the richest of all her former possessions, and that fertile and best cultivated "division of Italy" is united to the Kingdom of Piedmont.

7th. Austria, by the events of the war, and the diplomatic transactions which preceded and followed it, is now completely isolated in her Italian policy—too weak, by her own acknowledg-

* This point is not invalidated by the terms of the treaty agreed upon at the Zurich Conferences; for though the Arch Dukes reserve their *rights* to the Ducal crowns of Modena and Tuscany, the *possession* may remain in abeyance for generations to come. The Emperors of Austria have not yet surrendered their claims to the *Kingdom of Jerusalem;* though Baron Rothschild in Frankfort-on-the-Main, can show a better title to the estate. The reservation of the *rights* of the Arch Dukes may save their honor; but the treaty says nothing about their *reinstatement.* Their right, unless they have the power to enforce it, is no better than that of the Wasa family to the throne of Sweden, now occupied by one of the offsprings of Napoleon's generals.

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ment, to enforce it herself; and without an ally, even in Germany, to sympathize with her in her political solitude. We consider this the most important result obtained by the late peace of Villafranca; because all the delay which now occurs between this preliminary arrangement and the final settlement of the Italian question by an European Congress, is in favor of Italy who is in *possession*, and against Austria who is kept *out* of Lombardy and the Duchies. The new Congress may meet or it may not meet, it may settle the Italian question or it may not settle it; the Congress may last as long as the Council of Trent, or it may be as short as the Queen's visit to Cherbourg; it can only inure to the benefit of the Italians. The very fact that there is an Italian question on which the great Powers of Europe are called to decide, and that Austria is willing to submit that question to an European Æropagus, justifies the war which France and Piedmont have waged against her, and involves her in logical contradictions. Austria will be as isolated in the Congress as she was in the war, and far more powerless than she was on the evening of the battle of Solferino.

The objection which has been made to the peace, rests on two distinct grounds—a military and a political one. The military objection is to the famous quadrangle of fortresses, Peschiera, Verona, Mantua and Legnano, which remains in the possession of Austria; but this objection loses much of its force when it is considered that Austria, in surrendering Lombardy, proclaimed to the world that she considered herself vanquished, while she had yet a powerful army in and behind those fortresses; and when it is further considered that her finances are wholly exhausted, and that the loss of her finest province cannot add to her national resources. The people of Austria, during the war and under the mortification of defeat, might have made voluntary loans to the government; the convents might have made donations of money and jewels, and the creditors of the State might have made further advances to make good their previous ones; but neither of these things will now be done to enable Austria to plunge into a *second* war. While the game is playing, the loser, under the influence of extraordinary excitement, may double the stakes; but none but a professional gambler

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will try to win to-morrow, what he has lost to-day—after he has slept over his loss. Austria, if she had been attacked in her strongholds, might have overcome the aversion of Prussia; but the peace of Villafranca has caused the Prussian army and the contingents of the smaller German States to be disbanded; so that, if circumstances were to compel the Emperor Francis Joseph once more to measure swords with France, he would open the campaign under far greater disadvantages than the loss of Peschiera and Mantua would have entailed upon him in the first encounter.

Again, the Emperor Francis Joseph, previous and during the last war, held out sundry promises of internal reform, which were to be introduced into *Austria proper*, after the conclusion of the peace. These promises stimulated the ardor of his German subjects, and disposed them for large sacrifices to sustain the honor of their sovereign. It remains now to be seen whether the Emperor is as good as his word. If the Emperor Francis Joseph disappoint the expectations of his people—and this will in all probability be the case—then it would perhaps have been better for him to lose the celebrated quadrangle, than the confidence of his most faithful subjects. Austria must improve her present respite to regulate, as far as this may be within the range of possibility, her finances, her system of taxation, and her uncontrolled expenditures. This is expected of her by those of her subjects who have most contributed to the expenses of the war, independent of municipal reforms, commercial regulations adapted to the spirit of the age, and equal rights for five millions of Protestants. If Austria disappoint these just and reasonable expectations—and it is difficult to see how she can manage *not* to disappoint them—then the consequences may be worse to her future position in Europe, than if she had at once treated for the surrender of her Italian fortresses for a round sum of money, and made herself strong at home. If Austria retains Venetia and endeavors to govern her as heretofore, her wealthy subjects will emigrate, and she will draw but little revenue in return for the expense of maintaining fortresses and military roads; while any concession which Austria may feel disposed to make to Venetia, will instantly be demanded also by the other Provinces, which have

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remained loyal to her House. Provincial governments, unless they partake of the representative form, would not satisfy either the Venetians, the Hungarians or the Sclavonians, much less the Germans; and Provincial *Parliaments* would be equivalent to the dismemberment of the Empire. Austria, therefore, will be compelled to continue the system of centralization introduced by Prince Schwarzenberg in 1849, and Venetia will enter against it an unceasing protest, which will constantly present the alternative of war or revolution. Against the insecurity of such a position, the possession of Mantua and Verona is no adequate offset; and Austria will soon find herself obliged, either to make a last desperate effort to reconquer all she has lost, or cede what was left to her for a consideration in money or territory. The probability is, she will demand both; and as Italy can only furnish one, fall back for the other on some of her South Eastern neighbors. Austria has some experience in that species of trade; having for more than a century not only frequently exchanged or sold her own hereditary Provinces, but also those which belonged to the Germanic Empire. Her first acquisition of Venice (at the peace of *Campo-Formio*) was secured by such a traffic; for Austria, it must be remembered, received Venice out of the hands of the first Napoleon (who obtained for it the left bank of the Rhine, which did *not* belong to Austria;) and it would be but a historical retribution, if Austria were now obliged to surrender it again—for a slice of Turkey. Turkey is the "Indian Reserve" of Europe, in the partition of which those sovereigns, who feel aggrieved by the "new political map," must seek their permanent redress. It is for this reason, that we believe the settlement of the Italian question will accelerate that of the Oriental one. Austria will be glad to surrender the four fortresses, if she can take a step or two in the eastern direction of her Empire.*

As regards the political work which it is charged the Emperor

* If Russia, previous to the last Crimean war, was favoring Austrian domination in Italy, it was to prevent Austria from taking an active part in the affairs of Constantinople. Pozzo di Borgo, has already said so in so many words. Since the Crimean war, however, Russia has lost all confidence in Austria, and expects more from her necessities than from her gratitude.

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Napoleon has left undone, the answer is already contained in the preceding pages. We only wish to refer once more to the fact, not yet sufficiently appreciated, that Austrian influence in Italy is crushed; and that she can now neither uphold despotism in Naples, nor force it on the Central Italian States. That she considered this her mission in Italy, up to the latest hour, was confessed by Metternich himself, in a dispatch which Count Buol Schauenstein, the late Austrian Premier, then (in 1845) Austrian minister to Turin, handed to King Charles Albert, father of the present King of Sardinia. In that dispatch, to which we have already once cursorily alluded, and which the King of Sardinia, to his honor be it said, *refused to receive*, Metternich warns the Princes of Italy against making concessions to the people, and reminded them of the fact that "the Italian (despotic) governments have, for the last ten years, existed only by the assistance of Austria."* Well then, this assistance to despotism, which Austria afforded to the former Italian governments, exists no more; and if Metternich spoke the truth, these governments must fall without it. The proposition could not be more clearly laid down, nor more satisfactorily demonstrated. If the Italians, in their improved present condition, are unable to work out their own salvation, we must conclude that they are, as yet, unfit for liberty. For the first time, for many centuries, are the people of Central Italy permitted to exercise the sovereign right of choosing their rulers and establishing their own governments. If Southern Italy is not moved by this example, it is because other influences prevail, which can only be removed in the course of time. It is assuredly not pretended by any reasonable man, that the Emperor Napoleon is bound to dethrone the King of the Two Sicilies, or establish a constitutional government in Naples by means of rifle-cannon. This would only be imitating the policy of Austria, though applying it in another sense. Let the Republic of Switzerland put an end to the enlistment of her people in the service of foreign Princes, let the agents and recruit-

* The dispatch was originally addressed to the Grand Duke of Tuscany; but was also intended as a lesson to King Charles Albert, and, for that reason, the Austrian minister was instructed to hand him a copy of it.

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ing officers of foreign governments, if caught on her soil, be sentenced to the work-house or the penitentiary, and let the men who enlist be dishonored, instead of having monuments erected to their fidelity, and a great step will be gained in the emancipation of the Two Sicilies from despotic rule. The Marquis de Turgot, the present French minister at Bern, is, perhaps, instructed by the Emperor to press these considerations on the Swiss government. If so, we feel assured that public opinion in Switzerland will be with him, and that this last remnant of the *condottieri* practice of past ages will soon cease to disgrace Europe.*

But the Papal States, we are told, are still suffering from temporal misgovernment. This is undoubtedly true; but who contends that no Reforms are to be introduced into those States? Certainly not the Emperor Napoleon, who is pressing them all the time on the Holy Father, without losing either patience or courage. That the question of political Reform in the Papal States is surrounded with difficulties and dangers, need not be urged on the Emperor Napoleon either by the English or German press; the French Catholic journals being sufficiently remindful of that fact. It may indeed be questioned whether the advice, given by the public writers of England and Germany, is altogether disinterested. The Protestant Powers of Europe are quite ready to abolish the temporal power of the Pope altogether, and "be done with it;" but it is one of the characteristics of the present Emperor of the French, that he not only emulates the achievements, but also avoids the mistakes, of his great uncle. The Papal States may be governed without a British Constitution, and yet satisfy the reasonable aspirations of the Roman people. Reforms in the Papal States have been advised over and over again, by Catholic and Protestant Powers,† and the time is close at hand when they must be intro-

* It is but justice to Switzerland to state that the so-called "Swiss troops," employed in foreign service, are only in part composed of Swiss soldiers, and that perhaps the majority of them are adventurers from all parts of Europe. But for this very reason, the Swiss government ought to coöperate with other powers to put down the practice.

† See page 61.

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duced to prevent revolution. With liberal governments established in Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Lucca and Piedmont, it is physically and morally impossible for Rome to retain the temporal government which Austrian bayonets have forced upon her. The Pope himself, though the experience of 1848 and 1849 may have rendered him cautious and timid, will, when no longer under the influences of interested advisers, yield to the reasonable demands of his subjects, and complete the work which he has so gloriously inaugurated in 1846. We have the testimony of *Gioberti** who, in 1848, was Charles Albert's minister, that Pope Pius IX. before his flight from Rome, promised him that, in case the King of Sardinia were successful, he would crown him *King of* ITALY, and when, after his flight to Gaeta, the Holy Father, at last, decided to throw himself for protection on Austria, he remarked, with some bitterness, "they *willed* it so;" referring evidently to those who had forced him into a position so little congenial to his heart. The Pope has since been surrounded by Cardinals in the Austrian interest; and Von Bach, the Austrian ex-minister of the Interior, now Austrian envoy at Rome, is not the man to advise and counsel the Holy Father in his present extremity.†

The rôle which the Republican Unionists assigned to the Pope in 1848, was that of a belligerent Prince, engaged in an unequal contest with a vastly superior military Power, and he declined it. The part now assigned him, by the peace of Villafranca is more consonant with his spiritual calling. After his antecedents, he

* Author of the *Primato morale e civile degl' Italiani*, published in 1843, and dedicated to Silvio Pellico—a political work, with strong Catholic tendencies, which exercised an immence influence on the minds of the Italians.

† Mr. Von Bach was, at the beginning of the Austrian revolution in 1848, an obscure lawyer in Vienna, who harangued and led the students in the Aula. No paper, published in Austria or the German States, was then sufficiently liberal for his democratic zeal. But he was soon converted to a different faith, accepted office, and was, through the medium of the Arch Duchess Sophia, promoted to the rank of a cabinet minister. In that capacity, he systematized the reactionary movement under various disguises; and was mainly instrumental in the conclusion of the *concordat* which may safely be considered as his work. Neither Count Buol Schauenstein, ex-minister of foreign affairs, nor Baron Bruck, the able minister of finance, enjoyed, in the same degree, the confidence of the Emperor.

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may, at first, find it embarrassing; but as soon as laymen shall be introduced into the civil government of the Papal States, and the line of demarcation drawn between that government and the supremacy of the Pope in all things belonging exclusively to the Roman Church, (*in sacra*) the principal difficulty in the way of reform will be removed. We must not, of course, expect these things to be done over night—"Rome," says the proverb, "was not built in a day"—nor believe that these reforms will be introduced without serious opposition from the reactionary party; but good sense will ultimately prevail, if moderation continues to characterize the proceedings of the liberals.

But in order that the reforms about to be introduced may be lasting, and serve as a basis for the national development of Italy, the Pope must not appear to be coerced, or to yield his previous convictions merely to a combination of circumstances beyond his control. The Pope cannot be considered merely in the light of a sovereign Prince. As such, he has the control over some three millions of subjects; but as the head of the Catholic Church, he has the spiritual control (*circa sacra*) over one hundred and fifty millions of Europeans. Whatever shall lessen his spiritual authority, or appear as an indignity offered to the Head of the Church, might be accompanied by sad consequences in France and other Catholic countries, without benefiting Italy. If the Pope appear coerced, there will be a reactionary party in Italy and throughout Catholic Europe, to oppose whatever has not received his sanction; while, if the Pope himself can be induced to separate his temporal from his spiritual power, and to administer the former on liberal principles, his example on all other Catholic sovereigns will be irresistible. Liberty, then, will be received as an article of faith, sanctified by the solemnities of religion. Such a state of things may be brought about by forbearance and prudence, by gradually extending the power and influence of the liberal members of the Sacred College,* and by convincing the Holy Father that reforms

* Since writing the above, news has reached our shores that Cardinal Antonelli, the chief of the Austrian party in the College of Cardinals, has resigned the Presidency of the Pope's Council, though he still retains the office of Secretary of State.

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in his temporal government, in spite of the threats of the sovereigns of Austria and Naples, will not lead to a schism in the Church. They will, on the contrary, increase his power by the harmony they will introduce between his temporal and spiritual calling, and promote the welfare, not only of his subjects and of the Italians generally, but of the whole Catholic world. Pius IX. is not called upon, by the Emperor Napoleon, to make war upon Austria or any other Catholic Power; his aid is invoked to make *peace*, and to bless the birth-day of the Italian nation.

Those who imagine that Italy can only be saved by abolishing Popery, and substituting Protestantism for Catholicism, take a very narrow view of the history of human progress. A new Protestant faith could not now be introduced in any part of Europe, except by dividing the sects already in existence; and there is no established Protestant faith, in any part of Europe, which would satisfy the heart and the genius of the people of Southern Europe. Religion, to become the leading principle of action in all people of Roman or Greek origin, must not merely appeal to the understanding, but also to the senses;—it must not merely consist in solemn ratiocination, but be felt as something that has impressed itself on the heart. To deprive the Church of its authority, in such communities, is not to *reform* the Catholic religion, it is simply to *destroy* it without putting anything in its place. It would be equal to the introduction of a moral and religious anarchy, such as we have witnessed in France during the Reign of Terror. The Reformation which, in Germany, led to the *separation* of the churches, not to the *reform* of the Catholic church, was followed by thirty years' war, and ended in the division of the Germanic empire—a historical lesson which, under all circumstances, but especially at this moment, when the national sentiment prevails over all others, is not very inviting to the Italians. To this moment, the antagonism between Protestant and Catholic Germany exists; and yet the Teutonic mind, which is naturally inclined to scepticism and ratiocination, is incomparably more considerate and calm than that of the people of Italy. If the political union of Germany is now the absorbing aim and desire of the whole German race, it is not be-

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cause the Catholics and Protestants, there, have concluded an eternal peace; but because they have arrived at that point of religious indifference, where they can no longer find any serious matter for dispute. It is exceedingly questionable whether the imaginative mind of the Italians, surrounded as it is by works of art, to the creation of which faith has essentially contributed, will ever arrive at the German point of indifference; and it is a matter for the gravest consideration of statesmen, whether that point of indifference in regard to religious matters, if it could be attained in Italy, would be an element of political strength, at this or any other period.*

We must, then, come to the conclusion that the introduction of a religious schism in Italy, would be no means of achieving that union which is indispensable to her safety; and that, whatever reforms may be necessary in the Papal States, must relate exclusively to their civil government. That these reforms will be brought about, that it will be impossible to reëstablish the system which prevailed previous to the late war, is confirmed by the attitude of the people in the Roman Marks and Legations; by the organization which has there been effected, and by the armistice which seems to have been tacitly agreed upon between the reformers and the partisans of the present government.

The idea of an Italian Confederation, with the Pope for its no-

* It is a great mistake to suppose that the Catholic clergy, in a body, are opposed to liberal reforms either in Rome, or in any other part of Italy. On the contrary, the Priests in Lombardy, in Naples, in Piedmont, and in the Papal States, have generally sided with the people; and many of them have suffered imprisonment and death for their heroic devotion to the cause of liberty. On this subject, the historians, and the reports of the diplomatic and consular agents of England and France (Protestants and Catholics) furnish the most ample and conclusive testimony. That a portion of the Catholic *Hierarchy*, in their ultra-conservative zeal, should oppose popular reforms, is, perhaps, inseparable from their elevated position, which is productive of the same feeling in Churchmen and Laymen, in Lords and Bishops. Ferdinand Cortez was certainly a good Catholic, who ascribed his escape from Mexico, after the failure of his first attack, simply to the intercession of St. Peter; but his faith did not prevent him to implore Charles V. rather to send him Priests and Monks, than Bishops, to convert the American Indians.

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minal President, needs no apology. The political union of the free Italian States is indispensable to their national independence, and consolidates what has been acquired at so terrible an expense. The Italian Confederation now proposed, is the exact counterpart of that *League of Princes* which, ever since the Congress of Vienna, Metternich aimed at, as a means of extending Austrian influence and despotic rule over the whole Peninsula. That very league, which the Austrian statesman partially established by separate treaties with the smaller Italian Princes, and which the sovereigns of Sardinia at all times so stoutly opposed, is now practically dissolved by the elimination of these Princes, and the proposition of a confederation of liberal governments, against the reactionary tendencies of Austria. Metternich's Italian statesmanship is now turned against himself; the means which he employed to crush Italy, are used to save her from Austrian domination. For though Austria is invited to become a member of the Italian Confederacy, the Emperor of Austria will exercise no more influence over it, than if he were simply Duke of Venetia. Doomed to an unavoidable minority in council, he will have no influence on its deliberation; and an attempt to control it by force, will bring him in conflict with all the Great Powers of Europe. The Italian Confederacy, if it does not at once introduce "Italy one and indivisible" into the family of nations, will, nevertheless, be able to effect many objects indispensable to the safety and welfare of the country. It will devise means for common defence; it will facilitate the building of railways and canals; it will abolish the vexatious line of custom-houses between the several States, by the establishment of tariff-leagues after the example of Germany; and it will bring the people of the different States and towns, who have been divided by centuries of civil war, in friendly communion with each other. It is by such means, Italy must be regenerated; not by some absolute, abstract rule of action; confounding all conditions, and obliterating all historical recollections.

And if an Italian Confederacy is formed, who better than the Pope—who *but* the Pope can be its President? Shall vanquished Austria preside over its deliberations? None but a madman would

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propose it. Shall Piedmont preside, with whom Austria has been so recently at war? National comity forbids it. Shall Naples preside—she who is still an absolutist Power, and a stranger to the whole arrangement? None of the remaining sovereigns of Italy can properly claim precedence over his peers, but they are all Catholics, and can, as such, defer to the Head of the Church. The Presidency of the Pope, so far from being unnatural, seems to us the only means by which an Italian Confederacy can be successfully organized, so as to command, from the start, the respect of the world.

There is yet the matter of garrisoning the fortresses of the celebrated quadrangle. This, if not now, will hereafter lead to serious complications. In the first place, we may ask, is Austria willing to make federal fortresses of all or any of the four fortresses composing that quadrangle? and, if so, how shall the federal fortresses be garrisoned? The federal fortresses of Germany have *mixed* garrisons, and their commanders are alternately Austrians and Prussians; yet, even with such an understanding, questions have arisen, not at all conducive to harmony; how, then, shall we expect an agreement on this subject among the different States of Italy? Shall the fortresses of Verona, Mantua, Peschiera, and Legnano receive mixed garrisons, to which all the larger States of Italy are to furnish their quota, or shall these fortresses be exclusively garrisoned by Austrians? If garrisoned exclusively by Austrians, the troops will not consist of Italians; but of Germans, Hungarians, Croats, etc.; for Austria, without Lombardy, will not have enough Italian troops in her service to properly garrison Verona and Mantua, much less the other places we have named. The Lombard regiments which, during the war, were sent to Gallicia, Bohemia, and the German federal fortress of Radstadt, cannot be retained in the Austrian service after Lombardy itself is surrendered; and the Province of Venetia, be it dukedom or kingdom, cannot furnish more than thirty or forty thousand men with the system of conscription now in use in that Province. If the Emperor of Austria, therefore, as an Italian Prince, honestly consents to an Italian Confederation, he must also consent to the Ita-

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lian fortresses receiving Italian garrisons, which he cannot furnish without the aid of his confederates. These points, we think, will be the most difficult to settle; and hence the formation of an Italian Confederacy was only, in general terms, agreed upon between the two emperors. They will open a wide field for discussion and future disagreement, which will be periodically renewed till Austria retires to the eastern shore of the Adriatic. But whether Austria alone, or conjointly with her Italian confederates, occupies these fortresses, if their garrisons are to be formed exclusively of Italian troops, Austria might as well have surrendered them as retained them in such custody. And yet, on no other terms can she expect to be at peace either with her own Italian subjects, or with the distrustful members of the new Italian Confederacy. To sum up, the condition of Italy has never been more promising than now; and it would be folly and ingratitude in her not to acknowledge the vast advantages secured to her by the Peace of Villafranca. If all she desired has not been accomplished, all that she could reasonably hope for is still within her reach. The present political constellation is more propitious to Italy, than any that thirty generations have seen, in that beautiful land. If the Italians have the tact, prudence, moderation, and fortitude for which we are willing to give them credit, and which they have so strikingly exhibited in their late conduct, the day of their final deliverance is already dawning upon them.

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CHAPTER XV.

NAPLES AND SICILY. WILL THE DYNASTY OF THE SICILIAN BOURBONS BE CONTINUED? WHAT CHANGES ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW THE PEACE OF VILLAFRANCA—THE MURATISTS—THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISLAND OF SICILY.

Of all the States of Italy, none have been so long and so thoroughly misgoverned as Naples and Sicily. Though the Sicilians, whose nobility claim the honor of Norman descent, had fought bravely for a separate constitution and government, and were promised both, by Ferdinand I. and his English protectors, during the wars with France, the Congress of Vienna decided (and Metternich and Talleyrand received pensions for aiding in this decision) that the island shall be joined to Naples, and that Ferdinand I. should be recognized as *King of the Two Sicilies*. The Neapolitan yoke was a terrible infliction on the Sicilians; but their many heroic and sanguinary struggles to throw it off, only ended in their entire subjugation. The revolution of 1820, in Naples, only revived the hopes of the islanders to establish a separate government of their own, and aided the coercive movement of the Austrians, by dividing the forces of the Liberals. After the Austrians had entered Naples, they also occupied Sicily; but the foreigners were hardly as much detested as the Neapolitans. What the Sicilians wanted, was a Constitution after the British model, with a House of Peers and a House of Commons. Republican tendencies existed in no part of the island; and Mazzini and his emissaries never succeeded in making the least impression on its inhabitants.

In 1848, the Sicilians again rose, and having driven out the Neapolitan troops, succeeded in establishing a government of their own, which was favorably received, though not officially recognized, by England and France. These powers were unwilling to recognize a Republic; but when, on the 11th of July, 1848, the

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Duke of Genoa (second son of Charles Albert and brother of the present King of Sardinia) was declared *King* of Sicily, under the name of Albert Amadeus I., the French and English Admirals saluted the Sicilian flag, and an English steam-vessel carried the Envoy, with the offer of the crown, to Genoa.

Charles Albert, who in the meantime, had been driven out of Lombardy, was not in a condition to accept the crown of Sicily for his son; but rather sought to conciliate the King of Naples, whose assistance he now required for a second campaign against Austria. The King of Naples, however, not only refused to send troops to his aid, but preferred employing them against Sicily. Filangieri with 16,000 troops was dispatched against that unhappy island, which was now, by France and England, abandoned to its fate. Messina, which had been shelled from the citadel for eight long months—and which, in return for this favor, had bestowed on the King of Naples the title of *il Re Bomba**—was now, for the fourth time, bombarded, and only taken after a four days' hand-to-hand fight, and after the batteries of the town had been silenced from want of ammunition. A truce was now agreed upon, and England and France again interceded between the king and his Sicilian subjects; but in vain. The campaign reopened, and the insurgents were again beaten. After Catania had fallen, Palermo, advised by the French Admiral Baudin, surrendered on condition of a general amnesty. Filangieri entered with his Neapolitan soldiers; but no amnesty was granted, and the leaders, as heretofore, handed over to the executioner.

The fate of the Neapolitan constitution was even more melancholy. The King, a crafty hypocrite, like his two predecessors, never intended that it should go into force; and, from the first moment of its granting, and for months previous, negotiated with Austria for military assistance. But Austria, at that time, required all her troops at home, and the King of Naples was obliged (10th February, 1848,) to proclaim a constitution. Five days later, on the occasion of a procession to solemnize the event, Lord Napier delivered, from the balcony of the British Embassy, the

* The King of the Bomb-shells.

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following remarkable speech: "Happy are these days, when Italian liberty and independence are forever secured. Italian nationality is no longer an affair of sentiment and desire, but a reality. *Let all rally round their institutions, to secure the triumph against the stranger.* Long live the independence of Italy! Long live Ferdinand II.!" We do not, for a moment, doubt the sincerity of his Lordship; but between the love of Italian independence, as expressed by the British Minister on that occasion, and the subsequent advice of the British government to the King of Naples, "not to engage in a war with Austria, to promote the interests of the King of Sardinia," there is such a palpable contradiction, that none but the British Premier himself can explain it. More intelligible was the previous offer of Admiral Parker, to protect the King of Naples with his fleet.

The opening of the Neapolitan Chamber was fixed on the 1st May; but owing to some imperfections in the electoral college, Parliament was prorogued to the 15th. On that day, however, the city was filled with troops; and a quarrel between the people and the soldiers having been artfully provoked, the artillery from the forts was ordered to fire upon the town, and a general massacre ensued, which only ended at night. In the midst of the carnage, and while the houses of the liberals were being burnt and sacked, the King sent a message to the Parliament, ordering it to disperse, as he should otherwise employ force. Resistance was, of course, hopeless, and the members left, under protest. Some of the ministers, imploring the King to put a stop to the slaughter, were told that "the time for clemency was past, and that the people must now render up an account for their actions." The following day the National Guards were disbanded, and the city placed under martial law. Thus ended the first act of the Neapolitan Constitutional drama.

Italy, however, was not yet pacified; and though the Neapolitan troops were withdrawn from Lombardy, the Piedmontese had obtained a victory at Goito. The King of Naples, therefore, gave a new electoral law, and convoked Parliament for the 1st of July. Though the electoral law was changed, and every

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species of intimidation used, nearly the same Deputies were returned. Parliament actually opened on the day appointed; but there was no reliance on the King, either on the part of the Deputies or the people; and this want of confidence was soon justified by the King's acts. Scarcely had the Peers and Commons (each separately) voted the address, before the King, even without receiving it, signed the decree for the prorogation of Parliament. A bloody riot accompanied the adjournment. The royal treachery is explained by the fact that, on the 25th and 26th of July, (nearly a month after the opening of the Neapolitan Chambers,) the Sardinian army was beaten in Lombardy, and Radetzky had again crossed the Mincio.

But the Hungarian Revolution was now making considerable progress, and Charles Albert was again arming to retrieve his political fortune. The King of Naples, therefore, convoked another Parliament, for the 30th November; but on the 24th November adjourned it until the 1st February, 1849. What enlightened Italians thought of this new convocation, is emphatically expressed by a single line of *Carlo Poerio*, in a letter to General Pepe, dated Naples, 4th Dec. 1848: "Another Bartholomew threatens all who will not sell body and soul." The new Parliament, whose liberal composition was similar to that of its predecessors, was hardly recognized by the King's ministers, and on the 13th March it was formally dissolved.

Thus closed the Neapolitan Parliamentary play, with its cruel, sanguinary episodes; but the end was not yet. The loss of the battle of Novara by the Piedmontese, and the victory of Radetzky, furnished Ferdinand II., of the Two Sicilies, matter for an epilogue. Feeling, at last, secure against all chances of success of the liberal party in Italy, he ordered criminal proceedings to be instituted against all who had borne a prominent part in the late patriotic movements. The worthiest men in the land were now either executed, banished or thrown into prison. Mr. Gladstone has described the sufferings of some of these patriots; and the Neapolitan dungeons have since become as famous, through the eloquent pen

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of the British translator of the Iliad, as those of the *Spielberg* by the graphic pencil of Silvio Pellico.

Ferdinand II., after having thus carried out his purpose "to be King—alone, and always King," as expressed, in his remarkable letter to his uncle, Louis Philippe, referred to in another chapter,* locked himself up—not in a convent, but in a fortress—the only place in his kingdom where he thought himself safe from the vengeance of his subjects. He there died, of a frightful lingering disease, which made him an object of loathing to his own family; cursed by the thousands he had betrayed, and seeing his throne again surrounded by dangers from the rekindled patriotism of the Italian people, and the victorious progress of their arms. His son by his first wife, Marina Christina, of Savoy, (youngest daughter of Victor Emanuel I.,) born on the 16th of January, 1836, succeeded him, as Francis II. of the Two Sicilies, without any of those manifestations of hope or joy which usually greet a young sovereign on his accession to the throne. The Neapolitans and Sicilians have ceased to hope for the introduction of political reforms, except through revolution and bloodshed. There is nothing the King might promise that could, for a moment, inspire the people with confidence—nothing that he could do, which would not instantly be construed into a new artifice of deceit and dissimulation. No other government in Europe is, in a moral point of view, so completely bankrupt as the Neapolitan; no other line of sovereigns so thoroughly hated and detested by the people.† It is the loyalty of the Piedmontese people, their entire confidence in the sacredness of the King's word, their conviction of his honesty, which have sustained Victor Emanuel II. in the darkest hour of his life. Had his ancestors left such a historical record as the First and Second Ferdinand of Naples, he might now be an exile in England, or a citizen of the United States. How easy it would have been for the present King of Sardinia, to make his peace with Austria, by revoking the constitution and crushing the liberty of the people! And how

* See page 64.

† The only popularity the late King Ferdinand enjoyed was among the Lazzaroni—the nobility and gentry, the learned and educated, were equally opposed to his rule.

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difficult and beset with dangers is the path he is now treading, unless he feels that he is supported and loved by a whole people!

The want of confidence in their King, which the Neapolitan people have transferred from Ferdinand II. to his son, and which is strengthened by the still lively recollections of the enormities committed by Ferdinand I. and Queen Caroline of Austria, is an insuperable obstacle to any beneficial changes which the present sovereign may intend to introduce in his kingdom. If he granted a new constitution to-morrow, few would believe that it is his purpose to support it; and the members of the new Parliament would not venture to take their seats, without first ascertaining that their voices are not likely to be drowned by the roar of the King's artillery. Neither can the King, after the record left by his father, confide in his subjects. It is so natural for a southern people to love or to hate—how much more then must this hold of the people at the foot of Mount Vesuvius and Mount Ætna! And yet, without mutual confidence between the sovereign and his subjects, a constitutional government is practically impossible, and far more demoralizing than an absolute despotism. But it will be urged that there is a constitution in Naples, which, though fallen into desuetude, has never been revoked. Will any one assert that elections, under that constitution, could now be held with a satisfactory result? The present King, if he wants to establish a liberal government, must use none of the blood-stained lumber of the old political machine of his father; he must strike out a new path, and consign the old one, if possible, to oblivion. But will he do this? "The Bourbon's are old," said his father, in his letter to Louis Philippe, "and if they wished to remodel themselves, after the fashion of the new dynasties, they would render themselves ridiculous." We doubt much if Francis II. has the least disposition to render himself ridiculous; the education he received being a sufficient guarantee against all such unworthy suspicions.

But of what use can constitutions be in Naples or Sicily, as long as the available and best part of the Neapolitan army consists of mercenaries? As early as July, 1821, did Ferdinand I. disband his former army, which had been raised by conscription,

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and which, in fact, had made the revolution of 1820; only the Guards and the gens d'armes were retained. The new army was entirely formed by enlistments; and, from that time, it has been a wilful and ready instrument in the hands of the King. It was the army, and especially the Swiss regiments, who, on the 15th of May, 1848, established anarchy and despotism on the ruins of a constitutional government, and who, since that period, have been the main support of the Neapolitan throne.*

The transition from an absolute military despotism, to a liberal representative government, is, under all circumstances, fraught with difficulties and dangers; but with the antecedents of the Neapolitan government, it would be doubly so in Naples and Sicily. The Neapolitan army, unlike that of every other Italian State, is exclusively devoted to the King; and an object of detestation to the people, with whom it has not a single sentiment in common. The army, therefore, would have to be disbanded and another one formed, or newly officered, to inspire public confidence. The Swiss regiments could not be continued a day after the establishment of a liberal government, and the same holds of the present organization of the police. Without these radical changes, there would be no safety for the constitution; no protection either to the members of Parliament, or to those who sympathize with them. But would the King and the royal family consider themselves safe under such a new arrangement? Would not the old party feuds, stimulated by the spirit of revenge, break forth with fresh virulence, and menace both the King and his Parliament?

Another difficulty consists in the unquenchable desire of the Sicilians for a separate government. Sicily, in that respect, bears the same relation to Naples, which Norway does to Sweden. They want a Parliament of their own, and a separate administration. Norway made the same demand on Sweden in 1815, and King Bernadotte had the good sense to grant it, rather than invade Norway,

* Francis I., grandfather of the present king, had no great appreciation of the Neapolitan soldiers; but a high regard for the Swiss. When his Guards demanded to be dressed in red, after the fashion of the "brave English," the King replied, "Dress them in blue or in red; they are sure to run."

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and enforce obedience through military force. Yet Bernadotte was a general. The Sicilian Bourbons, who were no soldiers at all, acted differently; and Messina, Palermo and Catania have become historical monuments of their cruelty and folly. Yet the hatred of the Sicilians of Neapolitan rule, and the desire for independence, are, at this moment, as strong as ever. At the Congress of Verona, Metternich, who was aware that the Sicilians hated the Germans less than the Neapolitans, proposed the separation of the two governments; but France opposed it, and England protested against it; and the proposition was dropped. But in 1848, Lord Minto, in his dispatch to Lord Palmerston, admitted the justice of the demand of Sicily, "who had as good a cause for revolution as England had in 1688." England mediated, but effected nothing; and when the King of Naples felt strong enough to throw off all diplomatic restraint, he plainly told the British minister that he would govern Sicily as he thought proper, and that England had no right to interfere with his sovereign pleasure. Diplomatic relations between England and Naples were afterwards entirely suspended, and remained so till the death of Ferdinand.

The question now is, what shall become of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in the present condition of Italy? Can the present absolute rule of Francis II. continue for any length of time, with Piedmont and Central Italy in arms, determined to establish and uphold representative governments? Can Italian freedom be secured, with more than a third of the whole population of Italy still subject to military despotism? The King of Naples, himself, does not seem to think so, as he is evidently preparing for a crisis. Whether he intends to invade the Papal States, or simply to defend himself against possible encroachments of the liberal army of Central Italy, certain it is that the concentration of Neapolitan troops, on the frontier of the Roman States, does not argue favorably for the Italian cause. If he intended to grant a constitution, such as is likely to satisfy his people, he would not put his army on the war footing; and thereby ruin his finances, which, in spite of his despotism, his father left in a tolerably satisfactory condition. Francis II., then, is resolved to resist the popular movement which

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sweeps over Italy, and to assume all the responsibility attending that revolution. He may, like his father, have no disposition to share the fate of Charles X. or Louis Philippe; but will he be able to avoid it? If the King of Naples were to follow his inclination, and intervene in the affairs of Rome, a *casus belli* would at once be presented, the result of which, if Austria is kept at bay by France, would be overwhelming. Francis II. is a young, inexperienced prince; and his queen, a Bavarian princess, sister of the Empress of Austria, may be ambitious. Both are, moreover, animated by a religious zeal, artfully stimulated by the leaders of the reactionary parties in Vienna and Rome. Thus circumstanced, and surrounded by indiscreet advisers, emboldened by former successes, they may be betrayed into a rash act, and realize, in their own case, the truth of Pitt's remark, that "there is nothing so short-lived as a military despotism."

The present strength and organization of the Neapolitan army are, undoubtedly, sufficient to enable the King, if left free to attend to his domestic affairs, to resist any demand of the people for popular reform. Whether he will be able to do so for a considerable length of time, is doubtful; but as long as the affairs of Central Italy remain unsettled, as long as constitutionalism is not definitely organized in the Duchies, and modified in the Papal States, the King of Naples will not change his form of government. Once entirely isolated from all the other States of Italy, he will be obliged to yield; but it may then be "too late." If the King be once *obliged* to yield, he has no longer the power to prescribe limits to the demands of the people.

But the King, relying on his army, seems to be disposed to take the initiative, and we can imagine a combination of circumstances which may lead him to believe that he can do so with advantage. A move of that sort, however, unless all Italy is crushed, and Austria again reinstated in Lombardy, is sure to cost him his crown. There can be no more compromise between him and his subjects—between Francis II., of the Two Sicilies, and ITALY. And he had better have a care, too, not to involve himself, even diplomatically, with the King of Sardinia and his allies; lest cause

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be found to invade his own country. In his present situation, he cannot afford to lose a battle. His troops, once beaten, would be treated as intruders; the Piedmontese, as the liberators of the country.

And, in this connection, we may as well ask what would become of Naples and Sicily, if the royal family were exiles in England or Austria? Republican elements there are but few, either in Naples or Sicily; and it is doubtful whether these could be combined into a government sufficiently powerful to protect life and property at home, and sufficiently conservative to maintain friendly relations with the other States of Europe. The revolution of 1820 was entirely achieved by the military; though the people afterwards joined it (as was lately the case in Florence) and the Parliament, convoked in that year, was as loyal to the sovereign as could have been desired by a king of Great Britain. In the Parliaments which met at Naples in May and July, 1848, and in February, 1849, there were but few Republicans. The charge of Republicanism, preferred against many members, was trumped up for the purpose of charging them with treason against the crown.* The majority in each Parliament was in favor of an Italian Union; nothing else. A Neapolitan or Sicilian Republic was not even in the programme of Mazzini; much less in that of the Neapolitan or Sicilian liberals. Besides, it must be clear to the humblest political capacity, that a Republic of ten millions of people, or even of seven millions, (Naples alone) would not, in the present situation of Europe, be recognized by any of the five Great Powers. But if either the Neapolitans, or the Sicilians, chose a King, the case would be different.

We have seen that the Sicilians, in 1848, *did* choose a King, and that the choice fell on the Duke of Genoa, brother of Victor Emanuel II. The French and English admirals, in Palermo,

* To give the reader an idea of the manner in which political trials were conducted in Naples and Sicily under the late king, we need only mention the case of six poor political criminals who, in January 1850, were handed over to a court martial, with this injunction to the judges: "These prisoners are to be found *guilty* and must be *executed to-day*." Judges which found the accused guilty were rewarded, those who voted for their acquittal were punished.

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saluted his flag in token of recognition; and had Charles Albert not been defeated by the Austrians, Albert Amadeus I. would have remained King of Sicily. Sicily, it may safely be presumed, will attempt another revolution; and if Francis II. be otherwise engaged, it may succeed and end in another choice of royalty.*

If there is to be an Italian Confederation, with the kings of Sardinia and Venetia as members, there can be no good objection to a King of Sicily, and another one of Naples. The separation of these two kingdoms would satisfy the people, and there would be no Bourbon interest in France to oppose it. But would England consent to it? We imagine that her assent to such a proposition would depend on the choice of the King. Piedmont, being already enlarged by the acquisition of Lombardy, and the probable annexation of Parma and Modena—perhaps Tuscany, could hardly claim Sicily, even as a secundo-geniture, unless she were disposed to cede the Island of Sardinia—perhaps Savoy, whose inhabitants are French—to France. This might displease England; but would she go to war for it? We hardly think so. Certainly not while French and English troops fight side by side in China; and, while a disturbance of those happy relations, might find a French fleet and French troops in the Indian ocean. Again, supposing a Sardinian Prince out of the question, might not the choice of the Sicilians fall on another member of the King of Sardinia's family? What, if the choice fell on PRINCE NAPOLEON, son-in-law of the King of Sardinia? Such a choice is quite possible, and would hardly be seriously objected to, unless a descendant of Joachim Murat be, at the same time, called to the throne of Naples. That the Muratists in Naples, in case of a revolution, would enlist a powerful party in favor of such a change of dynasty, is quite probable; but the

* The separation of Sicily from Naples presents a parallel case to the separation of Belgium from Holland, effected by revolution, approved by the London Conferences, and finally assured by French arms, under Marshal Gerard; only that in the case of Sicily—an island—the separation has been effected by nature, while Belgium which is contiguous to Holland, was separated by an act of violence, only subsequently legalized by treaty. Violence, in the case of Sicily, effected and maintained its junction with Naples, unless the treaties of Vienna are invoked to justify it.

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Emperor Napoleon has practiced wisdom and moderation too long, to accede to such a double proposition. France is too great and powerful, to seek territorial aggrandizement in Italy; but Sicily would be a *maritime* acquisition, for which the French Emperor might consent to let an Austrian Arch Duke mount the throne of Naples—provided Austria gave up Venetia. In this manner, the balance of power might be still preserved on the continent of Europe. Let us consult figures:—

	Inhabitants.
Austria has lost Lombardy with . . .	2,750,000
Add to this the possible loss of Tuscany, (Austrian Secundo-Geniture)	1,800,000
And Modena, ...	600,000
Total loss of Emperor and Arch Dukes, .	5,150,000
If an Austrian Secundo-Geniture were created in Naples, there would revert to the House of Habsburg	7,000,000

Or two millions more than she lost, for which, and a consideration in money, she might give up Venetia with 2,750,000 inhabitants. The Emperor of Austria might, besides, receive a suitable compensation on the Danube, where the Sultan possesses now nothing but a nominal suzerainty, which, in his present financial embarrassments, and the still unchecked extravagance of the Seraglio, he would willingly exchange for a sum of money, or a loan at a nominal rate of interest. The only serious obstacle to this arrangement might be Russia; but there are other means, to which we may refer hereafter, of procuring the assent of the great Northern Power.

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CHAPTER XVI.

EFFECTS OF THE PEACE OF VILLAFRANCA ON PRUSSIA, AUSTRIA AND THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION.

Germany has been profoundly agitated since the reactionary movement of 1849; though the failure of the revolution of 1848, the fear and general distrust which have followed it, the revival of the petty jealousies between the smaller Princes, and the more serious antagonism between Austria and Prussia, prevented any public manifestation of popular sentiment. Every one felt that the situation was intolerable, every body hoped that it would soon be changed; none had the courage to propose a remedy. During the Crimean war, Germany had played a part so utterly insignificant, that she was hardly considered a political Power; while Austria, by her ambiguous conduct, irritated Russia without satisfying the allies. The government of Prussia had relapsed into a state of torpor—that of Austria signalized at least some vigor in organizing a formidable army, enlarging and reconstructing her navy, and in making earnest preparations for the resumption of specie-payments. All these efforts suffered a terrible check by the late war; and arrested, at least for a decade, the development of her vast material resources.* Germany proper was in a better

* It was charged upon the Emperor Napoleon that his new year's salutation to the Austrian minister in Paris, forced the National Bank of Austria to stop specie payments, which she had just then partially resumed. Since the commencement of the war, she has even taxed the interest and coupons of her public debt; and it is now charged, though the Austrian papers stoutly deny it, that being unable to contract a new loan, even at ruinous rates, she emitted spurious bonds of former loans, and disposed of them at current rates, at the various stock exchanges of Europe. This, is seems, was done about the same time that steps were proposed to be taken in Frankfort, either to shame the delinquent American Railway Companies into propriety, or to take legal steps to foreclose on their mortgage bonds. Every bankrupt in Europe was then pleading "losses by the American crisis;" but Austria is not entitled to the benefit of such a plea; because she has never trusted the Republic.

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condition. The long continued peace, joined to the industrious and frugal habits of the people, had stimulated commerce and manufactures; while successive good harvests had vastly improved the condition of the peasantry. Compared to former times, Germany was rich, capital abundant, and labor adequately rewarded. This condition of things had produced a superficial calm; but the greater material comfort of the industrious classes only increased their desire to have a share in the government, and their political discontent. What little of political life was left in some of the States, was in constant conflict with the government; indicating a disposition, on the part of the people, to exhaust every legal means to procure relief, and a determination not to yield except to superior force. The moderation of the more or less absolute Princes, practiced under these circumstances, furnished the best practical proof of the insecurity of their position. The general condition of the people was, perhaps, tolerable; but from its nature, transitory. With undefined political rights, and no guarantee for maintaining even these, neither the people nor the princes felt assured of the future. They knew that a change must come; but not knowing in which direction, they had no means of preparing for it. One idea only was prominent in every man's mind—that Germany, to weigh in the balance of European Powers, must act as a unit, and that, to accomplish this great end, reforms must be introduced, not only in the local governments of the different States, but also in the organization of the Germanic Confederation. German nationality, from being the dream of the poets and songsters, had become the leading theme of public discussion; and was adroitly put forward even by those who least believed in it, as an element of political power. The statesmen of Austria and Prussia made all sails to catch the popular breeze, and men who, but a few years previous, would have been persecuted as demagogues or conspirators, were now applauded for their patriotic sentiments, and became the objects of royal or imperial favor.*

* There was a time in Austria, when the popular song, *"Was is des Deutschen Vaterland?* (What is the Fatherland of the Germans?)" was prohibited under pain of imprisonment, lest an Austrian might mistake Germany for his native country.

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While the Germans were thus permitted to discuss the necessity of German union, the men of mind among them were not forgetful of the lessons of 1848, and not disposed, without a reasonable chance of success, to risk a popular movement. The Liberals of Germany, compromising nearly all the educated and wealthy classes, and a considerable portion of the nobility, had become circumspect; the reactionary party, conciliatory, because reduced to a small minority. The Republicans, especially the leaders, were mostly in exile, scattered over the whole globe; and their cause—from the extravagance of some of their doctrines, and the extreme measures by which, it is believed, they intended to carry them into execution—was discredited at home. No substantial man in Germany is now in favor of a Red Republic; and it was a great blunder, on the part of the Republicans of 1848, to avow, that no other republic could maintain itself against its adversaries. The horrors of the French Republic of 1793 held out but few attractions to the philosophic, contemplative mind of the Germans; and but indifferently encouraged the expectations of a reviving industry. The declaration of the Republicans was a confession of their weakness—for no coercive measures of a violent character are necessary, where a clearly ascertained majority is at liberty to exercise power—and an open avowal that a republic, if it were established, could only last for a short time, through an intolerable despotism.

From republicanism thus weakened by the apprehension of terrorism, and still further reduced by the menacing attitude of socialism, the German Liberals gradually returned to more moderate political views. Upon reflection, they found that there were many things which they had an interest to preserve, and that the reforms which they desired to introduce, might be sought by legitimate means more immediately within their reach. In this manner Constitutionalism was, with a very large party, substituted for Republicanism—a Limited Monarchy, with Representative Chambers, for a prospective Reign of Terror.

There still remained, however, the old physical obstacle to the union of Germany, and the formation of a strong central govern-

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ment—the fatal dualism of Austria and Prussia. Austria is the historical power of Germany; Prussia, the revolutionary one. Prussia has fed and grown on the *débris* of Austria: Austria looks on Prussia as a parasitical plant, which saps her vitals. A lasting reconciliation between these two Powers is impossible; because it is their nature to oppose each other; since, what makes the one great, diminishes the power of the other. But this antagonism, strong as it naturally was, has, during the last ten years, assumed a far more threatening aspect than at any time since the *Seven Years' War* between Frederic the Great and the Empress Maria Therese—it approached the nature of a conflict.

Austria, since the Italian and Hungarian revolutions of 1848 and 1849, has abandoned her system of isolation (which did not secure her against conspiracies and revolts) and returned to her former relation as a German Power. "I speak as a German Prince, to my confederates," were the words of the Emperor Francis Joseph, when, in addressing himself to the Diet, he in vain sought to identify his Italian cause with that of Germany. He felt that, by abolishing the separate local governments which, under the auspices of the Imperial crown, existed in Hungary, Gallicia, Bohemia, etc., and substituting for them a great central power in Vienna, he must make one nationality prevail over all the others; and he naturally selected the German one, which was the most loyal of them all, and the most devoted to the fortunes of his family. The ancestors of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria had, for generations, been Emperors of Germany; the historical recollections of the Germans pleaded in his favor; and there was some hope of not only Germanizing the foreign elements in the Austrian empire, but also of rekindling, in Germany, the affection for the old Imperial House. But there was Prussia, created by the energy and genius of its Princes, with her seats of learning, her advanced civilization, her superior administration of justice, her well-regulated system of finance and her military organization, which has raised her to the rank of a Great Power! Prussia was too far advanced; Austria had started too late in the race to overtake her. The great body of the German people, the

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intelligent, industrious classes, who had become wealthy by the long peace and the fostering of material interests, did not look to Austria for salutary reforms: her commercial laws were considered a century behind the age; and the *Concordat* which she concluded with the Pope, and with which she intended to prop up her government in Italy, was loudly condemned even by the Catholics. They accused the Emperor Francis Joseph of having made concessions to the Holy See, which the latter did not ask for; and which, had they been demanded by a Pope before the introduction of Protestantism, would have been refused by every Emperor of the Houses of Swabia or Saxony. "The Hohenstauffens," they added, "would have answered such a demand by a campaign in Italy; and every Christian in Germany would have followed them, in those days." So reasoned the majority of the German Catholics—all who did not absolutely belong to the ultramontaine party; and the Catholic *clergy*, for the most part, joined them. Not even the clergy of the German Catholic Provinces of *Austria* could be united in the support of the Concordat. No one believed that it emanated from the emperor's piety, or that other than political objects prompted its conclusion. It was looked upon as an abdication of power, unworthy the sovereign. While the Pope could not well refuse what was offered, the emperor was charged with the design of establishing additional police regulations in matters of conscience, the more easily to govern and control his subjects. It was the *political*, not the *religious*, merit of the *Concordat* which was discussed in Germany, and condemned. From the stand-point of German religious indifference, which is far better understood and appreciated in Rome than at Vienna, no other view could be taken of it, and no other conclusions arrived at. It was the greatest political mistake made by Austria, since 1814, and it may prove a fatal one. It has availed her nothing in Italy; and it has excited a storm of indignation, even among her most ardent partisans, in Germany.

Prussia, since 1848 and '49, after suffering various humiliations from Austria, which indicated a disposition to humble her even with the assistance of Russia, reduced her antagonism to Austria

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to a system. Whatever Austria demanded, Prussia opposed—either at the reëstablished Diet at Frankfort, or in her negotiations from State to State. She felt, to use an American phrase, that Austria was "crowding" her—that she and Austria were pursuing the same object; and that the success of one, must necessarily involve the disappointment and discomfiture of the other. Hence, the attitude of Prussia during the Crimean war; her close alliance with Russia, and her present unwillingness to uphold Austrian power in Italy. On this subject, Prussia used no disguise. Her sentiments were known in Paris, St. Petersburg, and London, as well as in Vienna. Prussia, during the last Italian war, was willing to arm for Germany—she would defend *German* interests against any assailing Power, be it France or Russia—she would defend every village and hamlet belonging to the Germanic Confederation; but she stoutly denied that the interests of Germany were parallel to those of Austria, or that it was incumbent on Prussia and the States of the Germanic Confederation, to uphold Austria in the possession of her non-German provinces. Prussian, and other liberal partisans, went even farther. They boldly asserted that it would be better for Germany if Austria were stripped of all her Italian possessions, and of Hungary and Transylvania to boot; because, then, she would be compelled to foster German interests, instead of sacrificing these to her policy in Hungary and Sclavonia, Transylvania and Gallicia. If Austria were reduced to her German States, then Prussia would have the ascendancy in Germany; and that union, which it is in vain to hope for as long as Austria and Prussia retain their present limits, would at once be spontaneously established. That this is a part of the Prussian creed, and that a large body of German liberals is of the same persuasion, is now an incontestible fact. A number of pamphlets, which have gone through many editions, have been published on this subject, and the Daily Press itself has entertained its readers with similar speculations.

It is the peculiar misfortune of Austria that, in addition to her political misrule, she finds, in the heterogeneous charac-

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ter of her subjects, a potent auxiliary to despotism. Under Metternich's system, and before him, Germans were employed to check or put down Hungarians; Hungarians, to put down or overawe Germans; Croats, to coerce the Italians; Italians, to coerce Poles and Sclavonians. When Austria appeals to the national sentiments of her subjects, she forgets that she is not only a complex of different nationalities, but that, unfortunately, she possesses only *fragments* of nations, the greater portions of which are incorporated into other States. Thus, Austria has nearly eight millions of pure Germans; but there are some thirty-four millions of Germans, partaking of a more advanced civilization, beyond her. She has nearly seventeen millions of subjects of Slavic origin; but Russia embodies more than sixty millions of that race, united under a strong government, and inspired with fierce national sentiments, which exercise a perturbing influence on the kindred populations of Austria. Finally, she has a little more than five (now only about three) millions of Italians, who, with the twenty (now twenty-three) millions of Italians subject to other princes, are always ready to conspire against her rule. The only nationality entirely under her sceptre is the Hungarian; and with this she had to contend in a deadly struggle for existence, without conquering its pride or its antipathy. That Austria, under these circumstances, should have been able to develop all the substantial elements of a Great Power, shows the incontestable talent of her statesmen, and the immense advantage of military discipline over unorganized masses. But States, thus composed, cannot have an indefinite growth. There is a natural limit to their cohesion, even if not menaced by foreign Powers.—Austria, in 1848 and '49, had no foreign enemy to contend against, and was yet, by the revolt of the different nationalities subject to her rule, brought to the brink of destruction. The events of these years made an indelible impression on the mind of the emperor, and induced him to adopt a system of government better calculated to prevent similar occurrences in the future. Prince Schwarzenberg, Metternich's successor, a bold, enterprising, energetic

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soldier, believed that the monarchy could only be preserved by a strong, absolute, central government, supported by a powerful standing army. Since that period, in spite of the progress of her industry, her manufactures, her internal navigation, and her vastly increased trade to the Levant, the government of Austria has been nothing but a military despotism. If Austria, through her able Minister of Finance, Baron Bruck,* has augmented her material prosperity, compared to the hopeless condition of revolutionary times, the army—the great antagonist of every minister of finance—has deprived the country of the fruits of that improvement; while it has sown the seed of discontent broadcast through all the provinces.

When the statesmen of Austria had resolved to give up the system of *Provincialism* by which they had heretofore governed, and to adopt, in its stead, the centralism we have just described, the Press, inspired by the Cabinet, and one of the leading members of the imperial family itself, published to the world, that Austria was *rejuvenated*—that she had risen, like Phœnix, from the fire and smoke of revolution, and was now, *strong* in her right and in

* Baron Bruck, the most practical man in the whole Austrian Cabinet, is a Prussian by birth and education, and a Protestant who, on that account, is not very popular in the court-circles of Vienna; though his talents are appreciated by the emperor. He commenced his remarkable career by being an officer in the Prussian army. He resigned his commission and went to Trieste, where he engaged in commercial pursuits, and became the founder of the Austrian Lloyds—the Steamship Company which trades from that place to all the principal ports of the Mediterranean, and which has done more for Austrian commerce than either her diplomacy or her military fame. Baron Bruck is also the projector of the great Austrian Southern Railway, from Vienna to Trieste, and the father of that expansive commercial policy, whose object it was to join Austria to the German *Zollverein* (Tariff-league)—a policy which would have given Austria a preponderating influence on the material interests of Germany; and which has been cruelly thwarted by the events of the last war. Baron Bruck's adversaries in Vienna (his nobility is of a recent date) say, that he is a better Minister of Commerce than of Finance; which is easily accounted for by the fact, that the Austrian Minister of Finance is not permitted to regulate the expenditures by the income of the State, but by its military requirements, which change with the situation; while, in matters of commerce, he is furnished with data on which he can implicitly rely.

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the returned sense of duty of her subjects, entering upon a new historical period. "Rejuvenated Austria" (*das verjüngte Oestreich*) all at once had a *mission;* Providence had destined her to Germanize Hungary, Transylvania, Gallicia, in short, all the nationalities subject to her sceptre; with the probable addition of Servia, Wallachia, Moldavia and Bosnia, whose people, from their geographical position, naturally gravitate toward Austria. When these provinces shall once be made to enjoy the blessings of a strong central government, located at Vienna, Austria will be so strengthened by the process of assimilation, that she will be able to instill new life and vigor into some of the antiquated German States, and eventually succeed in rejuvenating all Germany. The new Germanic Empire, under the Emperors of the old House of Habsburg (which will be the result of this blessing of renewed youth all round) will then be the "*great Central Power of Europe*," and extend from the North Sea and the Baltic, to the Alps and the Adriatic, and from the Rhine to the Euxine; including the best part, if not the whole, of Italy. It will be an easy matter, then, to call France to an account for her robbery of Alsace and Lorraine; while Holland and Belgium will be but too glad to be placed under the protection of the rejuvenated Germanic Empire. All this will be done in the interest of civilization; for the semi-barbarous nations on the Danube will be made to partake of a higher civilization than they now enjoy; and the Italians, sunk from their high estate by indolence and corruption, will be rejuvenated, by having new Teutonic blood infused into their veins, and thereby saved from entire destruction. This is, indeed, a splendid historical mission (*der welthistorische Beruf*) of "Young Austria"—well calculated to strike the imagination, and kindle the enthusiasm, of so romantic and speculative a people as the Germans; and we must not be surprised, therefore, to learn that there are thousands of educated men, in the land of poetry and song, who firmly believe in the proximate realization of this dream, and who will probably die bequeathing their faith to their children. We cannot refrain here from quoting another of the satirical verses of Henry Heine:

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The French and the Russians have taken the land,
John Bull took the ocean it seems;
But the Germans, more mighty, supremely command
The Realms most expansive of—*Dreams!**

There is one man, however, who does *not* believe in this mission of rejuvenated Austria, and that is no less a personage than the Prince of Prussia. His scepticism, moreover, is publicly avowed; and he is daily adding to the number of converts to his political infidelity.

About two years before the breaking out of the late war, an event occurred in Prussia which, in no small degree, added to the acerbity of feeling already existing between that Power and Austria. The King of Prussia betrayed symptoms of alienation of mind; and it became necessary to appoint a Regent who, under the constitution, must be the next heir to the throne. The state of the King's health, however, was kept a secret, and he appointed his brother, only "to *act in his stead*, till himself should again be able to resume the government." The Prince of Prussia, who was thus made Regent by *appointment*, accepted the office so bestowed only temporarily; and, in exercising its functions, had a special care to abstain from any act that could be construed into an assumption of sovereign power. This conduct, though praiseworthy and as much dictated by loyalty and respect for his elder brother, as by prudential motives, suggested by the peculiar circumstances by which the Prince was surrounded, neither pleased the Court, nor did it satisfy the People. It was, therefore, resolved, in case the King's health did not improve, to vest the Regency absolutely in his successor, in accordance with the terms of the constitution. The Prince, nevertheless, felt some delicacy to let the Chambers vote directly on the "incapacity of the King;" especially as the *date* of his insanity could not be exactly fixed by his physicians;†

* *Franzosen und Russen gehört das Land*
Das Meer gehört den Briten;
Wir aber besitzen im Luftreich des Traums
Die Herrschaft unbestritten.

† The members of his Cabinet seem to have been entirely ignorant of the catastrophe.

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and because such a vote might hereafter be used as a dangerous precedent against any sovereign who, for some cause or other, might be judged by his subjects as bereft of reason. The Prince, on that account, waited patiently for the King's voluntary abdication; but when he found there was an intrigue on foot, to establish a Regency of which the *Queen* was to be a member, he at once resolved to terminate the interregnum, by either withdrawing from public affairs altogether, or managing them hereafter as he thought fit. The result was the entire resignation of the King's power into the hands of the Prince, as the *Constitutional Regent* of the kingdom, and the suppression of every other influence on public affairs. Now, Austria stands charged with having been at the bottom of this intrigue; and with having sought the extension of the Queen's influence beyond the limits of the constitution. What gave color to this suspicion, is the circumstance that the Queen of Prussia is a Bavarian princess, and a near relative to the Empress of Austria. She was, moreover, educated in the Catholic faith; and, though converted to Protestantism, to remedy her legal disability, still supposed, by many, to be at heart attached to the faith of her ancestors. What other motives Austria may have had in endeavoring to invest the Queen with a portion of the power of the State, will probably remain forever a secret; but the attempt, if really made, has utterly failed; and has only served to widen the gulf which separates the constitutional regime of Prussia from the absolute despotism of Austria.

One of the first acts of the Prince Regent of Prussia, in his sovereign capacity, was to dismiss the King's ministers, (the ministry Manteuffel,) and to construct a liberal Cabinet of his own. This he did *before* the general elections; anticipating thereby the popular will, and calling on his subjects afterwards, to approve of his choice. This anti-constitutional proceeding, on the part of the Regent, which, had it been applied in the opposite sense, might have crushed the hopes of the people, was received, not only in Prussia, but throughout Germany, with tokens of unfeigned admiration; but it was not, of itself, sufficient to secure the return of a liberal majority to Parliament. The power of the crown, there-

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fore, again interceded in the cause of the people; which was most effectually done by the removal from office of those persons who had borne a distinguished part in the former elections, on the opposite (reactionary) side of the question, and by withdrawing the subsidies from those presses and public writers, who had formerly exhibited the most zeal in supporting the King's government. These *sovereign* remedies for popular weakness, operated like a charm; and the result was an immense Parliamentary majority in favor of the new ministry. The People of Prussia, who had thus become free, as if by letters patent, and with scarcely a serious effort of their own, were, nevertheless, quite able to appreciate the boon bestowed upon them; and exhibited their loyalty and gratitude in a manner which could not but touch the heart of the Regent. Cities were illuminated, addresses of thanks poured in upon him, committees begged to express their devotion to his person, and the students "*rubbed salamanders*"—that is, consumed oceans of wine and beer in drinking the Regent's health. But the most remarkable phenomenon was the abnegation, practiced by some of the ultra liberals, compromised during the revolution of 1848, in withdrawing their names from the list of candidates for the Lower Chamber, "lest their election might embarrass the new constitutional government;" and the total absence of opposition in the Parliament itself, to reward the Prince's liberality with a corresponding mark of confidence in his administration. German loyalty partakes of the nature of filial piety; and requires but very little *nursing*, on the part of the Princes, to become hereditary. The security of the constitution of Prussia depends, at this moment, far more on the firmness of the Regent, on his plighted word, and on his individual sense of honor, than on the love of liberty or the spirit of independence of the Prussian people.*

* Another event which served to increase the popularity of the Prince Regent, was the marriage between his eldest son (the heir presumptive to the throne) and the Princess Royal of England. The good people actually thought that, with the British Princess, the British constitution would come to Prussia; and that the influence of a Princess, brought up under the wholesome restraint of constitutional law, would exercise a beneficial influence on the military Court of Berlin. The marriage was also regarded as an *alliance* with Great Britain;

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The entire confidence of the Prussian Parliament and the people in the honor and rectitude of the Prince, exercised an important influence on the attitude of Prussia, in regard to Austria and France, during the last war. In vain did the Wurtembergian, Bavarian and Hanoverian Chambers, instigated by Austria, urge an immediate declaration of war against France; the Prussian government thought there existed, as yet, no *casus belli* justifying such an act. In vain did the press of the other States of Germany, and the ultra absolutist opposition papers, call upon the Prussian Parliament to speak out; it only uttered the conviction of the vast majority that the Prince will do no wrong—that "he who had so generously acted toward the people, would not betray his country."

The example of the Regent of Prussia could not but exercise an important influence on the other constitutional governments of Germany. The King of Bavaria found it consistent with his principles of action, to dismiss his ministers, who had continued in office for ten consecutive years against popular majorities in the Chambers. The Kings of Hanover and Saxony, and the Dukes of Hesse Cassel and Nassau, who had been constantly at war with the majority of their miniature Parliaments, found that their situation had not improved by the example set them in Berlin; and there was a general cry among the old nobles that the Prince of Prussia himself had become the instigator of revolution, and the chief of the radical party in politics and religion.* Austria, ever on the alert and opposed to innovations, and considering herself now threatened by the progress of liberal ideas both in Germany and Italy, renewed her insinuation that Prussia sought an exten-

and as weakening the ties of friendship which, during a long period of years, has subsisted between England and Austria. When the Princess Royal gave birth to a son, a spontaneous thanksgiving burst from the lips of the whole people; and it was certainly a mark of refined attention to a British-born Princess, for the *civil* authorities and the *municipal corporations* of the kingdom, to be the *first* to offer their homage on this joyful occasion.

* The ultra orthodox (Hengstenberg) party, in Prussia, has lost position and influence; and the most enlarged tolerance of all religious differences of opinion and worship, is now officially enjoined. "Protestant Jesuitism" seems to have suddenly dwindled down to a mere aristocratic coterie.

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sion of power and territory by encroaching upon her German neighbors—that her constitutional zeal was the means of preparing the people for such a change of Government, and that the Prince of Prussia harbored the same ambitious designs in regard to Germany, which Victor Emanuel cherished in regard to Italy; and which Austria was now resolved to repress with all the power of the State.

As the war in Italy proceeded, and the popular Italian leaders called the people to arms to rid the country of the "detested Austrians," the smaller German Princes, and among them especially those who had most sinned against constitutional liberty, instigated their people to come to the assistance of Austria. The more they were inclined to absolutism, the more ardent was their Teutonic patriotism, and their contempt for the Latin races. The Prince of Prussia and his dumb Parliament, which had, in advance, sanctioned his policy, were the only drawbacks to a declaration of war against France. If Napoleon III., a few years previous, had been called the "Saviour of European Society," the Prince of Prussia was now "the invader of its historical privileges," and the conspirator against the established systems of government. Had Austria not been engaged in Italy, it is highly probable she would have remonstrated with Prussia; but the situation did not admit of any overt act which might lead to a diplomatic rupture. The attitude of the smaller Princes, backed by Austria, nevertheless, amounted to a demonstration against Prussia; and it was easy to perceive that, if Austrian arms were successful in Italy, the Prince of Prussia must give up his liberal innovations. Under these circumstances, the peace of Villafranca came most opportunely for the Prince and the liberal cause of Germany. Austria was humbled, her aggressive power diminished, and her attention imperatively called to her own half-revolted provinces.

There is no doubt that the alarming condition of his own Hungarian and Sclavonic provinces, the dissatisfaction of the Croats, and the menacing attitude of the people of the Military Frontier, exercised an enervating influence on the Emperor Joseph, which,

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with the other motives for peace, induced him to accept the terms proposed to him at Villafranca. The Emperor Napoleon and Count Cavour, who held the threads of all the secret movements and conspiracies in their hand, were far better informed of what was going on and preparing in the interior of the Austrian Empire, than the Emperor himself. At the interview which took place between the two Emperors, the mirror which reflected the position of Francis Joseph at home, was held before him, and he accepted without hesitation—a thing unknown in the former diplomatic history of Austria—the moderate and reasonable conditions, imposed by the victor. The defeat of Austria was threefold. She was beaten, in the field, in diplomacy, and in the nature and disposition of her internal policy. No wonder, then, that the Emperor Francis Joseph looked pale, after his interview with the "Gallic Cæsar."

Scarcely had the news of the conclusion of peace reached Germany, before the Prince Regent of Prussia, without consulting the Diet at Frankfort, dismissed his extraordinary levies and reduced his army to the peace establishment. The other Princes of Germany followed his example. Economy, no doubt, prompted this act; but it furnished, at the same time, the most complete refutation of the charge, trumped up during the progress of the war, that the Emperor Napoleon intended to seize upon the left bank of the Rhine. If such a fear existed in Germany, it must have increased, not diminished, by the conclusion of peace, which left France free to turn her arms against Germany. Besides, only preliminaries of peace were signed at Villafranca; the *treaty* of peace was to follow the conferences at Zurich. And suppose the treaty of peace was not definitely signed at Zurich, and the war renewed, where was the federal army to protect either the German provinces of Austria, or Germany proper? If the position of Francis Joseph was bad at Villafranca, it was certainly worse at Zurich, and will be painfully uncertain until a general European Congress assures to him the quiet possession of his hereditary States. In a Congress held *before* the war, France and Austria might have held equal positions; but this is no longer possible in the Congress now about to be held. In a Congress held *after* a war,

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the beaten party has lost its prestige, and must submit to what it can no longer resist by the sword. In this condition of things, we do not think it improbable that Austria will seek the alliance of France; hoping better things from the generosity of the conqueror, than from the dubious or unwilling support of her former friends and confederates. Thus, then, has the sagacious policy of the Emperor Napoleon succeeded, a second time, in transforming an enemy into an ally.

The Congress about to be held will be a long one, and all manner of questions, besides those now mooted, will be brought before it. The very fact that it will convene, and for the avowed purpose of remodeling the Public Law of Europe laid down at the Congress of Vienna—that it will redivide at least one half the spoils of the coalition campaigns of 1814 and 1815—is an immense achievement of the French Emperor, for which the people can never be sufficiently grateful, and which the French press itself has not yet appreciated at its full value. The respective rôles of France and Austria will be reversed. France, which was humbled in 1814, sought, at the Congress of Vienna, as a last resort, the alliance of Austria, and obtained it; now Austria is the humbled Power, seeking, and perhaps obtaining, on terms not inconsistent with her honor, the mediation of Imperial France. And the new Congress may yet resemble that of Vienna in another respect. It may be interrupted by the cry, "to arms!" and reverse the fortunes of Waterloo.

As regards Austria and Prussia, the peace of Villafranca affords them abundant opportunities of creating fresh issues between them, and of cherishing the mutual resentments to which each considers herself entitled by the conduct of the other during the war. Austria and Prussia will not act together for at least a decade to come, and then only in extreme cases. The smaller States of Germany, now secured against foreign invasion, will group themselves round these rival Powers, as their interests or their political predilections will prompt them. The dualism of Germany has found a new expression and a new cause; and it is, perhaps, easier at this moment

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to foment a war between Austria and Prussia, than to make them pursue the same policy in regard to France.

The liberal party in Germany which, during the war, was accused of anti-national sentiments, because it did not sympathize with Austria in Italy, is now free to adopt what course it pleases in regard to the Austrian policy in Germany. It can now openly oppose the Austrian reactionary influence on the Germanic Diet, and it may, without incurring the charge of treason, sympathize with constitutional liberty in any part of the world. The Austrian party in Germany can now no longer appeal to a false Teutonic enthusiasm, by exaggerating the dangers with which the common German Fatherland is threatened by a "ruthless foreign conqueror." The Rhine is no longer to be "defended on the Po;" but in the worst case, on the Mincio. The necessity of defending the common soil has disappeared; and the eyes of the Germans are once more turned from Italy to the condition of their own country, to which that of Italy bears such a striking resemblance. Reforms are now called for in Germany as loudly as they were in Italy before the war. If the Italians have succeeded in making some progress toward union, would it not be a disgrace for Germany to remain divided? Here Austria meets again the phantom of Nemesis. "What has she done for Germany?" ask, simultaneously, a thousand voices, "since the reëstablishment of her power at Vienna?" and a thousand voices answer: "She was the constant, unrelenting enemy of liberal institutions, whether these emanated from the Princes or from the People; and the ready defender of every falsified promise and broken pledge on the part of the rulers." To introduce reforms into the German governments, is equivalent to excluding Austrian influence; to be free, means to be independent of Austria. One more step, and the cry, "Away with the Austrians!" will be heard on the Rhine, as it was on the Po.

With the aversion of the liberal party in Germany to the despotic rule of Austria, and the antagonism which exists between that absolute Power and constitutional Prussia, it is impossible that the present organization of the Germanic confederation can

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long survive. The confederation, as we have shown, was the hasty work of the Congress of Vienna, conceived in a spirit which Germany has long since outgrown and abandoned. With its two leading members moving in different directions, it possesses neither influence nor power; and hence the Prince of Prussia has already announced his determination to conclude separate treaties with the Northern German States, for the protection of their common sea coast. If Prussia succeeds in this, she will probably form another League, to insure independent action in all matters concerning her internal policy; and thus the antagonism to Austria will be continued, till one or the other of these Powers is exhausted in the struggle.

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CHAPTER XVII.

THE EFFECTS OF THE PEACE OF VILLAFRANCA ON RUSSIA—THE MISSION OF RUSSIA IN ASIA.

Russia, as we have seen, sympathized with Victor Emanuel and the Italians, before and during the war. There was a time (to which we have also alluded) when Alexander I., uncle to the present Emperor, was willing to abandon the whole Peninsula to Austrian domination; hoping that, in return for this favor, Austria would not interfere with his designs upon Turkey. Russia, however, as early as 1829, complained of "Austrian ingratitude," to which she ascribed the unsatisfactory peace of Adrianople; and her experience in 1854, after having, in 1849, saved Austria from total dismemberment, made an indelible impression on the Czar and his seventy millions of subjects. If the Russians understand any political question, it is that of nationality; and if Austria is threatened with dangers arising from the peculiar complex of nationalities, constituting her Empire, it is chiefly from the fact that nearly one half of her entire population is of Slavic origin, looking to Russia, not to Austria, for the realization of its national aspirations. In addition to this, we must yet consider that a considerable portion of the South Eastern, non-German, population of Austria belongs to the Greek Church, of which the Emperor of Russia is the head; and that when these people pray for their sovereign, they mean the Czar, not the Emperor of Austria. For many years past, this part of the population of Austria has been propitiated by various gifts and largesses from St. Petersburg; either to help poor communities, who had nothing to hope for in Vienna, to build Greek churches; or to endow schools and churches and provide otherwise for their spiritual comfort. The Austrian populations are not as ungrateful as the Austrian government; and it is therefore but reasonable to suppose that the government of Russia has estab-

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lished relations with those populations which promise a rich return in the future. It is the advantage of a growing Power, like that of Russia, that she need not look to an immediate reward of her works of love; and that her charities do not appear in the nature of a loan which is to be repaid with interest at a specified period. Russia is not only an adept in diplomacy between courts; but maintains friendly relations also with the populations adjacent to her Empire. The Lomelina and the plains of Lombardy have exhibited the advantages derived by an army from the approving sympathies of a people; and Russia is not too old to profit by such valuable lessons in history.* Russia, by the homogeneity of her

* At the time of the Hungarian rebellion, the Sclavonic and Croatian populations of Hungary were, from the commencement, and even before the breaking out of actual hostilities, encouraged to take up arms against the Magyars. While the Emperor of Austria was flattering the Hungarians with the belief that he would have the Croats, Servians and Sclavonians treated as rebels, he was in close communication with Jellachich, the Ban of Croatia, who was collecting an army to resist Hungary. When hostilities commenced, the Ban took off the mask, and appeared as the Imperial leader. Many promises were made to him and his followers; but few, if any, were fulfilled. Even the money which was appropriated for the payment of spies, some 92,000 florins (about $46,000) was withheld, though the treacherous service was rendered to the Austrian government. The Sclavonians, as an inducement to their rising in a body, were promised various ameliorations, and a government of their own. The military centralism afterwards established, and maintained to this day, put an end to their hopes, and reduced the Sclavonian population of Hungary to a level with the Magyars. They had helped to despoil the Magyars of their historical rights and privileges, and lost their own. Jellachich, Ban of Croatia, has since died; but we have not learned that the Emperor has appointed a successor to that dignity. This imperial ingratitude has reconciled the Sclavonians with the Magyars, as it has convinced them of the folly of allowing their national jealousies to interfere with the maintenance of their rights. The malcontents on both sides are now confident that, in another struggle with the Austrian government, Russia will not interfere, nor assist in hemming them in and preventing them from procuring ammunition and arms. In the Military Frontier of Austria, the same discontent exists. The Province was heretofore considered a Military Colony, and the troops, a sort of native militia, were permitted to marry and cultivate farms. They were only, in extraordinary cases, to be employed against any other foreign enemy but the Turks. The Emperor, however, ordered nearly the whole military force of that province to Italy, where their wild, martial bearing, and their swarthy countenances, became objects of terror to the rural populations. Before

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people, has an immense advantage over her Austrian neighbor; for though there are some sixty-eight languages and dialects spoken in the Empire, the Moscovite element preponderates largely over all the others, and, being the representative of civilization and power, must eventually absorb all the others. The different races over which the Czar rules as autocrat, are, moreover, kindred races, whose natural affinities for each other may be increased by a wise and just government, and whose antipathies may be overcome by national concessions to local prejudices. Russia is a Sclavonic Power, and the idea of uniting all the Sclavonic races under her sceptre, has grown into a religious faith, not only with the nobles who surround the person of the Czar, but also with the people of the different Sclavonic tribes, whether these be subject to Russia or to other Powers. The plea of nationality, which threatens the dismemberment of Austria, promises large accessions to the Russian Empire; and is encouraged as the great moral basis of the "manifest destiny" of the Northern colossus. Russia "has the mission" to carry civilization into Asia—to reconquer the beautiful provinces which, in the classic ages, were the seat of the highest intellectual culture, from Mahometanism, and to plant the symbol of the faith of the Christian once more on the Church of St. Sophia. Here, then, are a religious and a political mission united in one—a sort of seraphic harmony, introduced between the diplomatist, the bishop and the soldier, well calculated, at some future period, (not far distant) to astonish the world with its achievements. The

the breaking out of the last war, in which these troops were again employed in large numbers, there were, as the writer was creditably informed by a superior officer, between sixteen and twenty thousand widows of soldiers in the province; and the last war must have largely added to their number. The women must now work the fields to support their fatherless children. This harsh treatment of these loyal subjects, contrasts singularly with the benevolent exemption from conscription, which the present Emperor of Russia has granted to Poland for the space of three years—not to deprive mothers of their sons, and to foster the increase of the male population of that unfortunate kingdom. The Poles had, by the revolution of 1830, and by subsequent attempts at revolution, incurred the extreme displeasure of their sovereign; the people of the military frontier of Austria, on the contrary, have always been distinguished for their loyalty and devotion to the Imperial House of Austria.

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geographical position of Austria is more favorable to a military advance upon Turkey, if she could act with the momentum of a well-assured central Power; but Austria has always been too conservative or reactionary for such a mission. She opposed the independence of Greece, which the Emperor Alexander favored, as she has recently opposed the liberal and national movements of the people of the Danubian Principalities. She sees danger and destruction in every popular movement; while Russian diplomacy does not disdain to receive aid and comfort even from professional agitators and religious fanatics. If the Emperors of Austria had studied the map of Southern Europe, they could hardly have failed to perceive that they, too, must advance in a southern direction. But they halted, not to afford Russia a pretext for a similar movement; and Metternich felt assured when England, instead of Russia, was, at the Congress of Vienna, finally entrusted with the Protectorate of the Ionian Islands. Russia, argued the Austrian statesman, must not, on any account, be permitted to take position in the Mediterranean, and thereby threaten the Adriatic, which he was disposed to consider as an Austrian sea; but Russia has taken a position at Villafranca, in the shape of a modest Coal Station; her influence now rules in the Morea, and inspires the hopes of the Ionians. Austria cannot bid the world to stand still; and the Emperor Francis Joseph must profit by the lesson taught him by the Emperor Napoleon, and try to "comprehend his epoch."

The Christians in European and Asiatic Turkey, belong, in the main, either to the Greek or Catholic (Latin) Church; the calm, reflective ratiocination of Protestantism having, as yet, made but little progress among the imaginative populations of southern climes. The former (the Greeks) look to Russia for deliverance; the Latin Christians, from the time of the Crusaders, considered France as their protector.* Between these two nations, the sympathies of the Christians in the East are divided; hence the importance of the question of the Holy Sepulchre, and the determination of the

* The term "Franks" by which all Europeans in Turkey are designated, is derived from "France" or the "French."

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Emperor Napoleon to preserve the prestige of France in the East. Russia considers herself the heir of Byzantium; France, that of Rome. Austria is a lost position between them, important only in a political and military point of view; from its proximity to the future scene of action. The old House of Habsburg has been as unsuccessful in its religious propagandism, as in its attempts at centralization.

We have already, in a preceding chapter, spoken of the consequences to Russia of the Crimean war. The enterprise of the Emperor Nicholas was evidently ill-timed, and Russia has thereby lost some of her outposts; but she has since, by her skilful diplomacy, and by the blunders of her adversaries, more than recovered her former influence on European and Asiatic affairs. Overhanging the whole Asiatic continent, from the Pacific to the Ural Mountains, the line of her diplomatic agents, educated and trained for their calling, extends from Pekin to London, and is, at all times, assisted by another body of diplomatists, permanently residing among, or selected from the prominent natives of foreign countries. Through them, the minister of foreign affairs at St. Petersburg is not only informed of the views and projects officially entertained by each government; but also of the character of the men likely to influence or control the decision of public questions. The duty of the corps of *attachés*, composed of young men physically and intellectually gifted, consists not merely in making themselves agreeable and useful at *soirées* and routs; but in reporting, directly to St. Petersburg, what they have seen, heard and observed;* describing the peculiar mental faculties, the character, virtues and vices of distinguished individuals, the persons by whom they are

* The faculty of observation seems to be enjoyed in an eminent degree by all Russians; diplomatists have merely to practice the art of observing *without being observed*. "When a minister of a Great Power," says Kölle in his hints to Young *Diplomates*, "takes you familiarly by the hand and draws you in a friendly manner into the recess of a window, to learn your opinion on some trifling question relative to your own country, playing all the time with your buttonhole or the chain of your watch, do not be flattered into the belief that he remembers one word of what you say to him. He is observing somebody else, and is merely making use of you—as a screen."

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surrounded, and the men and women who are likely to have a controlling influence on their acts. There are few prominent public men, in any country, whose portraits, thus ably drawn, may not be found at St. Petersburg; and many an author of "Lives of Eminent Men" would have given a different color to some of his heroes, had he been permitted to search the archives of the Russian Foreign Office.* Marriages between its diplomatic agents and natives of the country to which they are accredited, are always looked upon with favor, and encouraged by the government of St. Petersburg; the intimate relations thus created, and the sense of security accompanying them, being much preferred to evanescent conquests with their concomitant excitement, impatience, suspense and alarm, which are oftener the means of betraying diplomatic secrets, than of discovering them. By this thoroughly organized system of diplomacy, and the talent for acquiring foreign languages which the Russians possess in the most eminent degree, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg is better informed of what is going on in every quarter of the globe, than any other government in Europe. The fruits of this system of diplomacy, joined to the development of the vast internal resources of Russia which furnish the substantial elements of power, are fast maturing in Asia, where Russia is undoubtedly called upon to play a first part in the historical drama of the world.

Another immense advantage of Russia, over all other European nations, consists in the absence of powerful neighbors to impede or check her progress. Turkey is crumbling to pieces. Austria must conquer her separate nationalities. China cannot withstand the repeated shocks she receives from England and France, and India is shaken and impoverished by mutiny and rebellion. Catharine II. used to say of Poland, that it was "a country where one need only stoop to pick up something," and she got the best slice of it; but

* During the excitement and troubles of the years 1848 and 1849, the portraits of most of the foreign ministers to the Germanic Confederation, drawn by a Russian *diplomate*, fell into hands for which they were not intended, and were subsequently published. They were delicately drawn, and truth-like; but lacked what the Italian painters call the *tocca di maestro* (the touch of the master.)

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now half the world seems to be a political *placer* for the Czar. What Russia has now most at heart is to compete with British commerce in Central Asia. This she cannot do without extending her railways, and introducing steam navigation in the Caspian—a sea whose shores, now that Circassia is subdued, will soon be entirely subject to Russian domination and influence. The people south of the Caspian have long since been operated on by Russian emissaries; while men versed in Oriental diplomacy, have met British agents at Khiva. When the railway from Moscow to Saratof, now in process of construction, shall be completed (Russia can employ soldiers in the construction of her roads) and the rivers Amoor and Syr Daria be made navigable to a greater extent than they now are, it is difficult to see how the extension of Russian commerce, and with it, of Russian domination, shall be checked in Asia. Russia will certainly fortify every important point between the Caspian and the Aral; and with the vast advantage she possesses in the species of troops best adapted to frontier service and to the steppes, domineer all the smaller States which lie between her Asiatic possessions and British India. England has heretofore employed commercial agents to extend her influence in Asia; the Russian pioneer is the Cossack, who at heart is a good natured fellow, wonderfully frugal, inured to every species of hardship, and, himself a semi-Asiatic, disposed to fraternize with the native populations. He is armed and mounted at almost no expense, and, from his otherwise rural habits, the very best material for the establishment of military colonies. Since the Crimean war, the Russian diplomatic agents in Europe have become exceedingly reserved and modest. They assure everybody that Russia seeks no extension of power by military force—that she is engaged with reforms and improvements in the interior, which will occupy her at least for a period of twenty years, and that the Emperor Alexander is, *par excellence*, a man of peace. Russia seems to be entirely willing that France should take the initiative in all European affairs; and it was purely in the interest of peace that she concentrated an army of observation on the Pruth, and another in Poland, to prevent the war in Italy from assuming European

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proportions. As to the special treaty between her and France, however, to which allusion was made during the last war, its formal existence has been stoutly denied; and we have the assurance of a British minister, given to a British Parliament, that the "friendly understanding" subsisting between Russia and France, touches no point which especially concerns England. The British government seems to have been so assured by this frank avowal, that Lord John Russell was, for a while, unwilling to have England represented at the next European Congress; but, upon reflection, that eminent British statesman has altered his mind; a Congress without England bearing too close a resemblance to isolation in the settlement of European affairs.

In spite of the peaceful inclination of the Emperor Alexander of Russia, we have seen him take a very active part in the negotiations which preceded and accompanied the last war, and the result has not been favorable to Austria. The Emperor himself, from his well-known forgiving disposition (so very handsomely illustrated in his treatment of the Poles) cherishes, in all probability, but little resentment; but the old Moscovite party, which is an hereditary one, will transmit its hatred of Austria to succeeding generations.* Prince Gortchakoff, the present Prime Minister of Russia, belongs, as his name indicates, to the old Moscovite party; and his Anti-Austrian predilections have, on more than one occasion, manifested themselves in a striking manner. There is no ambiguity or reserve in regard to them, either in his dispatches or in his ordinary diplomatic intercourse. The Russians, undoubtedly, wish to see Austria entirely driven from Italy, and her influence

* It has been jocosely observed that the two leading parties in Russia—the Moscovite and the German, mutually relieve each other at the court of St. Petersburg. When the German party is in favor at court, the chiefs of the Moscovite party travel to Siberia; and when the Moscovites are in the ascendancy at the capital, the Germans travel in that direction. Under the Emperor Nicholas, the Germans occupied prominent positions in St. Petersburg; now the Moscovites are most appreciated; but with the known humane disposition of the Emperor Alexander II., it is doubtful whether Siberia will receive any access of population, except from men condemned for ordinary crimes, and from voluntary emigrants.

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destroyed in Germany; for this would make Russia the arbiter of Central Europe. Experience has shown her that Austria and England united may very materially interfere with her plans in the East, and thwart her diplomacy in Constantinople. The relations between Austria and Turkey had become very intimate since the Crimean war; but the events of the last Italian campaign, and the peace of Villafranca, have proved to the Sultan that he is leaning on a broken reed; and since then Russia, whose Eastern policy is parallel to that of France, has resumed her former influence. Thus Austria, in a few short months, has been stripped of the prestige she momentarily acquired by her dubious policy in 1854, and by the necessity which existed for France and England, at that time, to express themselves satisfied with it.

While the peace of Villafranca has thus changed the relative position of Russia and Austria in regard to Turkey, and while France has naturally different interests to protect in the East from those of England, the Oriental question must necessarily assume a different aspect. Austria, forsaken by England, diminished in Italy, and threatened by Prussia in Germany, has now nothing to hope from adhering any longer to the fortunes of Turkey. She is unable, by her detached efforts, to arrest the fate of that semi-barbarous Empire; and, having done all in her power to prevent its division, will find it not incompatible with her conservative statesmanship, to consent to it, on condition of receiving a proper share of the spoils. When Catharine II. first proposed to the Empress Maria Therese, of Austria, to divide Poland, the proposition was indignantly rejected, for nearly the same reason which has since prevailed on the statesmen of Vienna to oppose the division of Turkey. "I shall always be happy," said Maria Therese, "to have the Empress Katherine for a FRIEND, but not for a next door neighbor." When, however, her minister, Prince Kaunitz, represented to her that Austria had lost Silesia to Prussia, who had grown powerful, while she had suffered a diminution in her own dominions, this dyspeptic though virtuous abstinence, was suddenly changed into a healthy though criminal appetite, and she accepted Gallicia and Lodomeria, as the price of her consent to the parti-

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tion. Austria has now lost a province in Italy, and she may be compelled, either by persuasion or force, or by prudential motives of the highest order, to surrender another; and the desire to be even with Prussia, may again induce her not to refuse a large slice of territory, as the price of her consent to the spoliation of a neighbor. Thus Austria, after long and nobly repelling the advances of her northern seducer, and being worried and fatigued with the effort of resisting his arts of persuasion, will at last, half willingly, half forced, rush into his arms. Will Russia be faithful to Austria? In the last Will and Testament of Peter the Great, when speaking of the necessity of dividing Turkey, there occurs this remarkable passage: "Austria must receive her share of the division, which must be taken from her afterwards (*qu' on lui enlevera plus tard.*") The will has never been proved in a court of Probate; but the administrators of the estate have, thus far, acted as its faithful executors.

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CHAPTER XVIII.

THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE—THE ORIENTAL QUESTION—ENGLAND'S POSITION AS A WORLD-POWER.

We have, in the preceding chapters, treated of the different relations of the States of the Continent of Europe, and the manner in which they have been affected by the late war and the sudden conclusion of peace at Villafranca. Let us now consider the question which is most important to us, as Americans; namely—how does that peace, the embroiled condition of Europe, and the approaching solution of the Oriental question, affect the relative position of England and France?

All reasonable men will agree that the *entente* CORDIALE, which, at one time, gave our own statesmen some unnecessary concern, is now, if not virtually terminated, at least reduced to the ordinary friendly relations between two neighboring States. The *entente cordiale* has answered its purpose, and is now growing cold and dying out, unless fresh causes spring up to warm it into life again. It was, indeed, never more than a well-intended governmental affection—a passion which sprung up from a sudden opportunity, and which was never cordially shared by the people of either country. If the national antipathy between France and England was hushed for a while, to conduct the Crimean war to a successful issue, it only shows the prodigious influence which the Emperor Napoleon exercises over the public mind of France, and the extreme skill with which he wields that influence for the benefit of the State. The *entente cordiale*, though not yet changed into the opposite sentiment, is, as such, nevertheless, an obsolete idea. A cordial understanding can only exist between two nations who have the fullest confidence in each other's intentions, strengthened by a parallelism of interests which leaves no room for suspicion. This does not exist between France and England; as the statesmen of both countries know, and as their separate

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acts have but too clearly demonstrated since the conclusion of the Crimean war. Up to a certain point, France and England had the same interest in Russia; but, when that point was reached, cordiality made room for suspicion; in spite of the consoling assurances, on both sides, that their affections had undergone no change. France built Cherbourg, merely to assure herself of England's fidelity; England reëstablished her Channel-fleet, and increased her navy, merely to prevent France from loving any one better than herself. Yet, notwithstanding these strong measures for perpetuating each other's love, reflection has weakened the sentiment. "*Plus qu' on raisonne, moins qu' on aime*," * said *Jean Jacques Rousseau*, and the maxim applies equally to the affections between States. England bears now no other relation to France, than that of any other European Power. When the interests of the two countries are the same, or parallel to each other, they will move in similar directions; whenever their interests clash, each will pursue its own policy; and it will depend on the particular view one or the other may take of a leading question, and the manner it may affect its paramount interests, whether the difference thus created shall lead to a rupture. In the mean time, we may rest assured, that a war with England will always be popular in France; that it will rouse the whole nation in support of it; and that, in such a war, the voice of party would be completely drowned in the ardor of the national sentiment. No man in France, of whatever party, rank, or condition, could oppose it and live; no woman could call herself French, and receive the attention of such a man. The Emperor Napoleon, who, better than any previous ruler of France, knows how to give tone and direction to public sentiment, holds, in this respect, a fearful weapon in his hands. May he never use it to the terror of the civilized world! What a catalogue of British offences against France, from the burning of the Maid of Orleans as a witch, to the counterfeiting of the Assignats and the infamous Jail of St. Helena, could he not unfold to the exasperated French people? What a balance-sheet

* The more you reason, the less you love.

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he could spread before the nation, to call for a final settlement! England herself seems to feel the heaviness of her indebtedness; hence her little faith in the continuance of peace, which she has so much at heart, and for the maintenance of which she has so often, since 1814, sacrificed her friends and allies. England is, no doubt, sincere in her late professions. She desires no war; and her attitude, though strong in defensive preparations, is entirely quiescent. All the aggressive power seems to be lodged in France, and she is continually increasing it. The continental nations admit that she is master of the battle-field, and that the question of peace or war is decided in the Tuileries. No Englishman now dreams of invading France; no Frenchman, when speaking of the chances of war with Great Britain, thinks of anything else than an invasion of England. How the times have changed since Henry V.! How the *virtus militaris* of Rome has gained on the statesmanship of Carthage!

It would seem as if England had abandoned the initiative in European affairs. She has become so ultra-conservative in her foreign policy, and so progressive in regard to internal reforms, that any positive policy, adopted by one party or the other, is almost certain to lead to its defeat. The circle of the governing classes of England has become greatly enlarged; but it has lost in intensity and power. No one man, now, can lead a British Parliament; and no measure can be carried, unless it is popular. England has begun to count the cost of her renown, and her humanity has wonderfully increased with the expense of her national glory. Her ambition being satisfied, she is now willing to look on while other nations propose great political problems; reserving to herself simply the right of assisting at their solution, or approving of what has been done. This position naturally renders her the most conservative Power in the world;—a position to which she can the more readily resign herself, as she has already accomplished great things, and would now, like a man who has grown rich by toil, gladly retire on her fortune. The world is divided, and England is satisfied with her share of it. But the world is ever young, though individuals and nations grow old in it; and her gifts are

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constantly redistributed, to give birth to new life and to reproduce, with a new cast, the old drama, which we call history. Old personages leave the stage, new ones appear; but the play is never ended.

England owes much of her greatness, not only to the many eminent qualities of her people, but also to her geographical position, which admitted of the undisturbed development of her institutions from that period in the history of Europe, when national progress and civil liberty emerged from the barbarism of the feudal ages. She enjoyed the rare good fortune neither to be unduly stimulated, nor retarded in her progress, by circumstances beyond her control. Nothing was done out of time; no change was introduced unless it was found necessary; and no innovation destroyed the respect for the memory of the past. Yet, for this very reason, the present political institution, though in regard to public liberty far in advance of those on the Continent of Europe, cannot serve as models for imitation to other countries. They present an antagonism to the civilization and progress of other nations who, though not politically free as she is, have far surpassed her in social freedom, and in the emancipation of the individual from the prejudices and injustice of castes. The British system of government is a happy compromise between the historical growth and the intellectual progress of the nation; admirably suited to the temper and habits of the people of England, but to none other. Everything which has grown up in England during the progress of ages, is cherished and preserved with religious reverence; while the improvements, which time has rendered necessary, have taken their places quietly by the side of the historical *debris* of past centuries. The British edifice of state is not a uniform building, in which you can trace the one, presiding idea of the architect; it is an old Gothic castle, with its high arched windows, its battlements, and its drawbridges, to which at various periods extensive and magnificent wings have been added, provided with all the conveniences and comforts of modern times. There lives the noble, the merchant, the manufacturer, the artisan, each occupying the part most suited to his habits and tastes, without intruding on one another, and with scarcely the

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desire of intrusion. Every successive age has left its imprints on that remarkable edifice; nothing has been radically changed, nothing removed—the improvements consist merely in the valuable additions. To the external beholder it appears cumbrous, clumsy, out of proportion, and in wretched taste; yet, when you behold its interior arrangements, you are struck with its wonderful adaptation to the wants of the occupants. It is not the product of a moment; it is the result of the undisturbed workmanship of ages. No modern architect will now imitate that edifice; no sensible one attempt it. The building materials of which its ancient parts are composed, are no longer in existence; the workmen are used to other tools. If that edifice were now destroyed, England herself could not raise such another; how, then, can France, Germany, Italy, or Spain be expected to build on such a plan? Suppose the crown or the nobility were swept away; could the loyalty of the British people be secured to another dynasty? Could the deference to the nobility, which is part of an Englishman's loyalty to the crown, be transferred to a new set of men, strangers to the people, whose achievements date from yesterday? The nature of an Englishman forbids it. It is time which has sanctified the institutions of England; the education and habits of the people have confirmed them. And, we may add, that the wisdom of the privileged classes in making, at proper times, adequate concessions to the people, has also contributed to their preservation. There has always been found sufficient space for valuable additions to the edifice of state, without intruding on the Gothic part of it. The modern extensions have saved the old Gothic structure from demolition.

On the Continent of Europe men do not move in concentric circles. Liberty there, especially with the Latin races, is synonymous with equality; and it is astonishing to see to what extent the latter may be cherished, even under an absolute monarchy. Where men are of a social disposition, inequality can less be borne than injustice; where education and learning are generally diffused, inequality of consideration, not based on superior personal merit, is tantamount to barbarism. The people on the Continent

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of Europe are much more disposed to submit to an enlightened absolutism, than to the supremacy of privileged classes; and hence the British system of government, whatever advantages it may possess in a political point of view, has no attraction for them. Englishmen, who are generally but the representatives of classes, (a Frenchman, whether cook or general, barber or statesman, always represents his nation,) so far from being able to act as propagandists, (if they ever thought of a thing so foreign to their nature,) are more apt to produce a certain aversion to their political and social system. Englishmen themselves are sufficiently aware of this fact; but, until lately, it has given them but little concern. As the people on the Continent of Europe have, thus far, had but little to say in governmental matters, no one thought it worth while to conciliate their good opinion. England, up to the latest period, has exercised a commanding influence on the political affairs of the European Continent; but this was by governmental action, not by popular sympathy, and not unfrequently in spite of the latter. This influence, however, since 1815, has visibly declined, and seems to be still further diminishing. An impression prevails, that England will not easily go to war—that the growing importance of her industrial classes is opposed to that foreign policy, which sacrificed the wealth of the nation to the maintenance of supremacy abroad; and that taxation has, at last, reached that point, where it cannot be increased without enhancing prices, and encouraging foreign competition with British products in the markets of the world. If this were so, England would really have reached the climax of her power; but there are yet other causes which operate to her disadvantage.

Nations do not always rise or decline by their own merit; but by the circumstances which surround them, and which it is impossible for them to control. The most terrible blows inflicted on the Republic of Venice, were the discovery of America and the circumnavigation of the Capes; the circumstances most contributing to the growth of Russia, were the internal divisions of Germany and Poland. Some States decline by moving slowly; while other nations, with whom they are in *contact*, outrun them in the race.

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Holland, for instance, which, some two hundred years ago, was one of the most influential and warlike Powers of Europe, has quietly dwindled down into a Power of the second rank: not by any fault of her own, or the debasement of her people; but simply by the natural growth of England, France, Prussia, and Russia; which she had not the power to arrest, and which she even assisted with her accumulated capital; her own industry and commerce being insufficient to afford scope for its investment.* England is now in a somewhat similar condition. Stupendous as her industry is, British capital still seeks foreign, more remunerative investments. It builds railways in America, in France, in Belgium, in Italy, in Egypt, and, by this means, develops the resources of other countries; and the same holds of other industrial pursuits. In like manner does English capital sustain the credit of other States, and helps to sustain them in periods of difficulty and trouble. England thus becomes the creditor of the world; but it is very questionable whether this is an advantage to her as a nation.

The population of the British empire, which, for support, depends on the labor and industry of the country, has reached a point which cannot be surpassed without increasing pauperism in almost the same ratio. In Russia, the population may triple, in the United States it may quintuple, without visibly diminishing the means of support of the laboring classes. If Holland lacked the material basis for a Power equal to that of England, so England lacks the physical means of rivaling hereafter the industrial, commercial, and military development of the United States. Her empire and her maritime power are scattered over the globe. They are imposing, but efficient only as long as they are not threatened on different points at the same time. British statesmen have heretofore succeeded in forming coalitions against any

* See "*Recherches sur le commerce de la Hollande,*" Amsterdam, 1828; and especially the answer of the Dutch merchants to the queries addressed to them by the Stadtholder William IV:—"*Why the trade of Holland has been rapidly declining, and by what means it was to be reëstablished and placed on its ancient footing?*"

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Power that threatened the commercial supremacy of England; will they be able to do so in future? And what if a coalition—we mean a voluntary one, not one coerced by military power, like that formed by the first Napoleon—were now organized *against* her? With the French navy nearly, if not quite, equal to the British; with the French army, at least, equally efficient, and vastly superior in numbers; with Russia, becoming daily more formidable in the East; with France, straining every nerve and exhausting her inventive genius to become the great maritime power of the Mediterranean; and the United States in majestic, natural growth, and a continent of their own, unavoidably contending for the empire of the ocean, it is difficult to perceive by what means England will be able to secure, in the future, that influence on the politics of the world, which she has hitherto maintained by her wealth, her valor, and the wisdom of her statesmen. England is, no doubt, peaceably inclined; but the times are troubled, and the nations disposed for war. England will not draw the sword, unless she is threatened by a foreign Power. Her future course will not be aggressive; and she has, we will believe her, no further idea of conquest. The wars in which England will henceforth engage, will not be for new acquisitions, but for the preservation of her present power. England, as we have above remarked, is satisfied with the world's partition; provided no new division is attempted, to enlarge other Powers beyond their present proportion. And how is she to arrest the natural growth of the United States and of Russia? How can she prevent the revival of the Latin nationalities under the auspices of France, and their probable future concert of action?

England is a continental power in Asia; nowhere else. She possesses colonies in America and in Africa, and important islands in Europe and elsewhere; but the time has passed when colonies were profitable, and England's power in Asia can henceforth be maintained only by an European army. Colonies which cannot be made to assimilate with the mother country, can only be retained by military force; colonies which in origin, language and thought are assimilated to the mother country, demand similar institutions

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or entire independence. The colonies of Great Britain may, henceforth, afford scope to her commerce and increase her wealth; but, in a military point of view, they constitute elements of weakness, not of strength; because, in time of war, they require aid, instead of furnishing assistance to the mother country. England holds Gibraltar, Malta and the Ionian Islands, merely by military power; her dominion in India does not extend beyond the reach of her guns; her West India Islands produce no revenue, and her possessions on the continent of America are only secure in time of peace. The power of England is neither homogeneous nor compact, and does not compare, in these respects, with that of France, Russia or the United States. Nine-tenths, if not ninety-nine hundredths, of all the aggressive means of England are still confined to the two Islands constituting the united kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland; and in computing the available military force of the British Empire in time of war, reference must be had, almost exclusively, to those islands. England cannot now enlist troops on the continent of Europe; and her course, since the Congress of Vienna, has been such that she will not easily succeed in forming lasting alliances with any European Power.

England once threatened the reactionary sovereigns with "letting Democracy loose upon Europe;" but England has not the power to do that. England cannot conjure up a spirit with which she does not sympathize, and between which and herself there has heretofore existed such a deadly antagonism. England has produced a poet who espoused the cause of popular liberty from true devotion to it; but the statesmen of England have never been guilty of a similar indiscretion. They invoked liberty to foment civil wars; and formed coalitions against democratic France, to restore the rule of despotism. If, within the last ten years, England has been found on the popular side of public questions in Europe, it is because her governing classes have lost power, and are obliged to account for their acts. England, to let Democracy loose upon Europe, must herself become Democratic; or she will in vain try to drum up recruits for such a service. With her past history, the aristocratic cast of her government, and the specific

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loyalty of her people, it is easier for the Emperor Alexander, of Russia, to "let Democracy loose on Europe," than for any nation on the continent to believe in the sincerity of such a move proceeding from England. The Czar, the Emperor of the French, the Regent of Prussia, Victor Emanuel, the Pope, may let Democracy loose on Europe; but an aristocracy cannot do so without destroying itself. If England wants to let Democracy loose upon Europe, she must employ the French army.

Another cause which has served to diminish British supremacy, is the invention of steam and its application to industrial pursuits, to railways and to ocean navigation. As far as industrial pursuits are concerned, it is clear that steam, as a substitute for hands, equalizes whatever advantage experience may have given to the British artisan or manufacturing laborer; and that the advantages of concentrated capital in England, are quite, if not more than compensated, by lighter taxation, cheaper living and lower wages elsewhere, or by the greater proximity of the raw materials employed in manufactures. The latter advantage is especially enjoyed by the United States in regard to the world staple cotton and to dye stuffs; while France surpasses England in the manufacture of all articles of taste, which are past the competition of steam. France, being by the common consent of all nations, allowed to set the fashions of the world, fears no competition with her fashionable goods, for which she furnishes the only standard of comparison. This privilege is worth incalculable sums of money annually. Wherever, throughout the whole range of the civilized world, a man rises to the condition of ease and comfort, he becomes tributary to the industry and taste of France. There are numberless and nameless articles of taste and fashion—articles *de vertu*, of luxury, of elegance, manufactured in Paris, comparatively out of nothing, and exceeding in value many hundred millions of francs. The ratio of the cost of the raw material to the price of the manufactured articles, is as one to four, and exceeds often that of one to fifty; while, in most articles of British manufacture, it is the near approach of the price of the manufactured article to the cost of the raw material, which commands the market,

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by diminishing or excluding competition. The privilege of setting the fashions is the only monopoly which requires no protection, and does not act injuriously on every other species of industry. It commands the highest price, and insures the best markets. It is a tax levied on the prejudices and vanity, perhaps on the discernment, of men and women, and is, on that account, cheerfully submitted to in every quarter of the globe. Finally, it creates artificial wants, far beyond the computation of the political economist, and supplies them, not unfrequently, to the exclusion of the necessaries of life.

The long peace enjoyed in Europe since 1815, while it undoubtedly developed the industry of England, has, in a still greater ratio, stimulated that of other countries. The long wars of the French revolution made Germany, Spain and Italy almost entirely dependent on English manufactures; while France herself, engaged in warlike pursuits, but imperfectly supplied her own wants. England, since Harry VII., free from foreign invasion,* quietly and steadily cultivated the arts of peace; while the industrial development of the States of Continental Europe, though much older than that of England, had not only suffered from hostile legislation—as, for instance, in the case of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which expelled certain industrial classes altogether—but also from continued wars, which rendered all species of property insecure, and quartered large bodies of troops upon the peaceful inhabitants of rising cities. The civil wars of France and Germany *commenced* during an industrial period; those of England *preceded* it. During the *twenty-five* years' war of the French

* It is doubtful whether even the landing of Henry VII., with his English followers, in their own country, can be called an *invasion* of England, especially as it only served to put an end to the civil wars of the Roses. The short inglorious attempt of Charles II. to recover the throne of his father, during the life of Cromwell, certainly does not deserve that name; nor can the landing of the Pretender's son, Charles Edward, in Scotland, in 1745, be magnified into an invasion. Finally, the Stadtholder William of Orange, landed, in November, 1688, by *invitation* on the shores of England; and his almost bloodless success was a triumph and a delivery of England, rather than an invasion. He raised the power of England, instead of diminishing it; so did Henry VII. before him.

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Revolution, England not only enjoyed the monopoly of manufactures, but also complete supremacy on the ocean. She supplied the principal markets of the world, and extracted large sums even from France and her allies. The burning of English manufactured goods, wherever they were seized by Napoleon I.'s agents, on the Continent of Europe, only enhanced the price of them, without diminishing the demand; so that, in a commercial and industrial point of view, the war, which diminished the resources of every State on the Continent of Europe, largely added to those of England, and enabled her to subsidize the armies of her allies. Since the second peace of Paris (1815) France, Germany, Belgium, and even Russia, have entered the industrial arena; not only excluding, to a great extent, British manufactured goods from their own markets, but also competing with them successfully in the markets of the world. And America, with inexhaustible stores of coal and iron, has joined these States in the competition with British industry; claiming a large part of her own best market for her domestic goods, and diminishing both the extent and the ratio of the profits of English labor. These diminished profits are the most effective means of driving British capital and manufacturing labor out of England, and investing or employing them more remuneratively in other countries.

The application of steam to propulsion on railways is of far greater benefit to other countries than to England. British territory is so limited in extent, and the public roads are in such excellent condition, that, even before the introduction of railways, no important point of the island was more than some twenty-four hours distant from another. These distances have undoubtedly been shortened; but the effect of it does not compare in importance with the advantages resulting from railways in the United States, or on the Continent of Europe. Here products are brought to market which otherwise would be entirely excluded from it; and at a cost so low as not materially to affect prices. States with a comparatively thin population, like Russia and the United States, are made to enjoy the advantages of thickly settled communities; while large, continuous and populous countries, like Germany and France, have been furnished

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the means of concentrating vast power at convenient points. Had Russia, during the Crimean war, had a continuous system of railways from St. Petersburg to Sebastopol, or any other point on the Black Sea, her fleet in that sea might yet hover over Constantinople. Unless England derive great commercial advantages from her railways in India, propulsion by steam will do more for the development of the power of her rivals than for herself. Large Powers have heretofore found it difficult to act from a common centre; this is now accomplished by railways, without difficulty and with very little loss of time. The action of the whole Continent may thus be assimilated, in point of speed, to that of an island; but it acts with a greater mass, and therefore with a greater momentum. When the Russian railways shall extend from Petersburg and Moscow to Central Asia, and when a continuous railway communication shall be opened between New York and San Francisco, the commerce of the world will be changed by the adoption of new routes, which will benefit other countries more than England, and, in the same ratio, diminish her political prestige.

The most serious change, however, in the relative position of England and her great Continental rivals, was effected by the application of steam to the propulsion of ships. Before the introduction of steam navigation, that Power which had the greatest number of experienced seamen—in other words, that Power which furnished the greatest employment to seamen by her fisheries and her trade—commanded the ocean; and if that country was an island, it was invulnerable, because free from foreign attacks. It then possessed the greatest aggressive power, and, at the same time, the most effective means of defence. Thus England was

> "That precious stone set in the silver sea,
> Which serves it in the office of a wall,
> Or as a moat defensive to a house
> Against the envy of less happier lands!"

But the sea serves it in that office no longer. Steam has done for seamanship, what gunpowder has done for chivalry. It has more

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nearly assimilated the conditions of people living on different shores of the same water; and it has left that to the operation of mechanical engines, which was formerly achieved by the combined efforts of officers and crew. Sails on board a steam vessel are but an auxiliary force; it is the engine and the engineer, and her tonnage, that give character to the ship. Now, as steam ships, in moderate weather, can take any direction they please, or change their course as it may suit the purpose of their commanders, it is evident that fleets now-a-days cannot lay waiting for each other, as in former times. Fleets will henceforth be manœuvred with nearly the same facility as armies on land, and it is the quality and quantity of the metal which will decide naval contests. Neither the physical superiority of the men, nor their superior skill as sailors, would outweigh any positive advantage that might be possessed by the enemy's artillery, in the superiority of his guns and the mode of serving them. The success of future naval battles will mainly depend on the superior engines of destruction possessed, at the time, by this or that power; and this superiority will far more depend on the successful application of the mathematical and physical sciences to the purposes of war, than on long experience and practice on the water. In the present state of the French army and navy, it is not likely an English force will be landed on the coast of France; but there are fears in England that a French army may be landed somewhere either in Ireland or Great Britain. What the French lack at this moment, is a sufficient fleet of transports; they have ships of the line and frigates enough to act as convoys. France does not require her present immense navy to protect either her maritime possessions or her commerce. One fourth of her present naval force would be amply sufficient for either or both these purposes. But if she intends to do great things in the Mediterranean; if Turkey is to be partitioned, if Egypt is to be Europeanized, and Morocco taught a lesson of civilization, then we can easily understand why the Emperor Napoleon bestows such unremitting attentions to the defence of the French sea coast and to the increase and improvement of his already formidable navy. In a war with England,

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France might lose all her distant colonies, without serious diminution of her power or prestige in Europe; or she might dispose of these colonies as she once did of Louisiana, to have her hands free in the Channel and in the Mediterranean. If France were to attempt the invasion of England—a thing which probably lies further from the thoughts of the Emperor Napoleon than the most patriotic Englishman believes or desires—she could afford to lose half her entire fleet, if she succeeded in landing a sufficient number of troops on the British shore. The mission of her whole navy, in the last resort, would be to convoy a fleet of transports safely on a voyage of a few short hours. We leave it to naval men to determine whether the present navy of France is equal to such a task.*

But whether the Emperor Napoleon alone, or in conjunction with Russia, meditate any offensive movement against his British ally, it is quite evident that England mistrusts his friendships, and, in anticipation of untoward events, multiplies her military and naval forces. And from her recent attitude in regard to the Italian question, it would seem as if England also apprehended a concert of action between France and Austria—her last and most steadfast ally on the continent of Europe, up to the period of the last war and the peace of Villafranca.

The political changes in Italy have, since 1849, occupied but a small share of the attention of British statesmen. The old Tory ministers were quite willing to abandon the whole Peninsula to Austrian domination, and actually stipulated for it at the Congress of

* It is now believed, by many seafaring men, that the navy of France is at this day superior to that of England, if not in the number of ships, at least in caliber and weight of metal. Rifle guns are already introduced into the whole French navy; and her artillery men, which, on land, excel any other troops in the world, may, at some future day, if not now, claim the same superiority on the water. Add to this, that the same Democratic spirit which pervades the French army, and excites the greatest amount of military emulation, exists also in the navy; and it will be difficult to comprehend why it should not there produce similar results. With such a national, democratic navy, the Emperor Napoleon may attempt much—and succeed.

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Prague, in 1813.* Holding Gibraltar and Malta, and receiving at the Congress of Vienna, the Protectorate over the Ionian Islands, England thought herself sufficiently strong in the Mediterranean, not only against France, but against any combination of Powers which might interfere with her supremacy in that sea. From Austria she could hardly anticipate any considerable naval demonstration; and besides, Austria, as we have already related, had allowed the whole naval establishment of the kingdom of Italy, which, with the retirement of Eugene Beauharnais, had fallen into her hands, to decay, and the vessels of war (several line of battle ships and frigates) to rot in her ports. Austria, Prussia, and the German States generally, took it for granted that, in case they went to war with one or more of the Continental maritime Powers, England would protect their sea coast; hence no effort was made by either of them, till 1848, to establish a military navy. Even the miniature fleet, which the Germans in 1848 and '49 had collected to oppose the pretensions of Denmark, was, chiefly through Austrian jealousy of Prussia, brought to the hammer. England never favored the development of any, the smallest naval force of a continental Power; for, apart from the possibility of a coalition, the involuntary reliance of Germany and Austria, and the smaller continental States, on England, was a British check on an independent continental policy. England, up to the last moment, was looked upon as the "natural ally" of Austria and Prussia—(the Queen of England is officially addressed as the "Protectress of the Hanseatic Towns,")—and, in return, England had a right to consider them as her natural allies on the Continent. This mutual relation of England and Germany has been totally changed by the events of the last war. England abandoned Austria to her fate. Austria looked in vain for a British fleet to protect Venice,

* Metternich, on 26th May, 1814, (after the peace of Paris,) addressed a long Protest to Lord Castlereagh, complaining that England had not redeemed the pledges she had made to Austria at Prague, in 1813. He claimed, by the secret treaty with England of that year, the Duchy of Parma and a portion of the Papal States. The Spanish Bourbons were to be compensated for the loss of Parma—in Germany!!

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or the ports of the Adriatic; while British statesmen, conjointly with the British press, declared that Prussia and the German States, in case of a war between them and France, must not count on British assistance or protection. A British fleet did appear in the Adriatic; but it did not interfere with the blockade of the Venetian coast. No British fleet appeared in the North Sea or the Baltic. Austria, in preparing for war with France, fortified her sea coast. Prussia, since the peace of Villafranca, has already declared that she will do the same thing, conjointly with her German allies bordering on the North Sea and the Baltic. Looking no longer to Great Britain for the protection of their commerce in time of war, their policy will, henceforth, be less liable to be influenced by Great Britain; unless England (which is not likely) considers the family alliance between the British and Prussian sovereigns as a sufficient cause for entering into treaty stipulations with the States of Northern Germany.

In regard to Piedmont, the policy of England was strictly conservative; no more. England had an interest not to see Piedmont dwindle down into a province of Austria or France. She wanted an independent kingdom in that important strategical position, placed between these two rival Powers; and a port (Genoa) where, in case of need, she might land an army. Beyond this, no British minister, it is but fair to presume, ever extended his vision. What assistance England will now give to Sardinia, in her conflicting claims on the Duchies, and to what extent she will advocate the establishment of an Italian Power, capable of resisting further Austrian encroachments, remains to be seen, The greatest counterpoise to Austrian domination would have been a firm league between Piedmont and Naples; but this, as we have related, England opposed and helped to prevent, in 1848 and 1849; the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy having never before entered the programme of a British minister. From 1846 till 1850, the weight of British influence in Italy was undoubtedly thrown in favor of political reforms; but not in favor of Italian *nationality*, or against Austria; though any reforms introduced into the governments of Italy, without, at the same time, diminishing Austrian power and influence

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in the Peninsula, were worse than useless. Neither did England wish to plunge Italy into revolutions, which might have endangered any of the Dynasties; and Lord Minto took a special occasion to assure the Neapolitan minister in Rome, that "the encouragement of popular insurrections formed no part of the hearty support she (England) was disposed to give to the progress of liberal reforms in Italy." England, to improve the condition of Italy, expected to employ no other than moral means, which were not likely to interfere with her exchequer; when the Franco-Italian alliance was formed, she maintained an armed neutrality.

During the Italian war, which has just been brought to a close, England was actuated by two important considerations:—First, she did not wish her "old, faithful ally," Austria, driven to the wall; and secondly, she was apprehensive that the French Emperor was about to establish a Napoleonic Dynasty somewhere in the Peninsula—perhaps in Naples or Sicily. How could we otherwise account for the large reinforcements sent to Malta, Gibraltar and the Ionian Islands, or for the increase of her fleet in the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic seas? The Emperor of the French could hardly misconstrue these movements, and he is not the man to forget them. England could not for a moment suppose that the Emperor Napoleon wanted Parma, Modena, or even the Grand Duchy of Tuscany for his cousin, the Prince. Such an ambition is assuredly below the imperial mark. No such miniature principality or kingdom was consistent with good faith to Victor Emanuel, and it is quite certain the Emperor never gave it a thought. If France were to *purchase Savoy*, neither England nor any other Power of Europe could raise an objection to it. The Savoyards are Frenchmen, speak the French language, and their separation from Piedmont would neither be a hardship for them, nor infringe on the doctrine of nationality laid down by the French Emperor. But Naples and Sicily are differently situated, especially the latter. There is a Bourbon Dynasty to be displaced, which, for more than half a century, has disgraced royalty by acts of the lowest and bloodiest treachery, and by almost every vice which can disgrace

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humanity. The only intermission between the tyranny of the two Ferdinands, was the reign of Joachim Murat (that of King Joseph Bonaparte did not last long enough to create a permanent impression on the people), and every act of his successors has, by the contrast it afforded—endeared his memory. Here are natural causes operating to excite the inquietude of England; for if France, Piedmont and Naples are once agreed on the policy of Italy, Austria's *occupation* in the Peninsula is gone, and she will readily consent to a compensation on the Danube.

The Italian Islands of Sardinia and Corsica, though comparatively large, are, as maritime possessions, of little consequence to Piedmont and France respectively; but the case is different in regard to the Island of Sicily. The geographical position of that Island, its incredible fertility, (even the Sugar-cane succeeds on its soil) and the many magnificent and safe harbors, with which it is blessed, constitute vast elements of power which, under a liberal and energetic government, might change the political aspect of the Mediterranean. Sicily, in the hands of a maritime Power, might command the opposite shore of Egypt, and exercise a preponderating influence in the Greek Archipelago. Malta itself might be threatened; while the Ionian Islands, whose population will never be reconciled to British rule, no matter what concessions their British Protectors may make to them, would require the presence of a strong naval and military force, not to give vent to their national sentiments. England, therefore, in case dynastic changes are about to be introduced in Italy, will keep a watchful eye on Naples and Sicily; and if unable to guard both, at least take Sicily under her protecting wing. The population of Naples is more than twice as large as that of Sicily; but, in a maritime and commercial point of view, the Island possesses infinitely greater advantages. Under Neapolitan dominion, it will always be comparatively neglected; first, on account of the national jealousies between the Neapolitans and Sicilians; and secondly, because with the undying desire of the Sicilians for a government independent of Naples, and their repeated attempts at revolution, the island has,

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for many years, been treated merely as a conquered province. The Sicilian nobles, who claim the honor of Norman descent,* consider themselves related to those of England, and have, in their struggles for independence, emulated many British virtues. They have always shown themselves ready to make great personal sacrifices for the public good; and to surrender the privileges of their caste where they interfered with the liberal aspirations of the people. Of all the States of Italy, none gave the national party more concern than the Kingdom of Sicily. The Sicilians dreaded the unbridled liberties proclaimed, from time to time, by their countrymen in other parts of Italy, and actually resisted the Spanish Constitution of 1812, which the Neapolitans established in 1820. The historical antecedents of Sicily, the spirit of its inhabitants, and its geographical position, plead for its independence of Naples; and it would, perhaps, be easier for the island to become an independent member of the proposed Italian League, than to join that League merely as an appendix to Naples. Military men have laid down the rule that he who commands Upper Italy, commands the whole Peninsula; but this does not include Sicily. Napoleon I., and his Generals, did possess all Italy; but a British fleet protected the Island. With the present improvements in the French navy, events may happen which were not foreseen even by the genius of the "Great Monarch."

In connection with these considerations, we must yet refer to the Isthmus of Suez. The proposed ship canal, or a ship railway accross that Isthmus, is part of the Italian question, and of immense consequence to the trade of the Mediterranean. We all remember the fierce quarrel between the French and English Engineers, Lesseps and Stephenson, on that subject, and how the Chevalier Negrelli, the Austrian Engineer, took the part of Mons. Lesseps, in showing the feasibility of the canal. It was very evident, however, that England did not want a canal across the Isthmus; and it became equally manifest that France and Austria, and all the States of Italy desired it, as essential to a new route to

* The Normans having conquered the Island.

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India for their commercial marine. If a ship canal were built across the Isthmus of Suez, the whole trade from Marseilles, Trieste or Leghorn to India, would be coastwise; adding immeasurably to the prosperity of these important seaports, and damaging, in the same ratio, the British East India trade round the Capes. The Chevalier Negrelli agreed on that point, and on many others, entirely with Mons. Lesseps; but when the French Chambers of Commerce of Paris, Marseilles, Nantes, &c. subscribed largely to Lesseps' enterprise, and when it was believed that the French subscriptions alone were sufficient to commence and *finish* the work, Austria grew jealous of her French rival, considered Trieste outdone by Marseilles, and withheld not only her own support of the enterprise, but damaged it also in public opinion, through the aid of the journals devoted to her interests. A more natural explanation of this conduct is, perhaps, found in the reflection that Austria, foreseeing a rupture with France, either on the Italian or Turkish question, sought, in advance, to conciliate England; although in doing so, she opposed the best commercial interests of her own subjects. Mons. Lesseps evidently put that construction on her conduct; and, in return for her kindly offices, sent some three hundred Italian Refugees, on board of a steamer, chartered by himself, back to their native land, to aid in the war against Austria. The canal project has since met with varied success. Sometimes the Vice Roy of Egypt seemed to favor it, sometimes his opposition to it amounted almost to an injunction. Whether the work will be finished under the present auspices, seems to be doubtful; and to depend mainly on the preponderance of British or French influence at Cairo. It is difficult, however, to believe that France, after having subscribed some two hundred millions of francs, and after having obtained the necessary concessions, will now suffer the work to be suspended or abandoned. Neither the Vice Roy of Egypt, nor the Sublime Port, can with impunity throw obstacles in the way of civilization and progress; or attempt to confine commerce to its present limits. The Isthmus of Suez is, at this moment, quite as important, in a commercial point of view, as Constantinople; and its possession is coveted by more than one

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Power that looks forward to the division of Turkey. There is, to use one of Mr. Calhoun's celebrated phrases, "a mysterious connection" between France and Egypt, illustrated by many historical incidents, from the battle of the Pyramids, to the bombardment of St. Jean d' Acre. The romantic expedition of General Bonaparte yet lives in the memory of the veterans of the French army, and must have occurred more than once to the comprehensive mind of the Emperor Napoleon III.*

The whole foreign policy of the Emperor Napoleon seems indeed, to have been directed to the solution of the Oriental question; which involves not only the future configuration of the Powers of Europe, but also that of Asia, to the borders of the Pacific. It is the problem of our century; involving the regeneration and civilization of the Eastern Continents, and affecting, in its ultimate consequences, the material prosperity of the whole civilized world. When the Emperor Nicholas attempted to solve this question, without regard to the wishes of the other European Powers, Napoleon III. entered his protest, and conjointly with England waged the Crimean war. After the peace of Paris, Austria, supported in a measure by England, endeavored to exercise that predominating influence at Constantinople which Russia had lost by the war; but here, she too, was met by France, who, from that day, only sought a fit opportunity of lowering her pretensions. The Italian question was cognate to the Oriental one; but the Emperor Napoleon had no idea of fighting two mortal duels on the Po and on the Rhine, as mere preliminary steps to the accomplishment of his original design. The interests of France were not commensurate with such a sacrifice. With a powerful army, flushed with victory, and a magnificent navy longing for an opportunity to

* After the canal across the Isthmus shall be built, the possession of Constantinople by Russia, though it would give her immense prestige in Asia, and be a powerful means of stimulating the religious enthusiasm of her people, will, in a commercial point of view, be of less consequence than Alexandria. The domination of the Black sea would advance other projects; but these need not necessarily excite the jealousy of any continental Power of Europe. The further Russia goes East, the less momentum does she acquire on her western frontier.

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live in fame, other things may be accomplished than restoring Venice to the Winged Lion.* The liberation of Italy was a means of humbling Austria; it was a beautiful incident, not the sole cause and object of the war. That liberation, nevertheless, is about to be substantially accomplished, and an Italian Confederation, in some shape or other, will undoubtedly follow. But as long as the Oriental question remains unsettled, that of Italy will necessarily be involved in doubt. Austria is now as much in a state of transition as Italy herself. The mode in which Turkey shall be divided, will determine whether Austria shall again gravitate toward Italy, or become definitely, what some of her most reflecting statesmen already call her—"THE DANUBIAN EMPIRE." When Couza was chosen Prince of Moldavia and Wallachia, he declared to the world that he should look upon the power, thus conferred upon him, merely as temporary; and that he was ready, at any time, to abdicate in favor of a *foreign Prince*. Here, then, there is a *vacancy* which the Emperor of Austria or some other Prince, according to circumstances, may be called upon to fill; other vacancies may be created.

If the peace, concluded between France and Austria, is a sincere one (and this appears to be the case) there is some probability that these two Powers will come to an understanding on the Oriental question. France, Russia and Austria have sufficient power to settle it, and if agreed among themselves, would dispose of Turkey without much difficulty. England, isolated as she now is, from the continent of Europe, might protest against it; but would hardly wage war in a fruitless attempt to prevent it. Her land force would be insignificant compared with that of either of the opposing Powers; and Turkey herself is utterly unable to offer any serious resistance. Thus England might be obliged to ratify, by her acquiescence, an arrangement to which she has not been a party, and thereby suffer a fatal diminution of her prestige. She cannot be excluded from the councils of the continental Powers, without suffering in the estimation of the world, and diminishing the influence

* The ancient arms of the Republic of Venice.

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of her diplomacy in other quarters. This seems to be the true danger to which England is exposed by the foreign policy of Imperial France, and it is difficult to overrate it. An island within a few hours' sail from the continent, cannot avoid being affected by its fate. Neither can England remain an indifferent spectator to a continental arrangement which, by its ulterior consequences, may involve the security of her Indian Empire. India is not as easily defended now, as it was half a century ago, when England could threaten to bring her Seapoys to Egypt—when a native army, larger than any that a European Power could have dispatched to India, was ready to repel an invasion.

The possessions of England are scattered over the whole globe. It is of her, not of Spain, that it may be said, "the sun never sets in her dominions." But the extent of these possessions also involves responsibilities and cares proportionate to their importance. No political or commercial changes can take place anywhere without affecting British interests. England is obliged to take a part in every question of power, wherever it may arise; but as the greater part of her dominions lies in Asia, anything affecting that continent, necessarily strikes at her supremacy. England is the most considerable Power in Asia; and her influence, for some time past, has ruled that continent. But if Europe advances into Asia, and that old continent becomes the seat of European Power, revolutions must follow, the result of which must change the relations of every nation on earth. The British people are now taxed for the *support* of the government of India; would they be willing to be taxed for another Indian *war*? And if that war involved the integrity of British soil—if a French fleet were assembled at Cherbourg, and an army ready to embark—if England, deserted by all her old allies, and, "the dread and envy of them all," were preparing, alone, for the great world duel with an European coalition, where, in the wide world, could she look for sympathizing hearts, except to her own kindred in America?

And why should there not be growing sympathies between England and the United States? England, to be sure, has, until a very late period, scarcely treated us with the comity due from one great

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nation to another. She has sought to thwart our policy in many things, of vital importance to us, and of little moment to herself. She has periodically revived her pretensions to the odious Right of Search, in some form or other, with a full knowledge of the mortal offence the agitation of this vexed question must always give to the United States. She tried to overreach us in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, by construing it in a manner which would bind us against ourselves without a consideration; and she has, on various occasions, in the most offensive manner, attempted to read us homilies on the subject of slavery, which are unjust, scarcely regarded as sincere, and can serve no practical purpose except that of sowing discord and exciting prejudices between different sections of our common country. English statesmen and writers have repeatedly attempted to sit in judgment on us; forgetting that they have no longer any jurisdiction in our case; and that there is a public opinion on *this* side of the water, too, which it would be wise and proper in them to conciliate. England must cease to play the arrogant, aggressive part of arbiter of the world; she must resign the ungrateful office of censor of public morals, and she must allow other nations to judge for themselves as to the best mode of promoting their own welfare and happiness. If she will do that, and use her free press and the great power she still possesses, for the promotion of constitutional liberty from a stand-point higher than mere commercial interest, then she will not only regain much that she appears to have lost, but attach new allies to her cause.

It cannot have escaped observation that, of late, the British Press has taken a different tone, indicating a change of public sentiment, in regard to the United States. We are heartily rejoiced at this; and feel assured that there is every disposition in this country, to reciprocate whatever kindly feelings Great Britain may have in store for us. The British Press has labored long enough, and perseveringly enough, to depreciate our institutions and laws, and to throw ridicule on what it was pleased to call our "American idiosyncracies." These taunts and sneers could never serve any reasonable purpose; and could only alienate the sympathies which we naturally feel for a kindred people. It seemed

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really, for a time, as if the similarity of our institutions, instead of being favorably considered in England, constituted an additional grievance, on account of their approximation to the fundamental principles of British liberty. English statesmen and public writers were in a habit of treating us as political heretics; for whom those who consider themselves orthodox seem to have less consideration, than for downright infidels. The nearer we came to their own standard, the more intolerable seemed to be the difference. Let England henceforth practice a little more tolerance, and she will have no cause to regret it. Let us be united, henceforth, not only by mutual interest, which may change every day with the circumstances in which we are placed; but by that deep and lasting anxiety for each other's welfare, which characterizes members of the same family. One of our great statesmen, in a speech delivered in England, some years ago, called Great Britain the "Breakwater of Liberty." We are disposed to consider her as such, should the nations of the Continent of Europe relapse into despotism; and it would be both a source of pride and satisfaction for us to watch and do what may be in our power, to prevent that breakwater from being swept away. If the Emperor Napoleon, in a late proclamation, could justly say, that "wherever there is civilization, there is France;" we may, with equal truth, proclaim, that wherever there is Constitutional Liberty, there are the sympathies of the Great Republic of the United States!

France has never been more prosperous, or more powerful than at the present day. Never before was her industry in a more flourishing condition, her commerce less trammeled, and her agricultural labor more certain of its reward. Never have so many improvements been going on, at the same time, in so many different parts of the country. The wealth of France has astonished Europe; her enterprise keeps pace with her immense material development, and the gradual approach to free trade. If these have been the results of the wise and liberal domestic policy of the French Emperor, in harmony with the spirit of the age, and adapted to the peculiar genius of the French people, his foreign policy—the sole creation of his own mind—has even been more

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successful, and has made France the leading Power in Europe. The process by which this was accomplished, was natural; yet highly elaborate. The Emperor Napoleon did not create new elements of power; but he bestowed the mighty energies of his fertile mind on the development and improvements already in existence, and he combined them in a manner to produce the most striking effect. Without territorial conquest, without absorbing other nations, without the aid of allies to swell their numbers, his armies have become the terror of Europe; his fleets, the cause of alarm and anxiety to his neighbors. Frederic the Great used to say, that if *he* were King of France, no cannon in Europe should be fired without his consent;—the Emperor Napoleon reduced this hypothetical proposition to a verity. If, in the Crimean war, he lowered the pretensions of Russia, he also diminished the warlike prestige of his British allies by comparison with the efficiency and brilliant effect of his own military appointments; and like results may attend the joint military expedition of England and France against China.

These achievements have elated France much more than the Emperor who, after each victory, astonished his enemies as much by his moderation, as by the terrible energy he displayed before and during the battle. It is no disparagement to say of Napoleon III., that he does not possess the matchless military genius of his great uncle (since nobody on earth possesses it now, and perhaps but one—Hannibal—possessed it before him); but it may also be no flattery to say, that he excels him in wisdom and prudence. Whatever hope the reactionary party may cherish, no coalition will ever be formed, or, if established, succeed, against the nephew of the "Great Monarch;" for his allies are not coerced, and he makes it their interest to be true to him. He knows their aspirations and wants, and, by affording them scope, renders them tributary to his own views and prospects.

The foreign policy of the Emperor Napoleon takes the world by surprise. He baffles the combinations of the old-fashioned, conservative statesmen of Europe by his restless activity and celerity of motion, which secure to him the initiative in every important

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question. He is at work, when they are asleep; he plans, when they are reposing from their toils; and he is ready to execute, when they are ready to take matters into grave consideration. Even his rest is only a feigned slumber, to allow his opponents the privilege of closing their eyes. His productiveness seems to be unlimited; his endurance only equal to the quickness of his perceptions. To all this he joins an indomitable will, unsurpassed personal courage, and a firm belief in his destiny. His knowledge of the world extends to all classes of society, from the throne down to the day-laborer; and he possesses the wonderful faculty of reading men, as ordinary mortals read books. To those admitted into his presence, his attitude is calm and reserved: to his friends, he unbends with cordiality; but even those nearest to his person know as little of his resolutions, until they are ripe for action, as those whom they are intended to benefit or overwhelm. That the Emperor Napoleon is a statesman who reads alike the future and the past, and that, better than any man living, he comprehends "his epoch," will yet be demonstrated to eyes most unwilling to see, and to minds least prepared to receive a new truth. No country in Europe, or in the world, is more difficult to govern than France; because in none other has social emancipation proceeded so far; yet how eminently successful has the Emperor been in the performance of that painful and perilous task! Supported by the democratic sympathies of the people, which he has rekindled by the war in Italy; strengthened by the adhesion of the industrial and commercial interests of the country, to which he has extended his fostering care; at peace with the nobility, to whom, in the absence of everything else, he has restored their titles; and cheered by the enthusiasm of a victorious army, whose dauntless chivalry, led by himself, has gathered new laurels on ancient battle-fields, he is now not only the dictator of France, but the arbiter of the fate of Europe.

But one question remains to be answered:—Will Napoleon III. be able to perpetuate his dynasty? Will he be able to secure the throne of his uncle, which he has reconquered, to his son? Dynasties, in France, are neither easily established, nor revived,

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and cannot now be perpetuated without the adhesion of the people. France cannot, under any government, be content to play a secondary part in history. She must lead, or admit that her mission is ended. The traditions of Charlemagne, whom the French call their own,* the *souvenirs* of the first French Empire, and the prestige acquired by the second, plead strongly in favor of Imperialism; but the Bourbon Pretender, too, has a small party in France; and his cause is favored by the reactionary Courts of Europe. Legitimacy, in support of which the Treaties of 1815 were concluded at Vienna, and the armed interventions of Austria and France in Italy and Spain sanctioned by the Congresses of Laibach and Verona, though repeatedly defeated, is still plotting to regain its lost ascendency; and watching every step of the emperor to take advantage of a hoped-for turn of fortune. Will the emperor give his foreign and domestic adversaries a chance? We believe not.

As far as the Legitimists are concerned, the fusion between the partisans of the Duke of Chambord (Henry V.) and the Count of Paris (grandson of Louis Philippe) seems to be complete. The Count of Chambord will certainly die without issue; and the Count of Paris will then be the legitimist successor to the throne of royal France. The education of this Prince, the principles instilled into his mind by his most excellent mother (wife of the unfortunate Duke of Orleans), and the fact that he is looked upon with apparent favor by the party which professes to adhere to the Constitutional Government established in 1830, may render him, if favored by circumstances, a dangerous, if not a powerful, pretender to the throne of his ancestors. His friends reason thus:—"The Emperor Napoleon, while he has undoubtedly succeeded in attaching to himself the army, the agricultural and industrial population, and a large portion of the clergy (who were never sincerely attached either to the Citizen King or to the Republic), has not, as yet, been able to satisfy the *haute Bourgeoisie* (comprising the Bankers, Brokers, and the gentlemen engaged in the higher

* So, at least, the boys, in France, are taught at school, in spite of the rival claims set up by the Germans.

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branches of manufactures and commerce*), and he has not yet reconciled the men of *Letters*. The great body of the literary men of France are national, and will support the national cause under any government; but the emperor will never be able to overcome their aversion to the censorship. But few among them are Republicans; and between the anarchy, toward which the late French Republic was gravitating, and the Empire, they resigned themselves to the latter as the least of two evils. Their adhesion, however, is involuntary, and their hopes and expectations lie in a different direction." These arguments the emperor must meet practically, by making such reasonable and timely concessions, as circumstances and the increased security of the State will permit. The intelligence of France is proud of the position the country now occupies in Europe—it is, with the mass of the people and the army, rejoiced at the triumph of French arms, which has blotted out the stain of the invasions of 1814 and 1815; and it is flattered with the thought that France is once more dictating law to Europe. But all this and much more—the astonishing development of French commerce and industry, the improvements in navigation, the creation of a powerful navy, and the impregnable fortresses erected on the French coast, does not compensate it for the absence of a representative government. It is as natural for men who have once enjoyed constitutional freedom, to covet its possession, as for a hungry man to long after bread; and no administration, however brilliant, no success, it matters not how substantial, can wholly eradicate that desire. As long as it exists (and it will exist as long as civilization exists in France), no government which withholds its gratification, can be considered entirely secure; no pretender, with "*liberty*" inscribed on his banners, as insignificant.

As long as the Emperor Napoleon retains the use of his faculties—as long as his foreign and domestic policies increase the number of his admirers and diminishes that of his opponents, his government will be strong enough to crush any attempt at revo-

* The "upper-tendom" of Paris; principally established in the quarter known as the *Quartier de Finance*.

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lution; whether its object be the establishment of a republic, or the reinstatement of the banished royal family. But the enduring strength of a government is not measured merely by the means it possesses, to overcome resistance; but also by that disposition of the governed, which renders the employment of these means unnecessary, and thus enables the government to turn its whole available force against a foreign enemy. "The consent of the governed" is not only morally, but physically an element of power. In this respect, the late general amnesty, granted by the emperor to all political offenders without distinction, is a greater proof of his growing power and security, than the victories he achieved at Palestro, Magentá, and Solferino.*

As long as the emperor lives, no pretender to the French throne will cause him any serious uneasiness; but, in case of his death, the regency during the minority of the *Infant of France*, or the Imperial successor himself, might not enjoy the same immunity from intrusion. One thing only is sure to act permanently in favor of the Napoleonic succession. The glorious recollections which attach to the first French empire, and which have inspired the emulation of Napoleon III., will forever contrast with the return of the Bourbons, who, escorted as they were by foreign bayonets, will constantly recall to mind the period of the humiliation of France, and the triumph of her foreign enemies. This contrast between the two dynasties constitutes the real strength of the empire, and the permanent weakness of all Bourbon pretenders. The empire is progressive. It produces and accomplishes great things. It lives by its productiveness, and is sustained by the national plaudits. This is the key to all the emperor's plans and combinations, and the best explanation of his "mysterious foreign policy." The memory of the first Napoleon is constantly refreshed by analogous achievements, which exhibit the interval of the Bour-

* The emperor, more than two years ago, desired to grant this amnesty; but the men who surrounded him advised against it. They thought the moment had not yet arrived, when the emperor could, with safety to the State, gratify the promptings of his heart. In the projection of all liberal measures, he is known to have always been far in advance of all the members of his cabinet.

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bons from 1815 till 1848, as a mere calamitous interruption of a long brilliant period in French history.

But the return of the Bourbons is not the only thing that threatens, however faintly, the permanent Napoleonic succession to the throne of France. There is also a party, located principally in the large cities, which desires the return of the Republic. What, if this party, moderating its impracticable views of *immediate* and *direct* self-government—least suited to an imaginative and excitable people—were to make common cause with the friends of constitutional freedom, after the example of the Italian Republicans, who have now, almost in a body, joined the constitutional party of the King of Piedmont? Against such a combination, the emperor will undoubtedly provide by a gradual extension of the representative system; provided no new perturbing causes interfere with his present resolution. But the French National Assembly must learn to confine itself to its *parliamentary* duties; and not look upon itself continually as a *constituent assembly*, whose business it is *to establish* a government, or to change it at its pleasure. It must restrict its opposition to *measures*, and not extend it to the dynasty; so as to create two conflicting powers in the State, which must necessarily terminate in the suppression of one or the other. It can hardly be supposed that the Emperor Napoleon favors the cause of constitutional freedom in Italy, without meditating its introduction, in a new form, into France; and it is difficult to conceive how he could wish to condemn so enlightened a people as the French, who, in some form or other, have enjoyed a National Parliament for more than half a century, to permanent political inactivity. France, being surrounded by representative governments in England, Belgium, Prussia, and Italy, cannot, without admitting her inferior political capacity, or her deterioration in public morals (against either of which imputations the French people will, at all times, enter their solemn protest), cannot but desire that political form of government which marks the progress of civilization of our age, and most conforms to the abstract idea of public justice. The French people may have faults which disqualify them for institutions similar to our own,

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and their historical antecedents may render the introduction of such institutions dangerous and impracticable; but they are too ingenious, too brave, and too public-spirited not to be able to live under *some* form of government more nearly approaching the representative system. At the time of Aristotle, several hundred political governments existed, all laying claims to the appellation of popular, and yet all differing from each other in their mode of distributing power. Why should the Emperor of the French not be able to devise a government for France, essentially liberal in substance and form; yet adapted to the peculiar temper and habits of the French people? Such a government, carrying with it the prestige of success, of glory, and of progress, would secure Europe against all future chances of reaction—imperial France herself, against revolution and anarchy. The late acts of the Emperor Napoleon indicate a disposition to pursue this course. May he adhere to it; and may his quiet progress not be arrested by circumstances which call again for the display of force. France, with her civilization, her power, and her historical renown permanently introduced into the family of free nations, would turn the scale in favor of liberty throughout the world. Such a mission is, indeed, enviable; its fulfilment sure to receive the gratitude of the latest posterity.

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CHAPTER XIX.

THE MANNER IN WHICH THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN EUROPE MAY AFFECT THE UNITED STATES—OUR PROSPECTS AND HOPES.

The traditional policy of the United States consists in maintaining friendly relations with all the Powers of the earth, in recognizing every *de facto* government, and in keeping aloof from all "entangling alliances." We may have sympathies for this or that people; but sound reasons of State forbid that we should become a party to its conflicts with its own government, or with any other nation. This holds especially of our relations with the Powers of Europe, all of which we wish to treat with becoming international comity and respect. We have nothing to do, either with their revolutionary movements, or with their so-called "Balance of Power;" so long as that phrase is applied merely to their European possessions. Whether France acquire the Rhenish Provinces and Belgium; whether Prussia, practising hegemony, absorb the smaller States of Germany; whether the Italians succeed in driving the Austrians from their soil, and the people of the Two Sicilies in changing their dynasty, is, in a national point of view, of but little consequence to our development and progress. But if it be contended that we must remain absolutely indifferent to the affairs of Europe—that the changes wrought in the institutions and mutual relations of European governments do not merit our consideration and challenge our watchfulness, then, assuredly, our neutrality doctrine would amount to an injunction on ourselves, and condemn us, in our foreign relations, to absolute political inaction. It would insure all other nations against harm from our growing energy and power; while it would not protect us from *their* intermeddling with *our* affairs. European alliances *have* been formed against us, as in the case of the Quintuple Treaty,

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for the exercise of the Right of Search, so strenuously and successfully opposed by General Cass, then our Minister to France; European statesmen, like Mr. Guizot, have talked of the "necessity of confining the power of the United States within limits no longer threatening the world-equilibrium of nations;" Lord Clarendon threw out hints in regard to the late Anglo-French alliance, neither complimentary nor assuring to our country; and the complication of our Central-American relations shows, most conclusively, that even on this continent we may come in contact, if not in conflict, with European diplomacy. As early as 1822 and '23, the Powers represented at the Congresses of Laibach and Verona contemplated an armed intervention in Mexico and South America; thereby giving rise to the proclamation of the *Monroe Doctrine;* and we have no guarantee whatever that similar attempts will not again be made, if circumstances favor so monstrous a scheme.* The question now is, shall we patiently wait till such plans are matured; or shall we meet them at the threshhold, and confound their concocters? A nation which, without regard to the circumstances in which it may be placed, should declare its intention to adhere, in all future time, to the principle of absolute neutrality, would deprive itself of half its influence; for power consists not only in the ability of a nation to defend itself, if attacked; but also in the aggressive means which it possesses to prevent or punish provocation. Let no European Power hold an assurance policy against the United States, which gives it the unpunishable initiative in every question of public law; and let no European government flatter itself that we are still in the humble position of shaping our policy merely in reference to self-preservation. We may be the youngest member in the fraternity of nations; but we have signalized our childhood like Hercules, by strangling a monster in our cradle.

We have, in less than a century of national existence, risen to the rank and consideration of a great Power, and we cannot, if we

* The correspondence of the Hon. Mr. Rush, then our Minister to England, contains valuable information on this subject, and refers pointedly to the noble part which Mr. Canning took in relation to it.

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would, rid ourselves of the responsibility and the influence which we exercise on other nations. The example of our institutions, the prosperity which we enjoy under them, our staples which supply the wants of the world, our widely extended commerce, are all so many elements of power; exciting sympathies on the one hand, and jealousies on the other, which we have no means to counteract either by our foreign or domestic policy. We cannot help being loved or feared, as our progress may favor or conflict with the progress of other nations; and we must expect to become the theme of European political writers, and the aim of European statesmanship. We furnish the world staple of clothing, (Cotton) we export the largest quantity of bread-stuffs,* and the manufacturing industry of all civilized nations competes for success in our markets. What elements of power are these—what means of reaching every interest and every class of society in Europe! Every American ship is a propagandist, every bale of cotton an eloquent defender of the Monroe doctrine; and this not only on the defensive principle; but as a representative of our aggressive power.†

How intimately our material prosperity is now interwoven with that of Europe, has been illustrated by our late money crisis. Though the fortunes of Europe have accumulated during the progress of centuries, and rest, on that account, on a more substantial

* Chicago exports more grain than Odessa.

† One of the most effective means of exercising a steadily increasing influence on the people of Europe, consists in the success of our Democratic institutions. The fact that we maintain all the relations of a Great Power, without the luxury of kings and nobles; that we excel in every species of enterprise, and successfully compete with Europe in all the departments of knowledge, and latterly, also, of the fine arts; and that we do this without hereditary families acting as protectors and patrons, naturally excites curiosity and a desire to imitate our cheap institutions. The achievements of our industry and commerce are considered as Democratic achievements; and classified with the victories of the French army, recruited and officered from the People. It is our social development, even more than our political one, (though one is necessarily dependant upon the other,) which dazzles the populations of Europe; as it is the social organization of France—the result of the great revolution of 1789—which, far more than any political doctrine France has emitted since that period, has planted the seed of revolution in every State of the European Continent.

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basis than our own—though the capital of Europe exceeds by many thousand millions that of the United States, a scarcity of money in New York is sure instantly to react on the money market of every important commercial town in Europe; while an appreciable diminution in our imports, produces greater distress among the laboring classes there, than a foreign war would inflict on our own. Wages, in Europe, are reduced to the minimum of what is necessary to sustain human life; and a farther diminution of them, or a momentary suspension of work, is sure of sending hundreds and thousands of industrious men and their families hungry to bed, or to the grave. Considering the political transition state of many, if not all European governments, such catastrophes may involve the security of kingdoms; while, with us, a temporary suspension of business is merely complained of on the score of "hard times," which cannot last long, and are sure to be succeeded by better ones. A commercial distress in Europe undoubtedly reacts also on the United States; but not to the same extent, and unaccompanied by such fearful consequences. Europe, whether rich or poor, must have our staples; we may dispense with European luxuries. Our influence on Europe, therefore, is greater in proportion to our means, than that of Europe upon us: in other words, we have gained the start on Europe.

Another immense advantage we possess over every Power in Europe, except Russia, consists in our geographical position. Spanning the whole continent, from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean, bordering to the North on friendly colonies whose inhabitants are assimilated to us in origin, language and habits, and latterly, also, by reciprocal free trade; and advancing southward by superior energy, and the unavoidable influence of our institutions, we are almost beyond the reach of those casualties which usually accompany the rise and progress of nations; and able, with a unity of purpose entirely depending on ourselves, to shape our own destiny. No people of antiquity, or of modern times, has been so favorably circumstanced; none has been allowed such a spontaneous, uninterrupted, rapid growth. And, in addition to this, we draw population from all other quarters of the globe, and enrich

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our magnificent domain by the labor, wealth and enterprise of every other civilized country. Well may we thus excite the envy and jealousy of other governments; but a wise and firm policy on our part, will render these harmless. The human tide which flows from Europe to the United States, cannot be arrested by any sovereign power; though it may succeed in throwing innumerable obstacles in its way; the expansion of our people, in the absence of geographical barriers, cannot be stopped by paper leagues and diplomatic subtilties. Against these, if we remain united, we shall always have the power to defend ourselves; but for that purpose we may as well employ our influence and standing in Europe, as our arms and our patriotism on this continent.

There is no reason why our opinions—the opinion of thirty millions—should not have its influence on Europe, as the opinions of Europe have heretofore influenced us; and there is no reason why we should not have a *diplomacy* in Europe, as well as a *power* in America; provided that diplomacy be directed to averting dangers, instead of courting and provoking them. We have reached that period in our history, and that eminent position among the nations of the world, which renders our good will and friendly offices valuable objects to be secured by other governments; why, then, should we not discriminate in regard to those on whom we bestow them, and thus make some return for favors shown to ourselves? Such a policy would give no just cause of offence to any nation. It would only convey a proper idea of our self-respect, and of our just appreciation of the conduct of others. To this point of positiveness our foreign diplomacy must certainly advance, if we would counteract foreign influences on our own affairs, and if our envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to foreign courts, shall enjoy a higher consideration than mere special agents. If our people and government object to the direction of our diplomacy to some preconceived, determined purpose, reducible to a system, and which *mutatis mutandis* shall become the rule of action for all our diplomatists, then why continue our diplomatic agents at all? The special things entrusted to their care, may as well be entrusted to our consuls and consuls general,

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or to special agents, as to our ministers. The country would have the same service at a cheaper rate; and a consul entrusted with diplomatic functions, would, as a republican officer, be received with the same distinction as a full minister.

The practice adopted in Europe is, for each government to send to all its ministers and diplomatic agents, copies of the instructions forwarded to any one of them. The British minister to St. Petersburg, for instance, knows what the British minister in Paris is doing, and *vice versa*. The same holds of every other diplomatic agent of Great Britain; and precisely the same system prevails in France and elsewhere. Thus, when an important question is started, by either of these governments, all the diplomatic agents of that government are at once advocating it directly or indirectly at all the courts of Europe, each in his own way; and by putting forth reasons suitable to the views and the situation of the government to which he is accredited. Thus a unity of action is produced, and a power brought to bear on the question, equal to the sum of all the relations of that government with foreign nations. The great object is to procure the coöperation of several governments to the same end, or, at least, to neutralize their action where it is likely to be unfavorable to the object in view. To isolate a government, that is, to prevent any other government from espousing its cause, is to achieve a diplomatic triumph over it. That this system has its advantages, no one can deny; that it may, at any time, be employed with great force against ourselves, is also apparent. It was very nearly successful in the case of the Quintuple Treaty for the exercise of the Right of Search, and it failed, at the Congress of Verona, principally by the withdrawal of England from the coalition. We have, no doubt, our own American views on subjects connected with this continent, and are entitled to them; and we have, or ought to have, a fixed American polity. Why should not this be urged by all our ministers abroad, not only in their intercourse with the sovereign or the minister of foreign affairs of the government to which each is accredited; but on all suitable occasions, officially and unofficially, with all persons who may possess influence with that government. In this manner

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our European diplomacy might be made a unit; while all European governments would be made to appreciate our position, and the particular interest of each to keep on terms with us. During the short period of the administration of the State Department by the Hon. John C. Calhoun, when the annexation of Texas was substantially if not formally opposed by England and France, a similar system was adopted, and it was admirably successful. The present situation of Europe is one which requires the greatest watchfulness on our part; while, at the same time, it may present points of interest which will not escape the attention of our statesmen. As long as the States of Europe have *colonies* in America, anything affecting their mutual relations will command our attention, and receive the consideration of our government.

But while watching the political events of Europe, and the changes to which they may lead in all the established relations, and even in the forms of their governments, we ought to have a care not to bind ourselves rashly by *Treaties*. We cannot have too few of these; for we are a growing nation, and what is refused to us to-day will hardly be denied to us to-morrow, if our demand is at all reasonable and compatible with the honor of others. Neither can we, like Frederic the Great, Peter the Great, or other great monarchs of Europe, disregard treaty stipulations when they no longer answer our purpose. But acknowledging, as we do, the binding force of treaties, our diplomatic agents ought not easily to be tempted to make one; though their abstinence, in this respect, may deprive them of immortality—in the archives of the State Department. There is no achievement for any of our diplomatic agents in making a Treaty. The whole world wants to treat with us; because we are not only getting stronger every day, but also richer. Our domain enlarges, our productions increase, and we afford every year larger markets to the manufacturing industry of other nations. To secure the American market, is the commercial policy of every nation in Europe; for their welfare, their prosperity, their safety depends on securing this market. While our policy is to trade with all the world, we have a right to stipulate for reciprocity; and when, from various causes, this is denied to us,

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we ought, if at all regulating our intercourse with such countries by treaties, make these for as short a period as possible; in order to enable us hereafter to affix conditions to the renewal of them. Neither ought we, while advancing with a giant's step, bind ourselves to any particular polity, in regard to foreign nations, without securing a great object. We ought to reserve to ourselves the greatest freedom of action, and thus oblige other nations constantly to cultivate our friendly sympathies. The parting injunction of Talleyrand to all young *diplomates* was, "No zeal gentlemen! above all things, no zeal." France, with Napoleon at her head, could afford to bide her time; our immense national resources, and the progressive spirit of our people, afford us the same diplomatic privilege. We may, therefore, repeat the injunction "no zeal," and add to it "no haste!"

Another measure of prudence may consist in not crowding our diplomatic agents with too many specific instructions. Instead of that, our agents abroad ought to be obliged constantly to report on the state of things, and the changes wrought in the respective positions of the different governments of Europe; from which, afterwards, instructions may be prepared, modifying the general rule of conduct prescribed to our functionaries abroad. In this manner all our diplomatic agents, accredited to foreign governments, would be kept usefully employed; and the Department in Washington would, at all times, be furnished with a political map of Europe, which could be studied to advantage, and applied to the solution of our own American problems. Even court gossip, when properly grouped, so as to illustrate events, or the thoughts and opinions of prominent individuals, may be reported with advantage, and used in unraveling diplomatic mysteries. A proper knowledge of the character of the men with whom we may have to treat, or with whom we ought not to treat, is often more essential to success, than the most familiar acquaintance with all the details of business.

To sum up. In the present condition of Europe, we ought to have an especial care not to contract, unnecessarily, obligations to foreign Powers. We ought to be on the *qui vive;* but abstain from all inconsiderate action. We can afford to let events take their

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course; but we ought to be prepared for them. If the map of Europe is to be changed—if Turkey is to be divided, and the nations of Europe are to extend their power and influence into Asia, we may consider how far this great historical movement of the people of the old world may affect the conditions of the new; and what steps it may be prudent for us to take, to balance the account. If Europe divides Asia, we ought to lose no time in taking a proper position on the Pacific; our power, our progress, our security, may depend on that step. In that event, San Francisco must become the Gibraltar of our Western coast; it must be fortified so as to be able to resist the modern instruments of destruction introduced into the navies of England and France; and it must be connected by railway with the Mississippi valley, the basis of its support. Whether this shall be done by federal authority, by charters from the States, or by individual enterprise, is a matter which we have no disposition to discuss, and which would be irrelevant to our purpose. But that its accomplishment, at whatever sacrifice of money, is of the utmost importance to our own success and progress as a nation, must be apparent even to the humblest political capacity. If European influence prevail on one side of the Pacific, American *power* must be established on the other. But by power we mean not merely the display of military force; and by progress, not merely the tramp of soldiers. We are neither Frenchmen nor Spaniards; but a plain, sensible, commercial people, with whom military power merely exists for the protection of the civil one. We require fortresses and soldiers merely for purposes of defence—to secure to us the undisturbed reward of our industry; nothing more. Our Pacific coast must not be exposed to the casualties of war; it must not *invite* foreign invasion. If placed in a proper state of defence, the invader will not be tempted.

We have, in another place, alluded to the Isthmus of Suez, and to the consequences which a ship canal across that Isthmus would entail on the *coastwise* trade to India of France and Italy. We must now allude to the consequences which would result from that canal to ourselves. We now receive a good part of our India

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goods from the assorted markets of London and Liverpool; but if the Emperor Napoleon were to introduce the British warehouseing system into Marseilles, we would, after the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez, receive those goods from the Mediterranean. Instead of shipping them a distance of eighteen hundred miles, to London, in latitude 51, to be thence reshipped to the southern latitude of New York, they would be shipped directly from Marseilles; saving time and freight and, in some instances, the deterioration of the goods. France would then be better situated for the East India trade than England; but with a railway to the Pacific, and a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama, the position of the United States would be more advantageous than either, and secure to us, ultimately, the greatest portion of that trade. *So far as the Isthmus of Suez is concerned, our interests are parallel to those of France;* a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama would benefit France and England in other respects; but it would shorten our own commercial route to the wealth of India and China.

We should not consider our task completed, were we not to say a word about Cuba. There may be many conflicting opinions in regard to that Island, and the value of its acquisition to the United States; but this fact stands uncontroverted, that it gravitates toward us, and that its destiny is necessarily connected with our own. If England, with all her wealth and power, her colonies, and the martial qualities of her people, cannot separate her destiny from that of the continent of Europe, how shall Cuba, a mere colony, under the auspices of a distant country no longer exercising any very appreciable influence on the affairs of the world, be able to maintain its present position in the West Indian Archipelago? The idea is preposterous, and cannot be entertained by any statesman of discernment or forecast. The material interests of Cuba would, most unquestionably, be promoted by its annexation to the United States; while the United States would, by its acquisition, undoubtedly increase their wealth and productiveness, if not their military and maritime power. It would add immensely to our material prosperity; but it would, in the same ratio, increase that of the Island, and of the other commercial Powers of the

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world. It would increase our exports; but these would, in turn, stimulate importations from Europe. The manufacturers of England, France and Germany would find new and rich markets for their goods; whilst the operatives they employ would see the colonial articles, and especially sugar, which is now to many of them merely an article of luxury, brought within their reach; adding, thereby to their health and comfort. Viewed in this light, the acquisition of Cuba by the United States is not only a question of political economy to Europe and America, but also one of philanthropy. Under the present government of Cuba, the productiveness is stinted, its revenue goes to enrich a few favorite officers of the crown, or is spent in the maintenance of a large military force, altogether disproportionate to the population and resources of the island.

The point of honor which Spain seems to make in regard to the alienation of the Island, is only fit to be answered by *Cervantes*. Has Spain never lost any territory? Did she not, at one time, possess Holland and the rich provinces of Flanders and Brabant? Has she not lost Southern and Central America and Mexico? Did she not once possess Hispaniola—the present Island of St. Domingo? Did she not hold the Floridas? Whence, then, this maiden pride and bashfulness? Suppose the Cubans were to revolt, and to succeed in overpowering the garrisons; would Spain be able to reduce them to submission? Would we be justified in allowing her to attempt such a task? Spain has now entered a *new* era of her history. She is developing her internal resources, which have once constituted a large portion of the wealth of Carthage and Rome; she is building railways and public roads; she is working her mines, encouraging her manufactures, and cultivating fields which had become deserted by foreign invasion or civil wars. How much better, then, would it be for her if, at this period, she were to increase her revenue from Cuba without incurring the expense of collection—if she were to dispose of the Island for a sum of money, the interest of which would far exceed her present income from it? Her merchants and shippers would lose nothing by the transfer. They would trade to Cuba as before,

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only with increased advantages and without any of the annoyances to trade incidental to the prohibitory system now established in the island. Spain would derive greater advantages from Cuba if it were part of the United States, than she can ever hope to realize from her colony; and would be better able to develop the resources of her Philippine Islands, which, under a wise administration, might be made as productive as the Dutch East Indies. It is absurd and wicked in the statesmen of Spain to interpose such an obstacle to the development of her varied resources; and to consider her pedigree invaded by making a reasonable and profitable concession to a powerful though "upstart" neighbor. We do not want Cuba for a monopoly; we want to open her ports to the trade of all nations, that her products may enrich the whole commercial world. Spain knows that she cannot keep it forever; and that if she lose it by conquest or revolt, her treasury will not receive a dollar by way of compensation. Spain may, at some future time, read us a homily on our "political turpitude;" but had she not better study the history of her own conquests of the Continent and Islands of America, to convince herself of the weakness of her title, and the terrible retribution which her own barbarities have brought upon her head?

But if the pride of Spain does not allow her to sell the Island of Cuba to a foreign country, and especially to the "upstart Yankees," why not dispose of it to her own subjects? Why not propose to the inhabitants of Cuba to acknowledge their independence of Spain, in consideration of a round sum of money, to be paid in coupon bonds, bearing five per cent. interest, to be secured by the revenue of the Island—perhaps guarantied by the United States, on certain conditions specified in a separate treaty. If the Cubans desire it, or if Spain insist upon it, the Island might be placed under the joint protection of England, France and the United States, till its people think fit to form another more natural connection, or until events, over which the Island has no control, induce its inhabitants to unite their destiny permanently with our own. Such a plan might remove the conscientious scruples of the government of Spain,

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save the pride of the countrymen of *el Cid campeador*, and meet with fewer objections on the part of France and England. If Spain understands her own interest, and wishes to raise the necessary funds to extend her chivalrous conquest of the Moors to Morocco, she will lose no time to make the proposition, or cause the proposition to be made to her.

France and England can only desire that we should possess Cuba. It would, as we have already observed, add but little to our military power, either for aggressive or defensive purposes; but it would greatly increase the exchange of products between Europe and America. The holders of Spanish bonds, too, might find their condition improved; while the vast sums which would become afloat in the principal money markets of Europe, would not a little contribute to advance the prices of all other public securities. The British government and the British commercial community, we feel assured, understand their interests too well to advise Spain to persist in her present course; and the Emperor of the French, with his usual masterly discrimination, need only bestow his attention on the subject, to come to the same conclusion. The times in which distant colonies were a source of wealth and power to the mother country, are past, and, with them, the opportunity of profitable investment of capital. The principal profits of colonies were derived from the monopoly of their products—a system now universally condemned, as contrary to the spirit of the age, and opposed to all sound principles of political economy. What would be the commerce of England with this country, if we were still British colonies, instead of independent States? Let Europe ponder on this proposition, and apply it to the case of Cuba. We look upon the acquisition of Cuba as a foregone conclusion, which it is impossible for Spain to prevent, and which does not, in the slightest degree, involve her national honor. Its annexation to the United States is as natural as the annexation of Calais was to France; though, from its imagined importance to England, it nearly broke the heart of Queen Elizabeth. The part of a statesman is not to oppose events which are inevitable; but rather to turn them to good account. There are, as we might ex-

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pect, parties in the United States who, for various reasons, object to the acquisition of Cuba; but their opposition will probably yield to a closer examination of the subject. If the Island be once incorporated into our federal Union, all parties and sections will sanction the acquisition, as has been the case with all previous annexations.

"And what shall become of Mexico?" will be asked by some of our readers. It is now in vain to regret the omissions in the treaty of Peace which followed our first victorious campaign; the question now is, how are these omissions to be supplied? We have certainly treated Mexico with a degree of forbearance and moderation to which there is no parallel in history; but our generosity has not benefited our vanquished foe, and has only served to consign Mexico, whose people, during our occupation of the best part of the country, had, for the first time since their national independence, enjoyed the benefit of equal laws and justice, to hopeless anarchy and ruin. Mexico, as a confederate Republic, may be said to exist no longer. It is already practically dismembered, and divided into a number of small military despotisms, without a shadow of law or order to entitle them to the respect and consideration of the world. *Juarez*, undoubtedly the best man in the country, may or may not succeed in overthrowing the nominal government established at the capital; the fact that he has to operate through generals, and that these are nearly all independent of one another, will strongly militate against the establishment of a strong central government, capable of maintaining itself, for any length of time, against the ambitious and rapacious leaders of faction and their military supporters. To all these evils must yet be joined the antipathy of races, which has always existed where two of them were thrown together under the same government. The descendants of pure Castilian blood have so diminished in number, that it is doubtful whether they will not, in time, be entirely extinguished or subdued by the indigenous and mixed populations; and whether the more civilized among the latter will not, in turn, succumb to the savages.

The future of Mexico is, indeed, gloomy; and our government

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may yet be obliged to intervene to protect our own border population from robbery and slaughter. It is certain that Mexico, in her present condition, would fall an easy prey to any European Power disposed to make its conquest; and it is equally certain that it is only the fear of becoming embroiled with the United States, which prevents the attempt. On the other hand, France and England, and the other Powers of Europe, would hardly object to our seizing the whole of Mexico, provided we succeeded in establishing a government of law and order, capable of protecting industry and commerce, and secured the creditors of the State. On this subject there hardly seems to be a dissenting voice in England; and, with proper explanations, none need be apprehended in France. France does not now export five per cent. of the amount of her staple articles and manufactures which, under a government of law and the principles of free trade, would find a ready market in Mexico; and the Emperor Napoleon is too wise a monarch not to appreciate whatever tends to increase the prosperity of the French people. The civilized world must, indeed, hold us responsible for the continued anarchy in Mexico, if we have the means of arresting its progress, either by diplomatic or military arrangements, or both. This is not so much a part of our "manifest destiny;" but, manifestly, a duty which we owe to ourselves and the people of a neighboring State, who have copied our institutions, before education and experience had rendered them fit to enjoy them. They are like minors, requiring a guardian to protect themselves and others from mischief. Meanwhile, Mexico will make no exception to the historical law which governs the rise and fall of all nations;—she will not stop declining, and will not be regenerated, till a new race, more powerful than any which inhabits that country now, shall establish a new order of things.

As regards the Central American complications, they are about to be settled, in a manner satisfactory to all parties concerned. Mr. Buchanan, while Minister to London, laid the foundation to their settlement, by convincing the government of Great Britain, in the Protocol conducted between him and Lord Clarendon, that the American construction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty is the only

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one which, being reasonable and just to all parties, can be honorably submitted to by the government of the United States. Her Majesty's ministers seem to have arrived at the same conclusion; hence the recall of Sir William Gore Ousely, who, in attempting to drive a bargain, evidently exceeded his instructions. The attempt to overreach, in such a petty transaction, a neighbor, relative and friend, is utterly unworthy a great Power, like England, and was very justly and wisely abandoned. The United States have no idea of establishing an exclusive transit across the Isthmus; and that declaration, which has satisfied the Emperor of the French, and extinguished Mr. Belly's heroic conceptions, might be equally reassuring to her Majesty's government. The railway or canal which, sometime or other, will be constructed across the Isthmus, will be open to all nations; but, as we have the greatest interest in protecting the Isthmus, and as we are nearest to it, it is but natural that, in case such protection be needed, we should be the first to render it.

As to the Central American States themselves, who seem to be so pugnacious in regard to their national independence, we would respectfully remind them that their country—we mean the five small States, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala and St. Salvador—in spite of the fertility of its soil, receives its political importance only from the fact that a great, enterprising, commercial nation requires the right of way across the Isthmus, to reach a portion of her own dominions; and that, without the United States, the Central American States might have been recolonized by almost any European Power. The Central American States never fought for their independenee. Spain, being unable to reconquer Mexico and South America, simply abandoned Central America to its own fate, and thus obliged the people of the former Spanish Presidencies to establish a government to fill a *vacuum*. The true interest of the Central American States now, consists in establishing the most cordial relations with the United States, who are their natural protectors. Their prosperity depends entirely on our success, and on the commercial relations which they may be enabled to establish with our people. Of this they

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seem to be convinced at last, and there is some hope, therefore, that the friendly relations now subsisting between ourselves and those States will be preserved, for their ultimate benefit.

The best government on earth cannot always avoid war, after it has made every honorable effort to avert it. We may find ourselves in the same predicament; and the question naturally arises, what means do the United States possess to resist an attack from a foreign enemy? Neither England nor America raises troops by conscription; and an army formed by voluntary enlistments, through bounties paid to the soldiers, is always an expensive establishment. As far as standing armies are concerned, France, in the facility of raising troops and the cheapness of their support, possesses vast advantages over both England and America; but we have another institution, which more than supplies the want of conscription, and which, by a single signal, transforms the whole country into a *vast camp* of soldiers. This is our volunteer and militia system. The number of our enrolled militia exceeds five millions, and events have shown that our volunteer force can be made to exceed any army which can possibly be sent against us across the ocean by one or more European Powers. Neither are our volunteer soldiers deficient in quality. They are composed of the fighting men of the country—of men familiar from childhood with the use of fire-arms, who take both pleasure and pride in the duties they may be called upon to perform. An American regiment of volunteers may not make the same military appearance as a body of regular European troops; but in martial spirit, in ardent devotion to a cause voluntarily espoused and understood, and in general intelligence, a comparison between it and a regiment of ordinary soldiers, would be an insult to the American people. Our militia, in the rural districts, is composed of farmers, (in the Western States of hunters,) while in the towns it is principally made up of mechanics, capable of doing any kind of work that may be required for the movement of an army or the materials of war. An American militia regiment on the march, may be compared to a moving community; it possesses all the elements of civilization and labor, it

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can supply all its wants, and it can, from its familiarity with the mechanic arts, throw infinite obstacles in the way of an advancing enemy. Compare this to the sluggish disposition of the rural districts of England, and it requires no profound knowledge of military science, to decide between the warlike qualities of our race, and the poetical simplicity of the old Arcadian shepherds. The English plough-boy becomes a fine soldier after a long drill—the French peasant is a soldier from impulse and love of country; but the American husbandman is a soldier from duty and reflection. He is armed for the defence of the institutions of his country; and as his early life, especially in the new States, is spent in a constant struggle with the elements of nature, he is inured to every species of privation and danger. Such men are not easily beaten, if fighting for their own fire-sides; and, if defeated, would, again and again, rally, till the invader were driven from the soil.

Our regular army, to be sure, is not large; but its organization and appointments are excellent, and it is so well officered, that it may, at a moment's notice, be doubled and tripled in number. What our army, small as it is, has already done, lives in history; what is still left for it to accomplish, is concealed in the womb of time. One consideration only may be urged on our general officers, and on the government. We are a commercial people; and, as such, it is natural for us to store up wealth in our seaports. To the defence of these, the energies and valor of our regular army must be directed in time of war—the country will always be sufficiently protected by our volunteers. In the last Russian war, two points only, Cronstadt and Sebastopol, the two principal Russian ports, were threatened; and their defence almost exhausted the resources of the empire. The two corresponding ports of our country, offering strategical and maritime positions of great importance, with great accumulation of wealth, are New York and San Francisco; both which ought to be fortified against all contingencies. No European Power will be so mad as to attempt the conquest of any portion of our vast territory; but it

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may try and surprise one of our great seaports, and, if successful, make itself paid for the expenses of the war. Here vigilance and forecast are indispensable. For the defences of harbors require time—they cannot be improvised after a declaration of war. To them, more than to any other engine of war, applies the old adage:—"In time of peace, prepare for war."

On the composition of our navy, little need be said. Young as it is, as a national institution, it has a historical record which is part of the fame of our country. Our ships are models of construction, our sailors not inferior to any upon earth; and we can command the best men from the crews of all seafaring nations. An American "seaman's protection" is the best passport of a sailor in any port of the world, and the last thing he parts with should he be ever so much distressed. He feels that it is a privilege to belong to our navy; and he is proud of it. Our own population has a most peculiar adaptation to maritime pursuits. Life on the water is as familiar and natural to our people, as life in the woods to our backwoodsmen; and this not only on the seacoast, but on our Mediterranean of Lakes, and on our mighty rivers. Our sea-coast is accessible the whole year round; and its extent, according to the official Report of the American Coast Survey, including bays, indentations, and islands, exceeds thirty-three thousand miles! Our navigable rivers and lakes render our inland population as familiar with steam navigation as the people on the sea-coast; while the trade on those waters, in 1846, according to official statistics, had already exceeded the prodigious sum of Five hundred millions of dollars.* The Mississippi, from the Balize to the Falls of the Missouri, presents a continued river navigation of 4,500 miles! What other people, not even excepting the British, can boast of such natural facilities for becoming a maritime nation; what other people could have improved them to the same extent? We have, indeed, acquired a character, by our amphibious nature, bordering on the romantic; and the tales of our "half-horse and

* Compare the Hon. Robert J. Walker's official Report, as Secretary of the Treasury.

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half-alligator" race are read with pleasure, even by European spinsters.

But it is not so much the number of vessels of war which a nation can arm and render fit for service, as the character of the people from which the ships are to be manned, which determines its maritime power. It is the adaptation of our people to sea-faring life, their familiarity with the elements, their skill and daring on the water, which have astonished the world; while they have swelled our tonnage and made our commercial marine larger than that of England! Should Congress, at any time, resolve to increase the number of our ships of war, we have the materials and the skilful workmen to do it, and the men to man the ships. But we require no extensive fleets to fight regular naval battles (though we have fought these with admirable success on our lakes); we want but to defend our sea-coast and harbors. Our navy corresponds to our army:—it is small, but capable of indefinite expansion. We have besides, in our Privateers, a sort of naval militia, whose efficiency has been tested, and whose achievements are yet fresh in the memory of all sea-faring men. A joint proposition has recently been made to us by France and England, to abandon this branch of our voluntary service; but our government has wisely rejected it. There was no reciprocity in the proposition; for if the making of prizes is confined to vessels of *war*, the largest navy will have the best chance, and, if the war be prolonged, succeed in driving the ships of the other nation from the ocean. The system of privateering, so admirably adapted to the enterprise and daring of our people, makes us a match for any enemy on the ocean; and enables us to inflict the severest blows on the commerce from which his military navy is recruited and supplied. To do away with privateering, is to tie one of our arms while the enemy has the use of two; and we are, as yet, too young to give such odds in a fight. The Powers of Europe need not be alarmed by our adhering to the practice. We are (we cannot sufficiently repeat it) a commercial, conservative people. Our mission is one of peace—not of war. We desire no conquests; we want to sub-

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due nothing that we cannot *assimilate*. Our Constitution contains no such words as "province" or "subject." We do not govern by Consuls and Proconsuls. Equality is at the basis of our institutions—the highest punishment (to use a hyperbole) inflicted on a vanquished foe, is the bestowal on him of all the rights and privileges of American Citizenship! We battle, not to destroy; we conquer but to save. But whatever fate may have in store for us—whatever vicissitudes may befal us as a nation, we shall never forget that we are the children of England (consequently her heirs at law), and that France was our first ally.

THE END.

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The first volume of this work is just published in Philadelphia and London. It contains the letters from A to J, both inclusive, 1005 pages, imperial double column, minion and nonpareil type, about 200 lines on each page on an average, the volume containing upwards of two millions of words. In bulk of typographical matter it is equal to thirteen volumes (470 pages each) of Putnam's edition of Irving's Works, or about fourteen volumes of Prescott's, Bancroft's, or Hallam's Histories, 8vo. The number of Authors whose works are noticed in the first volume is above 17,100; making in the forty indexes (at end of vol. ii.) about 24,100 names, viz:—

	Authors.
1. Agriculture	320
2. Antiquities: Archæology, Mythology, and Numismatics	510
3. Architecture	106
4. Astronomy and Astrology	203
5. Bibliography: Bookbinding, Catalogues, and Printing	120
6. Biography and Correspondence	1170
7. Botany: Arboriculture, Flowers, Fruit, Horticulture, Vegetables	257
8. Chemistry	191
9. Divinity	5668
10. Domestic Economy	55
11. Dramatic Literature	527

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12. Education	472
13. Essayists: Encyclopædias, Periodical Literature	617
14. Fiction: Facetiæ, Novels, Romances, Tales	620
15. Games and Sports	130
16. Geography: Atlases and Charts	159
17. Geology, Mineralogy	89
18. Heraldry and Genealogy	140
19. History, Chronicles, Chronology	1114
20. Juvenile Works: Tales, &c	145
21. Law, Jurisprudence	1272
22. Literary History	227
23. Mathematics: Arithmetic, Geometry, Trigonometry, &c	353
24. Mechanics, Engineering, Railways	141
25. Medical Sciences	1714
26. Moral and Mental Philosophy	487
27. Morals	309
28. Music	180
29. Natural History	305
30. Natural Philosophy	346
31. Naval and Military	510
32. Painting and Sculpture	256
33. Philology	511
34. Poetry and Poetical Criticism	1838
35. Politics: Government, Legislation, Documents and Reports	850
36. Political Economy: general subject and special topics	527
37. Topography	270
38. Trade and Commerce	280
39. Travels	892
40. Voyages	235
Total number of names in the forty Indexes from A to J, inclusive, Vol. 1	24,116
From K to Z, inclusive, Vol. 2, about	26,000
Total number of names in the Indexes of the two volumes, about	50,116

As each of the forty indexes runs through the alphabet from A to Z, this department of the work will probably consist of nearly one thousand divisions, enrolling about 50,000 names. It will be interesting to see at a glance the number of authors of names of common occurrence in the body of the work in vol. i., A to J.

Brown and Browne	175	Hill	67
Clark and Clarke	153	Holmes	24
Green and Greene	83	Howard	53
Davies	68	Irving	17
Davis	48	Jackson	81
Ellis	47	James	48
Gibson	42	Johnson	110
Grant	47	Johnston	35
Hall	92	Johnstone	17
Hamilton	86	Jones	189
Harris	52		
Harrison	52	Authors in 21 names	1586

The number of works recorded, and in very many cases criticised, both favorably and unfavorably, would, perhaps, in the whole work amount to between one and two hundred thousand; but this is a mere surmise, as they have never been numbered.

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The best, because the briefest, description which can be given of the Critical Dictionary, is, that IT IS INTENDED TO BE TO THE LITERATURE OF THE LANGUAGE WHAT A DICTIONARY OF WORDS IS TO THE LANGUAGE ITSELF.

The second volume, which will complete the work, is now more than one-half stereotyped.

From Wm. H. Prescott, Esq., the Historian.

Boston, Aug. 14, 1855.

Gentlemen :—I should sooner have replied to your note requesting my opinion of Allibone's Dictionary of Literature. I have rarely seen so large an amount of matter condensed into so small a compass. The work is conducted on what to me is an entirely novel principle, and presents the reader not simply with the opinions of the author, but with those of the best critics on every writer whose character he discusses. This is opening the best sources of information, while the original contributions of the editor, which connect the extracts together, are of a piquant kind that gives vivacity to the discussion.

The index of subjects will form a sort of *catalogue raisonnée*, that cannot fail to make the book as useful in a bibliographical as in a biographical view. If the rest of the work is as ably executed as that embraced under the first three letters of the alphabet,—all I have seen,—it cannot fail to be an important contribution to English Literature.

I remain, gentlemen, your ob't servant,

W. H. PRESCOTT.

Childs & Peterson.

Boston, Dec. 27, 1858.

My dear Sir :—I am truly obliged to you for so welcome a present as the first volume of your great work. I have read the whole of it with the same care which I bestowed on the earlier portion; and I may truly say that I find no occasion to modify the opinions I have before expressed in regard to the book. I find everywhere occasion to commend the excellence of the plan and the conscientious and able manner in which it has been carried into execution. Indeed, the work may be said to combine in itself a whole library of criticism; and the reader, who sees the scattered rays of opinion concentrated into one focus, carries with him what may be regarded as an expression of the public sentiment on the topic under review.

With my best wishes for the successful completion of your difficult task,

I remain, dear sir, very sincerely yours,

W. H. PRESCOTT.

S. Austin Allibone, Esq.

From Cardinal Wiseman.

London, Feb. 18, 1859.

Dear Sir :—I thank you very sincerely for the first volume of your Dictionary of Authors. I have tested its value in two different ways,—first by looking at the accounts of comparatively unknown or obscure authors hardly to be found in ordinary biographical works, and then by glancing over the history of celebrated ones, whose lives have occupied volumes. Your work stands both tests admirably. I have found more about the first class of writers than I have ever seen elsewhere, and than I could have anticipated in so comprehensive a work; while the interesting points in the literary lives of those belonging to the second are brought out in sufficient detail and treated with sufficient accuracy to render further reference or inquiry unnecessary.

I congratulate you on the success of your herculean undertaking, and am

Yours, very faithfully,

N. CARD. WISEMAN.

S. Austin Allibone, Esq.

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From Washington Irving, Esq.

Sunnyside, Aug. 23, 1855.

Gentlemen:—Accept my thanks for the specimen you have sent me of Mr. Allibone's Critical Dictionary of English Literature. The undertaking does honor to that gentleman's enterprise; and the manner in which, from the specimen before me, (464 pages,) he appears to execute it, does honor to his intelligence, perspicuity, wide and accurate research, impartiality, and good taste. When completed, the work cannot fail to be a valuable library companion and family book of reference. The beautiful manner in which the work is got up is highly creditable to American typography.

Very respectfully, gentlemen, your obliged and ob't servant,

WASHINGTON IRVING.

Childs & Peterson.

Sunnyside, Jan. 12, 1859.

My dear Sir:—I have to thank you for a copy of the first volume of your Dictionary of Authors, which you have had the kindness to send me. It fully comes up to the high anticipations I had formed from the specimen submitted to my inspection in 1855.

Thus far you have fulfilled admirably the stupendous task undertaken by you; and your work, when completed, will remain a monument of unsparing industry, indefatigable research, sound and impartial judgment, and critical acumen.

It merits, and cannot fail to have, a wide circulation, and to find a place in every library. With great regard, yours, very truly,

WASHINGTON IRVING.

S. Austin Allibone, Esq.

From the Hon. Edward Everett, late President of Harvard University, &c.

Boston, Sept. 20, 1855.

Gentlemen:—I have received the volume you were good enough to send me, containing the first three letters of Mr. Allibone's "Critical Dictionary of English Literature, and British and American Authors, Living and Deceased." The plan of the work is extremely comprehensive, and requires laborious research in the collection of the materials, and great care and discrimination in putting them together. As far as I have been able to examine the specimen contained in the volume sent me, Mr. Allibone is performing his task with great fidelity and success. In giving, in the words of the author, the judgments which he cites from approved sources, he has made a great improvement over former biographical dictionaries, which are, for the most part, unacknowledged compilations. Mr. Allibone's work appears to be, to a very unusual degree, the result of original investigation, and, if completed as begun, will, I am confident, be found a most useful work of reference, and an important addition to the literary apparatus of our language. I am, gentlemen, respectfully yours,

EDWARD EVERETT.

Childs & Peterson.

From Hon. George Bancroft, the Historian.

New York, Nov. 17, 1855.

Gentlemen:—The examination of articles under the letter A, in Mr. Allibone's Critical Dictionary of British and American Authors, has led me to form a high estimate of the comprehensiveness and the utility of his design, as well as of the fearless and indefatigable industry, the candor, and the general ability with which he is executing it. His work bids fair to take a very high rank in its own peculiar department. His plan has moreover a special attraction, for it not only presents appropriate information respecting each author, but also a general picture of the impression which he may have made on the public and on his critics. I wish the deserved success to this great undertaking, and

Remain, very respectfully yours,

GEORGE BANCROFT.

Childs & Peterson.

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From Lord Macaulay, the Historian.

Holly Lodge, Kensington, April 19, 1859.

Sir:—Since I wrote to you last, I have had frequent occasion to consult your Dictionary, and I have scarcely ever failed to find what I sought. I have no hesitation in saying that it is far superior to any other work of the kind in our language. I heartily wish you success proportioned to the labor and cost of your undertaking.

I have the honor to be, sir, your faithful servant,

MACAULAY.

S. Austin Allibone, Esq.

From Thomas Hartwell Horne, D.D., Librarian of the British Museum, &c.

British Museum, August 27, 1859.

My dear Sir:—I lose no time in transcribing the following notice, from Vol. I. No. 1, page 8, of "The Literary Record," a new Journal published April 30, 1859, which is now before me:—

"Mr. Allibone has based this dictionary on the Bibliographical works of Watt, Lowndes, Chalmers, &c. Notices are given of seventeen thousand different authors: for which, we learn from the Introduction, the materials have been drawn from some hundreds of books, of which a list has been given. The lives of recent and living writers, are treated with special amplitude; and considering the difficulties to be overcome before such a book can be produced, we think the undertaking reflects credit on the author, and deserves encouragement."

That "*encouragement*" I do fervently hope you are receiving in the United States. I hear but one opinion about the value of your *Magnum Opus*. I find it very useful, here, in ascertaining the Christian names of authors, and in finding out American Anonymes and Pseudonymes.

As my own copy, here, is never to be removed from my table, the junior assistant librarians frequently come to consult your work. I have not been able to collect any new information for you, but I hope to hear that you are advancing towards the close of your arduous labors: on the completion of which, if spared, I shall rejoice to congratulate you and your spirited publishers.

I remain, my dear sir, very sincerely yours,

THOS. HARTWELL HORNE.

S. A. Allibone, Esq.

From Dr. Smith, the Author of The Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography; Antiquities; Geography, &c.

London, July 22, 1859.

My dear Sir:—I owe you many apologies for having so long neglected to thank you for your very valuable present of the first volume of your "Dictionary of English Literature."

Having had, myself, some experience in drawing up dictionaries, I may, perhaps, be permitted to express to you my high admiration of the way in which you have executed the work. I have frequently consulted it, and have always found what I wanted. The information is given in that clear style and condensed form, which are so important in a Dictionary; and you have shown your skill in what you have omitted as well as in what you have inserted. You must have bestowed immense labor upon the book, but you have the satisfaction of having made a most valuable contribution to our literature.

I remain, my dear sir, yours faithfully,

WM. SMITH.

S. Austin Allibone, Esq.

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From Henry G. Bohn, the eminent London Publisher.

London, Sept. 2, 1859.

My dear Sir:—I very much regret that a succession of circumstances has prevented my earlier acknowledgment of your flattering and agreeable present. I was absent when it arrived, and since my return have constantly kept your volume before me with the intention of giving it a critical examination, before pronouncing an excathedra opinion, but have hitherto found this impossible. I have now great pleasure in saying that I know of no bibliographical work of modern times more successfully pains-taking, or more indispensable to the lover of literature. Being fully alive to all the difficulties you have had to encounter, I cannot but marvel at the patience, perseverance and industry, which have enabled you to accomplish so much and so well. I wish I had you as a coadjutor in my Lowndes.

As regards your article on myself, you have picked up some matters which I had all but forgotten, and have guessed my age pretty nearly. Curiously enough, just as your sketch of me came to hand, another appeared in Mackenzie's Biographical Dictionary, so different that the two would amalgamate with very little excision. Yours, my dear sir, very sincerely,

HENRY G. BOHN.

S. Austin Allibone, Esq.

From Charles Dickens, the Novelist.

Office of All the Year Round, No. 11 *Wellington street, North Strand, London, Tuesday, August* 26, 1859.

Dear Sir:—The impression that I duly acknowledged the receipt of the book you had the kindness to send me, is so very strong upon my mind, that I think a letter I addressed to you must have miscarried. I am pained to find, from your letter dated the 27th of last month, that in any case you do not know how highly I esteem the first volume of your excellent Dictionary, and with what pleasure I received that mark of your remembrance. Pray receive the assurance from me now, that I consider your book a very important and valuable one, and that I send you many thanks.

Dear sir, faithfully yours,

CHARLES DICKENS.

S. Austin Allibone, Esq.

From William and Robert Chambers, the eminent Publishers and Authors.

Edinburgh, July 22, 1859.

Sir:—We are favored with yours of the 27th ult., and have to apologize for having neglected to acknowledge the receipt of Vol. I. of your Dictionary. We should have done so at once, but the matter was not brought sufficiently before our notice at the time of the arrival of the book, hence we overlooked the source from whence it came. Permit us now, however, to express our best thanks, and to offer our humble mite of praise, for so extraordinary an undertaking as your Dictionary certainly is. We are as much pleased with the care and mechanical skill bestowed upon the book, as surprised that so much research could be brought to bear upon a subject demanding the treatment, not of one, but of *every* author of importance!

Your labors, collossal as they must have been, and must still continue to be, will, we trust, meet with due reward in time; and none will hail your final success more gladly than

Your obliged obedient servants,

W. & R. CHAMBERS.

S. Austin Allibone, Esq.

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

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